[BRIEF NOTE] Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia
Aug. 13th, 2007 11:59 pmRussian academic and journalist Sergei Markedonov has had a productive day roday, with two articles under his byline appearing in two--"Avoiding the Cubanization of Georgia" over at Russia Profile and "Abkhazia in geopolitical game in the Caucasus" at RIA Novosti. The first article is basically a backhanded compliment to the ability of Georgia post-Rose Revolution government under Mikheil Saakashvili to mobilize international support for his small country through the adroit use of propaganda/public relations, and the second can be seen as a plea to the international and Anglophone community to avoid internationalizing Abkhazia and the question of Georgia's territorial integrity.
On a related note, three predictions about the future of Russia in Georgia and Abkhazia.
1. Russia will not invade Georgia. Granting that the United States didn't invade Cuba in the 1960s after that country nationalized American investments and hosted nuclear missiles, and assuming that Putin and his successors manage a certain amount of realpolitik, Georgia doesn't have to fear an invasion. This is not the Warsaw Pact in 1981, never mind 1956 or 1968.
2. Georgia, while remaining far from EU membership, will edge closer to non-Russian Europe. Fault for this can be blamed on the sorts of sanctions which helped detach Estonia from the Russian sphere of influence in the 1990s, only recently imposed on Georgia, its migrants, and its exports. The European Union and its sphere represents the only other option and, though considerably further from Georgia than Russia, is also considerably larger and wealthier. If it comes down to a non-military competition over influence in Russia's "near abroad," the European Union can only lose if it abandons interest. One might as almost as well expect Mexico to put up serious resistance to the United States sphere of influence in Central America.
3. Abkhazia is going to gain recognition as non-Georgian. Yes, Abkhazia in the 1980s probably had an ethnic Georgian majority population, but those people don't live there in Abkhazia any more and aren't likely to be resettled there in any large number after nearly two decades. It would have been nice if Zviad Gamsakhurdia hadn't mobilized public opinion among ethnic Georgians in such a way as to awaken legitimate fears among the Abkhaz and then accidentally ignited an ethnic civil war that quickly became a Russian proxy war with new state frontiers, but it also would have been nice if Yugoslavia had managed a peaceful transition to multi-party social democratic federalism in the 1980s. Abkhazia exists and, barring an unlikely Georgian conquest, is going to continue to exist.
On a related note, three predictions about the future of Russia in Georgia and Abkhazia.
1. Russia will not invade Georgia. Granting that the United States didn't invade Cuba in the 1960s after that country nationalized American investments and hosted nuclear missiles, and assuming that Putin and his successors manage a certain amount of realpolitik, Georgia doesn't have to fear an invasion. This is not the Warsaw Pact in 1981, never mind 1956 or 1968.
2. Georgia, while remaining far from EU membership, will edge closer to non-Russian Europe. Fault for this can be blamed on the sorts of sanctions which helped detach Estonia from the Russian sphere of influence in the 1990s, only recently imposed on Georgia, its migrants, and its exports. The European Union and its sphere represents the only other option and, though considerably further from Georgia than Russia, is also considerably larger and wealthier. If it comes down to a non-military competition over influence in Russia's "near abroad," the European Union can only lose if it abandons interest. One might as almost as well expect Mexico to put up serious resistance to the United States sphere of influence in Central America.
3. Abkhazia is going to gain recognition as non-Georgian. Yes, Abkhazia in the 1980s probably had an ethnic Georgian majority population, but those people don't live there in Abkhazia any more and aren't likely to be resettled there in any large number after nearly two decades. It would have been nice if Zviad Gamsakhurdia hadn't mobilized public opinion among ethnic Georgians in such a way as to awaken legitimate fears among the Abkhaz and then accidentally ignited an ethnic civil war that quickly became a Russian proxy war with new state frontiers, but it also would have been nice if Yugoslavia had managed a peaceful transition to multi-party social democratic federalism in the 1980s. Abkhazia exists and, barring an unlikely Georgian conquest, is going to continue to exist.