[BLOG-LIKE POSTING] On Talsinki
Aug. 21st, 2009 11:09 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
rfmcdonaldThe gist of this post is that, since the late 1980s, Finns and Estonians have been forming a particularly intimate relationship between their two nation-states, both countries populated mostly by peoples of Finnic languages lying on either side of the Gulf of Finland, this relationship culminating in--among other things--the functional fusion of their capital cities, Helsnki and Tallinn into the community of Talsinki.
Crossborder relations are hardly unique in Europe. Nation-states continue to function, but older zones of cultural affinity and economic polarities power newer integration dynamics within these zones. The entire structure of the European Union was arguably founded to help create a virtuous cycle of prosperity uniting France and Germany, taking particular care to make French Lorraine and the German Rhineland a single unit. This, the prototype of the modern Euroregion, is hardly unique; in northern Europe, even, Swedish Malmö and Danish Copenhagen, separated by the Oresund, have begun to fuse into a single Scandinavian metropolis thanks to the cross-straight bridge.
The Finnish-Estonian relationship stands out, however, by virtue of the differences that it bridges: an established and prosperous First World economy brought into close contact with an aspiring First World economy still trying to leave the Second World behind; a Nordic social democracy against a more rawly capitalist regime; an ethnolinguistically stable society versus an ethnolinguistically riven one. Further, the Finnish-Estonian relationship is complicated by the presence of Russia, unspoken third partner and the historic Other of the two sovereign Finnic nations of northeastern Europe.
Like any two closely related nations, the Finns and Estonians have long had rivalries. As Toomas Hendrik Ilves noted, they've often taken malignant form, but his conclusion, these rivalries in this case leading to a friendly relationship as Mel Huang wrote in 1999 for Central European Review.
The two countries managed by the early 1920s to secure their independence and nationhood in the face of the Soviet Union. How did they compare? On the one hand, Estonia was somewhat richer than Finland; on the other hand, Finland avoided Estonia’s period of anti-Nazi dictatorship under Päts and remained a democracy. Estonia was much less lucky than a Finland that managed to avoid conquest by either of its totalitarian neighbours. Finland survived the Second World War an independent state; Estonia was not nearly so lucky, with two Soviet occupations and one Nazi occupation, complete with mass murders and ethnic cleansings and wholesale flights of refugees. Even in 1989 there were only 90% as many ethnic Estonians living in Estonia as there were five decades previously. Estonia lost its income advantage over Finland quickly thanks to the collectivization of agriculture, the reorientation of trade towards the Soviet Union, and programs of heavy industrialization (often for military aims) which resulted in the additionally problematic resettlement of most of the northeast and heavy Russian immigration to there and the new suburbs of Tallinn. Nonetheless, Estonia retained its privileged position within the Soviet Union as one of the wealthiest republics of the bloc, as part of the "Soviet West," possessing a relatively liberal and experimental political climate; Solzhenitzyn, among others, took refuge in the Estonian university town of Tartu. Too, Estonia was open to Finnish cultural influence, not least because of the ability of Estonians to receive Finnish television in the north of their country and their ability to understand the Finnish language.
Since Estonia and nine other European states joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, the 5.2 million Finns on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland and the 1.4 million Estonians on the southern have found themselves under the same political authority. Almost 95% of Finns are Fennophone, while two-thirds of the Estonians are ethnically Estonian; most non-Fennophones in Finland speak Swedish as their native language, but a growing minority of immigrants in Finland and the near-totality of non-Estonians in Estonia use Russian as their major language, perhaps as many as a half-million people in all. Finland is one of the richest countries in the world; Estonia is the richest in the former Soviet Union, and since independence (but until 2009) converged quickly towards Finland’s PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, regaining the ground lost in the post-independence depression and catching up. There are strong differences in Estonia--the north fares better than the south, urban areas better than rural wells, ethnic Estonians better than Russophones--but overall the picture is one of growth.
How does this affect the relationship between Helsinki and Tallinn? The very closely adjacent capital cities of the only two Finnic nation-states in Europe now lie only an hour's travel away. In the past, there has been a certain amount of interest in the idea of a Finnish-Estonian confederation, apparently more frequently from Estonia than not and more frequently under stress: "Estonia’s president, Konstantin Päts [proposed ] a federal state that would have a common head of state, a common defence policy, foreign policy and currency. He presented this idea only a few months before he was imprisoned and transported to Russia whilst Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union."
There have also been some recentish suggestions, as in this Interfax report, of a formal union of the two cities.
Without a tunnel or any other radical departure in type from the relationships of the past, a vast exchange between thw two countries and capital cities has already taken off, involving everything from commercial helicopter flights linking the two capital cities ("Our goal is for there to be no more than 35 minutes between getting out of a taxi in one city and getting into a taxi in the other city") to a retrospectively ill-judged massive influx of Nordic investment ("Charity and nostalgia have nothing to do with it," he said. "These Nordic companies definitely want a return in the long run. They are here for only one reason: they want to make a profit."). The massive increase in trans-Gulf traffic since 2004, never mind 1989, has obvious repercussions on the human scale for both countries--one news article claimed that a quarter-million Finns, looking for a familiar environment and lower prices, could move south.
There was some discussion of this in the English language in the area, I know. Aleksi Neuvonen's 2004 Estonian Architectural Review study "Helsinki/Tallinn bipolarcity" began by making an interesting distinction between "twin city" and "bipolar city," arguing that a more distanced relationship between the two cities is giving way to one much more integrated.
Jussi. S. Jauhianinen's 2004 "Urban networks between Tallinn and Helsinki -- Talsinki or Hellinn?" is skeptical of the possibilities, distinguishing between a good-case "Talsinki" and a bad-case "Hellinn."
Thoughts, whether on the plausibility of this idea or the ways in which the Talsinki concept is working out or the ways it possibly can't, et cetera, are more than welcome.
Crossborder relations are hardly unique in Europe. Nation-states continue to function, but older zones of cultural affinity and economic polarities power newer integration dynamics within these zones. The entire structure of the European Union was arguably founded to help create a virtuous cycle of prosperity uniting France and Germany, taking particular care to make French Lorraine and the German Rhineland a single unit. This, the prototype of the modern Euroregion, is hardly unique; in northern Europe, even, Swedish Malmö and Danish Copenhagen, separated by the Oresund, have begun to fuse into a single Scandinavian metropolis thanks to the cross-straight bridge.
The Finnish-Estonian relationship stands out, however, by virtue of the differences that it bridges: an established and prosperous First World economy brought into close contact with an aspiring First World economy still trying to leave the Second World behind; a Nordic social democracy against a more rawly capitalist regime; an ethnolinguistically stable society versus an ethnolinguistically riven one. Further, the Finnish-Estonian relationship is complicated by the presence of Russia, unspoken third partner and the historic Other of the two sovereign Finnic nations of northeastern Europe.
Like any two closely related nations, the Finns and Estonians have long had rivalries. As Toomas Hendrik Ilves noted, they've often taken malignant form, but his conclusion, these rivalries in this case leading to a friendly relationship as Mel Huang wrote in 1999 for Central European Review.
The two nations share a similar culture, history, heritage and language. As The Economist has noted, "Tallinn is probably the only foreign city in the world where a poetry reading in Finnish can attract a crowd." The 85-kilometre distance between Tallinn and Helsinki served as another link, as tourism between the two kindred peoples continue to grow. For example, the first international flight by Finnair in the 1920s was made to Estonia. These days, millions of Finns visit Estonia annually; albeit, most are "alcohol" tourists.
[. . .]
Even in strife, however, relations were strong. Many Finns fought with the Estonian resistance, and Estonians fought with the Finns against the Soviets. But the Cold War years reaped financial rewards for Finland as an economic conduit between the two spheres, and the economic difference between the two cousins widened drastically. By 1991 and Estonia's restoration of independence, Estonia was dramatically poorer than Finland -- many Estonians remember that, in 1939, Estonia was richer than Finland and on par with other Scandinavian states.
The two countries managed by the early 1920s to secure their independence and nationhood in the face of the Soviet Union. How did they compare? On the one hand, Estonia was somewhat richer than Finland; on the other hand, Finland avoided Estonia’s period of anti-Nazi dictatorship under Päts and remained a democracy. Estonia was much less lucky than a Finland that managed to avoid conquest by either of its totalitarian neighbours. Finland survived the Second World War an independent state; Estonia was not nearly so lucky, with two Soviet occupations and one Nazi occupation, complete with mass murders and ethnic cleansings and wholesale flights of refugees. Even in 1989 there were only 90% as many ethnic Estonians living in Estonia as there were five decades previously. Estonia lost its income advantage over Finland quickly thanks to the collectivization of agriculture, the reorientation of trade towards the Soviet Union, and programs of heavy industrialization (often for military aims) which resulted in the additionally problematic resettlement of most of the northeast and heavy Russian immigration to there and the new suburbs of Tallinn. Nonetheless, Estonia retained its privileged position within the Soviet Union as one of the wealthiest republics of the bloc, as part of the "Soviet West," possessing a relatively liberal and experimental political climate; Solzhenitzyn, among others, took refuge in the Estonian university town of Tartu. Too, Estonia was open to Finnish cultural influence, not least because of the ability of Estonians to receive Finnish television in the north of their country and their ability to understand the Finnish language.
Since Estonia and nine other European states joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, the 5.2 million Finns on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland and the 1.4 million Estonians on the southern have found themselves under the same political authority. Almost 95% of Finns are Fennophone, while two-thirds of the Estonians are ethnically Estonian; most non-Fennophones in Finland speak Swedish as their native language, but a growing minority of immigrants in Finland and the near-totality of non-Estonians in Estonia use Russian as their major language, perhaps as many as a half-million people in all. Finland is one of the richest countries in the world; Estonia is the richest in the former Soviet Union, and since independence (but until 2009) converged quickly towards Finland’s PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, regaining the ground lost in the post-independence depression and catching up. There are strong differences in Estonia--the north fares better than the south, urban areas better than rural wells, ethnic Estonians better than Russophones--but overall the picture is one of growth.
How does this affect the relationship between Helsinki and Tallinn? The very closely adjacent capital cities of the only two Finnic nation-states in Europe now lie only an hour's travel away. In the past, there has been a certain amount of interest in the idea of a Finnish-Estonian confederation, apparently more frequently from Estonia than not and more frequently under stress: "Estonia’s president, Konstantin Päts [proposed ] a federal state that would have a common head of state, a common defence policy, foreign policy and currency. He presented this idea only a few months before he was imprisoned and transported to Russia whilst Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union."
There have also been some recentish suggestions, as in this Interfax report, of a formal union of the two cities.
A plan for the development of Tallinn until 2025, approved by the city authorities last week, provides for the merger of the two capitals into an entity dubbed Talsinki. Such entities already exist and one of them is a merger between Danish Copenhagen and Swedish Malme.
A more efficient transport system is expected to facilitate the implementation of this plan. Estonian experts have proposing linking the two cities, located 80 kilometers from one another, with an underwater tunnel instead of the current ferry line.
Without a tunnel or any other radical departure in type from the relationships of the past, a vast exchange between thw two countries and capital cities has already taken off, involving everything from commercial helicopter flights linking the two capital cities ("Our goal is for there to be no more than 35 minutes between getting out of a taxi in one city and getting into a taxi in the other city") to a retrospectively ill-judged massive influx of Nordic investment ("Charity and nostalgia have nothing to do with it," he said. "These Nordic companies definitely want a return in the long run. They are here for only one reason: they want to make a profit."). The massive increase in trans-Gulf traffic since 2004, never mind 1989, has obvious repercussions on the human scale for both countries--one news article claimed that a quarter-million Finns, looking for a familiar environment and lower prices, could move south.
There was some discussion of this in the English language in the area, I know. Aleksi Neuvonen's 2004 Estonian Architectural Review study "Helsinki/Tallinn bipolarcity" began by making an interesting distinction between "twin city" and "bipolar city," arguing that a more distanced relationship between the two cities is giving way to one much more integrated.
Helsinki and Tallinn, or Helsinki/Tallinn, could be described as a twin-city in a verge of becoming a bipolarcity. Starting from the fact that Helsinki was founded to become a rival to Tallinn, their development could be imagined to have happened in a bipolar manner, in opposition to the counter part’s development. This would be, however, contrary to the current interpretation of the history, according to which the fate of these cities has been moved along with the kingdoms, empires and power regimes to which they belonged to from time to time. That is to say: polarity was not between the two cities but between larger entities.
We are about to enter new phase in the history: Helsinki and Tallinn are becoming part of the common European integration. They will both parts of the union, sharing a large amount of common laws, common parliament, partly common foreign affairs etc. Unlike the previous times the two cities belonged to the same ruling systems, there is no remote capital to which all the roads end and all the money is collected. At least in principle we live in a de- or
multi-centralised world consisting of complex networks between hubs of different size.
Jussi. S. Jauhianinen's 2004 "Urban networks between Tallinn and Helsinki -- Talsinki or Hellinn?" is skeptical of the possibilities, distinguishing between a good-case "Talsinki" and a bad-case "Hellinn."
From the 1990s onwards the relations between and within urban regions of Helsinki and Tallinn have enormously intensified. The integration of Estonia in the EU facilitates the networking. However, the gradual adjustment of cost differences between Tallinn and Helsinki reduce the current bazaar-economy and relocation of enterprises. In the future, the extreme possibilities for common urban region are progressive Talsinki or regressive Hellinn. These have substantially different impacts on the spatial development of urban regions and on the inhabitants living in-between spaces of flows and space of places. Nevertheless, transparent governance is an urgent necessity to create a common vision for the urban region(s).
Talsinki 2020 is a setting for mutual respect of differences between and within the urban region of Tallinn and Helsinki. The conceptual idea of this common progressive urban region is continuous learning, collective open participation with equal voice and transparent governance. Mistakes of the past in built environment are corrected through careful dismantling and recycling of unwanted infrastructure. Tacit knowledge and social capital are enhanced in cross-border and trans-national grass-root projects voluntarily subsidised by 10% enterprise tax in the urban region. Quality time, work, consumption and environment are valued when people work on average three days per week. A particular institution is the International Talsinki Open University (INTO) with computer-aided synchronous translation of activities into Finnish, Estonian, Swedish, Russian, English and Chinese. The university is well-known by the development and design of intelligent dis/connectable mobile devices and the “fourth way” capitalist economy based on regional production-consumption chains, identity and empowerment.
Hellinn 2020 is a setting for hard-core competitive global capitalism in which citizens are individual clients responsible themselves of their own well-being. The roll-out phase of neoliberalisation converted Hellinn into a market-led commodity consisted of purified consumptory space. The uncontrollable supra-local transformations creatively destruct political-economic space in multiple geographical scales. The political-economic elites of Hellinn promote aggressively economic restructuring and rejuvenation of the urban region based on marketisation, commodification and hyperexploitation of workers. The utopia of unlimited exploitation has led into geographically uneven, socially regressive and politically volatile trajectories that strangulate the urban region.
Thoughts, whether on the plausibility of this idea or the ways in which the Talsinki concept is working out or the ways it possibly can't, et cetera, are more than welcome.
