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rfmcdonaldWindow on Eurasia has an interesting article about the demographics of soldiering in the Volga-Urals Military district (comprising, naturally enough, the Volga and Urals Federal Districts.
The poster makes too much of this. The Volga-Urals district includes large ethnically Muslim populations, most notably but not only the Tatars who live within and without Tatarstan, and as he notes further down the transfer of soldiers between different Russian territories means that large concentrations of religious minorities can show up across the country (Muslims in Kamchatka, say). In addition, it's not unlikely that the Muslim populations of Russia are relatively young compared to the national average, and are relatively more likely to practice their religion than the national average, assuming a greater conservatism and isolation from Russian culture that's increasingly no longer the case.
Most importantly, though, the chaplains don't distinguish between people who might be of Orthodox Christian background and people who are practising Orthodox Christians. Indeed, it's quite likely that most Orthodox Christians in Russia don't practice their religion. Equally, though, the poster's a bit implausible in assuming that this latent identity means nothing, if only because Orthodox Christianity plays such a central role in Russian identity and Islam's incongruous. Why make such a break by converting to a religion that doesn't fit your background or your associates' backgrounds or your general environment? Individual conversions, sure, but one may as well expect mass conversions to Islam among French of non-Muslim background.
Fifty percent of the soldiers in the Volga-Urals Military District who say they are religious believers now identify as Muslims, compared to only 40 percent in that category who say they are Russian Orthodox and another 10 percent who declare they are Catholics or Protestants, according to a poll conducted by that military district.
These figures, gathered by the military itself as it launches a chaplaincy corps, are certain to be controversial. On the one hand, they highlight the impact of demographic change on the composition of the military – an ever-increasing fraction of the country’s 18 year olds is drawn from historically Muslim nationalities.
And on the other, they call into question the self-confident assertions of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin that ethnic Russians are inherently Orthodox and that they are just as likely if not more likely to have retained or recovered their religious faith than members of historically non-Orthodox nationalities.
Yesterday, Interfax reported that a source on the staff of the Volga-Urals Military District said that this was the first time that the number of Muslim believers exceeded the number of Orthodox faithful “at the level of a military district” as compared to individual units where that has happened before (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=34116).
The source, who was not further identified by the Russian news agency, added that despite this dev elopement, there had not been any “conflicts on a religious basis among believing soldiers” of the military district or cases of “a refusal to take the military oath or fulfill military duties on the basis of religious convictions.”
These figures directly contradict those offered by the defense ministry and used by the Orthodox Church for planning its chaplaincy corps. Deputy Minister Nikolay Pankov said that “about 80 percent” of all believers in uniform are Orthodox, while only 13 percent are Muslim. And not surprisingly, Interfax spoke with two experts who sought to play down the new data.
The poster makes too much of this. The Volga-Urals district includes large ethnically Muslim populations, most notably but not only the Tatars who live within and without Tatarstan, and as he notes further down the transfer of soldiers between different Russian territories means that large concentrations of religious minorities can show up across the country (Muslims in Kamchatka, say). In addition, it's not unlikely that the Muslim populations of Russia are relatively young compared to the national average, and are relatively more likely to practice their religion than the national average, assuming a greater conservatism and isolation from Russian culture that's increasingly no longer the case.
Most importantly, though, the chaplains don't distinguish between people who might be of Orthodox Christian background and people who are practising Orthodox Christians. Indeed, it's quite likely that most Orthodox Christians in Russia don't practice their religion. Equally, though, the poster's a bit implausible in assuming that this latent identity means nothing, if only because Orthodox Christianity plays such a central role in Russian identity and Islam's incongruous. Why make such a break by converting to a religion that doesn't fit your background or your associates' backgrounds or your general environment? Individual conversions, sure, but one may as well expect mass conversions to Islam among French of non-Muslim background.
