[BRIEF NOTE] French Christianity, An Immigrant Faith?

The Francophone evangelical Christian website Vox Dei, covering a "March for Jesus" in three French cities (under a thousand demonstrators in Bordeau and Strasbourg, ten thousand in Paris), mentions in passing that the overwhelming majority of the marchers were of immigrant background.

L'ambiance dans les 3 villes s'est révélée excellente et très encourageante, une centaine de décisions pour Christ ayant même été enregistrées à Paris lors de la prédication en plein air par l'évangéliste français Frank Alexandre, bien connu des visiteurs du site web TopChrétien. Excellente, oui, mais très ethnique aussi, fait remarquer l'écrivain et évangéliste Michèle d'Astier de la Vigerie, qui s'offusque de ce qu'il conviendrait d'appeler la tiédeur des églises françaises. Selon elle en effet (voir ci-dessous) il ne se trouverait plus que des immigrés pour élever bien haut la bannière de Jésus en France. Et ce fait est confirmé par l'organisateur de la marche sur Paris qui nous assure que, lors du concert en soirée, l'audience était "à 90% composée d'Africains et d'Antillais". Exagération? Réalité due aux changements démographiques que connaît notre pays? A Bordeaux, ville qui compte déjà pas moins de 7 églises ethniques, la marche comportait également une très forte proportion d'Africains et d'Antillais. Et c'est heureux car sans leur enthousiasme débordant nous aurions fait assez pâle figure ! Au Ciel, les barrières de race et de langues n'existeront plus, et merci Seigneur si nous commençons dès ici-bas à le vivre !

The heavy proportion of African and Caribbean immigrants in French evangelical Christianity isn't surprising, since other sources--for instance Agnieszka Tennant's February article for Christianity Today, "The French Reconnection"--have pointed to the disproportionate presence of immigrants of all stripes in this fairly new corner of French religious life. It will be interesting to watch this religious community's development over the coming years and decades, not least because of the question of secularization: Will it happen?

[ISL] The French DOM-TOM and the EU

It's not every day that the Wayampi people of French Guyana are cited as actors of world-historical importance. The Sunday Times of London has managed to do just that.

Among the Wayampi Indians it is not uncommon for children to give birth at 10 and become grandparents in their twenties. They hunt and fish in red loincloths. Their favourite food is smoked alligator. They are also among Europe’s most civic-minded citizens.

Britain has the Pitcairn islands and the Dutch have West Indian Curaçao, but these cannot compete with the impressive French portfolio of dominions around the globe from the Pacific to the Amazon jungle.

Their 1.4m voters could swing the result in the closely fought May 29 French referendum on the European Union’s constitution and determine the future of Europe, not to mention influence the timing of Tony Blair’s departure from No 10.

The Wayampi do not know him but excitement was building last week at the prospect of playing their part in the politics of the palan isi lena, or the "land of the white man", as Europe is known.

As the somewhat condescending article goes on to explain, the various French overseas territories--bordering the Caribbean, in the Indian and Pacific oceans, and elsewhere--will play an important role in the upcoming referendum on the European Union constitution. I noted last year in my essay on the situation in New Caledonia/Kanaky that the last of the overseas territories retained by France following the decolonization of the 1960s have been traditionally directly integrated into France. This has changed somewhat, as this website on language policy hosted by the University of Laval notes. (My translation follows.)

Since the constitutional reform of 2003, the status of the DOM-TOM has changed in France. The DOM have become DROM (for "Overseas Department and Region [French «Département et région d'outre-mer»]) and all of the TOM have disappeared but the Southern and Antarctic Lands, to make way for the COM (for "Overseas Collectivity" [French «Collectivité d'outre-mer»]). In this last category, one distinguishes the "Departmental Overseas Collectivity" [French «Collectivité d'outre-mer départementale»] of Mayotte and the "Overseas Territorial Collectivity" [French «Collectivité d'outre-mer territoriale»] of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

As for French Polynesia and New Caledonia, for now they hold the status of POM (for "Overseas Country" [French «Pays d'outre-mer»] within the Republic); French Polynesia is still an overseas collectivity, while New Caledonia has a provisional status of "Specific Collectivity" [French «collectivité spécifique»] while waiting for a local referendum to be held around 2014 to decide whether the territory should become independent or remain French.

This decentralization aside, the DOM-TOM remain critical; for, like almost all dependent island territories, the local economies dependent critically on external subsidization. As The Telegraph reports, in a referendum likely to be closely fought the pro-constitution government of Chirac is pouring as much financial aid as it can into France's overseas territories.

"There is a commonly held saying in the DOM-TOM: Tout s'achete' (everything has a price)," an official from France's overseas ministry said last night - a reference to EU aid.

"It is not bribery. Quite simply, we want them to be aware just how much they gain from the EU. The DOM-TOM are micro-economies that cannot survive without subsidies."

Since the beginning of the year, France's minister for European affairs, Claudie Haigneré, has been touring the DOM-TOM on a mission to "educate" overseas voters about how much they benefit from the EU.

"EU money is channelled into almost every aspect of life overseas," said Chantal Cransac, a ministry spokesman. "We want people to be aware of this, so that if they vote Non and lose out, they can't plead ignorance."

In one measure, residents of Martinique, and other departments and territories, have been offered free and subsidised transatlantic air tickets.

The scheme, which uses French government money, will offer students and those those on low incomes a subsidy worth €250 (£180) for a return flight, once a year, between Fort-de-France in the Caribbean and France.

In the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the strong "Yes" vote from the DOM-TOM ensured the treaty's acceptance by France. Will it work in 2005? Watch and see.

[BRIEF NOTE] Why I Have Issues With Allende

Abiola Lapite at Foreign Dispatches links to a story in Der Spiegel describing Allende's 1933 dissertation. Apparently, Allende strongly supported eugenics and enthusiastic stereotyped of Chilean minority groups (Jews were prone to usury, Arabs were thieving adventurers, Italians and Spanish were hotblooded). None of this speaks well of him, and simply observing that this sort of thinking was probably dominant worldwide shouldn't be taken as a vindication of Allende as a good man influenced by bad ideas. My profoundest issues with Allende stem from the circumstances of his election.

Eduardo Frei, a centrist political leader of the Christian Democratic Party, had been been elected president in 1964. With the support of more conservative elements Frei won the presidency with 56 percent of the vote against Salvador Allende representing the Socialist Party and a coalition of other leftist parties. Frei had received the support of more conservative elements because of their fear of an Allende victory.

Frei's term as president from 1964 to 1970 involved some fairly radical programs, such as the nationalization of the Kennecott and Anaconda copper mines. There was also extensive land reform. Frei was trying to gain the allegiance of the lower income groups but in the process he alienated the upper income groups and conservative elements of the electorate.

In the 1970 election Frei did not run. Tomic represented the centrist Christian Democrats. But, as a result of their experience with Frei, the conservative elements did not support the Christian Democratic candidates. Instead Jorge Alessandri ran for the presidency. In the election Allende got 36 percent of the vote, the conservative Alessandri got 35 percent and the centrist Tomic got 28 percent of the vote. Allende had the plurality but just by a bare 1 percent.

Although a runoff election was clearly what was needed there was no provision for it under the constitution. The National Congress had to certify the winner of the presidential race and many urged Congress not to certify Allende but Congress held to the tradition of certifying the top voter-getter. It was generally understood that a candidate receiving much less than a majority did not have a mandate to carry out radical change in the country.

The 1973 coup was a very bad thing. The refusal of Pinochet to restore democracy to Chile for another 15 years shows how little concern the man actually had for civil liberty, and the willingness of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s to support coup-plotters and to recognize their government (produced by a coup staged on the 11th of September, no less) shows a cavalier disregard for civil and politics rights outside American frontiers. (Not that this is unique to the United States, but one always expects more from the self-proclaimed "leader of the Free World.")

For Allende to try to make Chile a socialist state with such a slim plurality of the popular vote, though, was criminally stupid. Establishing a state broadly organized along Marxist principles is bad enough; it's much worse to do so with the support of only a minority of the population in a badly divided country. Having a monopoly on the use of force within the country (i.e. controlling the military) helps, but it doesn't lend the cause any moral legitimacy. Allende might have supported eugenics back in the day, but by far his most important flaw as a politician was his willingness to set all the tinder lying about Chile alight. He might have been a patriot; yet, he inflicted such damage on his country.