[PHOTO] Downtown, reflected in curves

Downtown, reflected in curves
Originally uploaded by randyfmcdonald

I took this in mid-December somewhere near front street, by the CN Tower. Curves, reflectons.

[LINK] "Soccer clubs central to ending Egypt's 'Dictatorship of Fear' "

Sports Illustrated's Dave Zirin makes some plausible-sounding claims.

Over the decades that have marked the tenure of Egypt's "President for Life" Hosni Mubarak, there has been one consistent nexus for anger, organization, and practical experience in the ancient art of street fighting: the country's soccer clubs. Over the past week, the most organized, militant fan clubs, also known as the "ultras," have put those years of experience to ample use.

Last Thursday, the Egyptian Soccer Federation announced that they would be suspending all league games throughout the country in an effort to keep the soccer clubs from congregating. Clearly this was a case of too little, too late. Even without games, the football fan associations have been front and center organizing everything from the neighborhood committees that have been providing security for residents, to direct confrontation with the state police. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Alaa Abd El Fattah, a prominent Egyptian blogger said, "The ultras -- have played a more significant role than any political group on the ground at this moment." Alaa then joked, "Maybe we should get the ultras to rule the country."

The involvement of the clubs has signaled more than just the intervention of sports fans. The soccer clubs' entry into the political struggle also means the entry of the poor, the disenfranchised, and the mass of young people in Egypt for whom soccer was their only outlet.

As soccer writer James Dorsey wrote this week, "The involvement of organized soccer fans in Egypt's anti-government protests constitutes every Arab government's worst nightmare. Soccer, alongside Islam, offers a rare platform in the Middle East, a region populated by authoritarian regimes that control all public spaces, for the venting of pent-up anger and frustration."

Dorsey's statement proved prophetic on Sunday when it was announced that Libya's government had instructed the Libyan Football Federation to ban soccer matches for the foreseeable future. Sources in the government said that this was done to head off the mere possibility that Egypt's demonstrations could spill over the border. The fear was that soccer could be the artery that would connect the challenge to Mubarak to a challenge to former U.S. foe turned ally Moammar Gadhafi.

The critical role of Egypt's soccer clubs may surprise us, but only if we don't know the history that soccer clubs have played in the country. For more than a century, the clubs have been a place where cheering and anti-government organizing have walked together in comfort. Egypt's most prominent team, Al Ahly, started its club in 1907 as a place to organize national resistance against British colonial rule. The word Al Ahly translated into English means "the national," to mark their unapologetically political stance against colonialism. Al Ahly has always been the team with the most political fans. It's also a team that's allowed its players to make political statements on the pitch even though this is in direct violation of FIFA dictates. It's no coincidence that it was Al Ahly's star player Mohamed Aboutrika, aka "the Smiling Assassin," who in 2008 famously raised his jersey revealing the T-shirt, which read "Sympathize with Gaza."

Go, read.

[BRIEF NOTE] Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United States, parting ways

At The Power and the Money, Noel Maurer notes Saudi displeasure with the United States' lack of support for the established order under Mubarak. At one point, the Saudis threatened to replace the United States as the foreign power subsidizing the Egyptian military, if the United States tried to cut things off. Saudi-American perspectives are diverging.

Saudi Arabia has deep links with the United States. The above picture was taken in an Aramco compound in the country; it is no coincidence that it bears a frightening resemblance to the view from my brother’s backyard in Coral Springs, Florida. The nationalization of Aramco was uncontentious, favorable to the companies, and served American goals. Only twice have Saudi and American interests substantially diverged: briefly in 1973 when the Saudis embargoed oil shipments, a stand they rapidly reversed; and substantively in the past two decades with Saudi financing for Islamic radical movements. And to be fair, the Saudis have been increasingly helpful in combatting terrorist finance, although their best is not always that good. “We are trying, but if money wants to go it will go,” said Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in May 2009.

The break over Egypt, though, portends a deeper split. The U.S. has decided that it really does not get much from keeping Mubarak in power. The alternative is not really that scary, and might even be better. Riyadh has decided something different. Now, I do not think that Riyadh is going to get what it wants here, but if you want to look for signs of the American empire cracking at the seams, this is a pretty good one.

I don't know about the cracking of the empire. I do know that Egypt has traditionally been more prominent--economically, culturally, whatnot--than a Saudi Arabia made rich through oil, and that during much of the Cold War period a nominally modernizing Egypt/United Arab Republic was a bitter rival of a traditionalist and pro-American Saudi Arabia, their rivalry escalating to the point of near-open war in the North Yemeni civil war of the 1970s. Might the Saudis fear the emergence of an Egypt that, far from being beholden to Saudi Arabia, might--might--become a regional competitor again?

Thoughts?

[MUSIC] Jesus Jones, "Right Here, Right Now"

Jesus Jones' 1991 song "Right Here, Right Now" has been popping up on my Facebook and Twitter feeds, so I figured that I may as well post it here, too.

"Simulated dendrochronology of U.S. immigration (1830-2015)" (Watch on Vimeo)

The song, the one-hit wonder for this group (a much bigger hit in North America than in the United Kingdom, so it seems), is a sort of panegyric to the time in 1989 and after when the Communist dictatorships of Europe fell and everything seemed possible.

A woman on the radio talks about revolution
when it's already passed her by
but Bob Dylan didn't have this to sing about you
you know it feels good to be alive
I was alive and I waited waited
I was alive and I waited for this
Right here, right now, there is no other place I want to be
Right here, right now, watching the world wake up from history
I saw the decade in, when it seeme
dthe world could change at the blink of an eye
And if anythingthen there's your sign of the times

Alex Harrowell's posts on Egypt at A Fistful of Euros have been filed in the Transition and Accession category at that group blog, the first new posts there since--well--the transitions and accessions of a goodly share of post-Communist Europe to the European Union. So, yes, with the transition of Egypt from Mubarak's dictatorship towards something more pluralistic and functional, a break point has been passed, etc etc.

One thing to note is that the transition from Communism wasn't nearly as pleasant and prosperous as people had hoped at the time, or would like to project retroactively in the past from now. Another thing to note is that the Arab world is far more diverse politically than Communist Europe, with populist presidential republics and conservative presidential republics and autocratic monarchies and nominally pluralistic monarchies, etc, all without any kind of coherent ideological or political union to unite things together. Tunisia's revolution spreading to Egypt wasn't that unexpected, inasmuch as the two regimes were similar, but, well, this is not 1989.

[BRIEF NOTE] What sort of revolution is Egypt's (if a revolution at all)?

There are two links I've been interested in sharing with you, if only to help me out.

"Is there a revolution underway in Egypt?", Understanding Society's Daniel Little asked just two days ago. Using three different paradigms--Hujntington's definition of a revolution as a rapid change in the normative political values and institutions of a society, Skocpol's as the transformation of political and social structures, and Goldstone's of revolution as a consequence of state breakdown--Little concluded that the Tunisian and Egyptian events didn't fit the mold.

Perhaps the most we can say about Tunisia and Egypt is fairly descriptive: these were instances of governmental change forced by a largely spontaneous social movement that erupted into the streets, with very little organization or leadership. Promises of political reform were made in response to the demonstrations, and if these promises are kept, then the movement will have produced some degree of political reform in addition to the successful ouster of the dictator. So popular movements can push the governments of Tunisia and Egypt in the direction of more inclusive democratic political institutions. But this process, and these limited outcomes of political change, seem to fall far short of the idea of "revolution." And, along with the realism that Huntington often expresses about this sort of process, it is entirely possible that these transformations will be hijacked by other groups as events unfold, so that their progressive political goals will be frustrated.

(That was two days ago, I say again.)

Shiko Behar, over at 3 Quarks Daily, quite disagrees.

Are the events we have now been witnessing like the 1919 Egyptian revolution? While my answer would largely be yes, it is clear that present events are considerably deeper than those of 1919. The revolt of 1919 was built from the bottom-up against a foreign British colonial power that had ruled Egypt (since 1882). While more Egyptians were killed in 1919 than thus far in 2011, and while a rudimentary system of parliamentary democracy was forced upon the British occupiers in Egypt – the revolt’s ultimate result did not deliver Egyptian national independence and self-rule. Nor did it deliver a functioning and egalitarian “democratic” elections as elections were consistently rigged by a collaboration between the monarchy and the colonial power against the leading Nationalist movement (the Wafd). Are the events we have now been witnessing similar to Egypt’s 1952 revolution? Here my answer would be no. Events in 1952 were led by young army officers (calling themselves the Free Officers). True, these events did manage to terminate the Egyptian monarchy, oust King Farouk and lead to the emergence of non-democratic military rule (self-described as republican). But the 1952 revolution was – paradigmatically – a revolution from above by armed forces. While the new military rulers did initiate a thorough Land Reform, their actions and deeds did not involve the mass, bottom-up mobilisation that we are witnessing in the Egypt of 2011. Furthermore, Mubarak’s very paternalistic, chauvinist and patronising attitude/tone vis-à-vis “his” people probably have their roots in the Free Officers’ attitude. Egypt in 2011 is not Iran in 1979 if only because Iran 1979 happened as it did! The social forces that produced the events of 2011 are younger, more liberal, more democratic and more global and international that the forces that operated in 1979 Iran. And yes, 2011 is reminiscent of Eastern Europe in 1989. When the Egyptian masses encircled the Presidential Place and the headquarters of Egypt’s National Television I almost thought that we are about to relive a Romanian moment where protestors took control of the Romanian television and later killed dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu.

Lastly, is 2011 Cairo in the league of 1789 Paris? I for one believe that it certainly can be. Both ends came into existence as a result of popular mobilization. There were moments earlier today that I thought that the Egyptian army's initial complicity with the regime may have necessitated an Egyptian mass call "To the Bastille!" Luckily for the Egyptians, 2011 Cairo involved less blood and violence that 1789 Paris. But 2011 Egypt has the potential to introduce popular democratic self-rule and sovereignty to an incredibly important part of the world that thus far escaped it.

What say you?