The uninhabited and possibly uninhabitable Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea are rather less famous than the Kuril Islands, perhaps undeservedly since unlike the more substantial Kurils these islets are being actively disputed by three states, Japan, China, and Taiwan. (Perhaps the actual total should of disputant states is two-and-a-half: China and Taiwan agree that the Senkakus should be administered as part of Taiwan, merely disagreeing about the state Taiwan should belong to.)
Nicholas Kristof got into some trouble with his 2010 blog post arguing that China/Taiwan had a somewhat stronger claim to the islands. I'm completely unqualified to judge. All that I can say is that the Economist article describing the latest stage of the dispute bodes ill, that Shintaro Ishihara's reputation to me is such that he discredits whatever cause he aligns himself with, and that the nationalist flamewar in the comments between Japanese, Chinese, and other nationalists is sadly unsurprising.
Nicholas Kristof got into some trouble with his 2010 blog post arguing that China/Taiwan had a somewhat stronger claim to the islands. I'm completely unqualified to judge. All that I can say is that the Economist article describing the latest stage of the dispute bodes ill, that Shintaro Ishihara's reputation to me is such that he discredits whatever cause he aligns himself with, and that the nationalist flamewar in the comments between Japanese, Chinese, and other nationalists is sadly unsurprising.
In the 1970s Japanese ultra-rightists took two goats on a 2,000km (1,250-mile) trip southwest from Tokyo to a group of uninhabited rocks near Taiwan called the Senkaku Islands. In the absence of humans willing to live in such a remote outpost, the hardy creatures would be the vanguard of a new push to solidify Japan’s hold over the islets, which are also claimed by China and Taiwan.
Now the prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, has signalled a more serious involvement in the dispute, by suggesting on July 6th that he plans to nationalise the privately held chain. On July 11th three Chinese patrol vessels were briefly spotted by the Japanese coastguard in waters near the Senkakus. That led to a flurry of hot-tempered diplomatic exchanges.
Mr Noda’s move is a clear political victory for Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara. In April the famously outspoken nationalist, who has long warned that Japan could become a “colony” of China, announced a plan to buy the Senkakus on behalf of the city. A private fund raised 1.3 billion yen ($16.4m) in donations, with pledges of more. The tailwind behind Mr Ishihara’s campaign forced Mr Noda off a fence on which most Japanese leaders have sat since 1971. That was when China began to make diplomatic noises about what it calls the Diaoyus. Both countries covet the oil and gas reserves believed to lie under the surrounding waters.
Mr Noda’s idea appears to be the transfer to the state of ownership of three of the five islets—along with the vast herds of offspring of those original goat-colonisers. The owners, the Kurihara family, took title to four of the five islands in the 1970s and pledged to keep them in Japanese hands. “It has long been our fear that a private local buyer could be a front for a foreign corporation or owner,” says Hiroyuki Kurihara, who shares Mr Ishihara’s conservative politics—and concerns.
China sees things differently. The day after Mr Noda’s announcement, a spokesman in Beijing called the islets “sacred territory” and pledged to defend them. (Coincidently, this week Apple appears to have removed a patriotic Chinese iPad application, called “Defend the Diaoyu” from its Chinese App store, according to the China Daily, a state-run newspaper.)