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rfmcdonaldBill Emmott. 20:21 Vision, Twentieth-Century Lessons for the Twenty-first Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003. 373 pp.
Emmanuel Todd. Aprs l'empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système américain. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2002. 232 pp.
Whenever I examine the prognostications of pundits on the future, I'm always interested to see where they agree. As a rule, I'm skeptical about long-term predictions, which as a rule have proven themselves to be wrong: My favourite example is that of early 20th century demographers in regards to the French population, which was supposed to decline sharply thanks to below-replacement fertility to less than 29 million when in fact in 1985 there were some 55 million French. Still, when two prognosticators using different methods agree on common factors in their future it should mean something.
Emmott (editor of the Economist) and Todd (a French writer and demographer) agree that, after a tumultuous 20th century in which the United States played a vital role by reinforcing generally liberal regimes worldwide against successive totalitarian threats, the United States has acquired a position of unchallenged dominance. The United States maintains a sophisticated and powerful military capable of global deployment; more importantly still, the United States has a first-class economy, a high level of human development, and a high degree of cultural influence that reinforces the United States' power. There is no challenger: Europe remains disunited and concerned by its demographic problems, China is preoccupied by its pressing need for economic development, Japan is still adjusting to its post-boom situation, Russia is far from reclaiming the superpower role it once had, and there are no other plausible contenders. (Todd is less sure of this than Emmott, but more later.)
The two writers do agree, however, that the lead of the United States is overstated. Emmott notes how, in the half-century after the Second World War, the gap in western European and American GDP per capita fell from 2:1 to 1.2:1, while in Japan's case the gap shrunk still more dramatically from 5:1 to 1.1:1. There is, Emmott acknowledges, the disturbing fact that global inequality (as measured by the gap in GDP per capita between the richest 20 nations and the poorest 20 nations) has risen sharply, and that this is destabilizing the world; he points to economic growth in China, however, and hopeful signs elsewhere in the world, to suggest that this gap will, if not close, remain static. The failure of the European Union and Japan to emerge as powerful global geopolitical actors in their own right is not because of innate European and Japanese weaknesses, but rather because of European and Japanese self-interest pointing away from that. (In Emmott's view, a China which is still short of the late Qing Empire's relative share of global power and wealth, and a Russia that may find its future lying more as a semi-subordinated European Union partner than as an independent factor, can't afford to challenge the United States though mistakes--i.e., a Taiwan crisis--could push China into a disastrous collision.) Todd agrees, placing more emphasis on the disunity of the European continent and Chinese reluctance to risk a confrontation than Emmott. Todd also points out that worldwide, standards of human development (as measured by literacy rates, mortality, and fertility, among other demographic indicators) are rising sharply, even in areas like the Muslim world which are thought of being hostile to modernity; Iran and the United States, for instance, now have identical fertility rates. The preeminence once enjoyed by the United States in the world simply cannot last, not when other countries entirely capable of competing with the United States (and winning!) are emerging.
The critical differences between the two authors lies in their perspective on American power. Emmott believes that, barring systematic decades-long mismanagement and a departure from the liberal policies supported by the United States (in the case of the WTO and other multinational organizations, despite the second thoughts of many American politicians), the United States' role as the preeminent global power is secure. To be sure, there is room for the United States to alienate other powers through its hypocrisies (for instance, its half-century long refusal to countenance a WTO to accompany GATT, and its current demand to exclude American soldiers from the purview of the World Court), but the only plausible way for the United States to lose its preeminence (apart from mismanagement) is the relative growth in wealth and cohesion of other powers. The United States, in Emmott's view, might be declining, but it is far from sharing in the experience of post-Second World War Britain, at least so far. Todd, in contrast, argues that the United States' political elites recognize their country's decline but have adopted (in the wake of September 11th) a set of policies aimed at destabilizing the world, by discouraging the growth of rival powers (discouraging European unification, engaging in a massive military building that no competitors can meet) and by establishing strategic footholds elsewhere in the world (Ukraine and Uzbekistan in the Russian sphere, Taiwan in the Chinese sphere, various points in the Middle East). To Todd, the United States has already departed from its liberal principles; he recalls the example of Athens in the Delian League, once a protector of the liberties of the Greek states but soon an aggressive hegemon that made the League into a Warsaw Pact avant la lettre which drew Sparta into a successful fight against Athens to free the Greek states.
Interpreting the role of the United States in the world is difficult at best of times. I've traditionally considered myself Ameriphile, broadly speaking; I'm quite aware of the United States' malfeasances in the world, but all in all the United States is a good global hegemon. Since Iraq, though, I've become more skeptical: Granted that the Hussein regime was evil, and granted that an intervention was a good thing inasmuch as it dislodged that regime, it seems increasingly clear that the intervention was made under false (or at least mistaken) premises. An intervention against Iraq explicitly on humanitarian issues, rather than supposed WMDs which no one has been able to locate, would have neatly undercut the legitimacy of many (if not most) of the invasion's criticisms. It seems, however, that far from trying to reinforce a fragiel international consensus or engage in coalition-building on legitimate grounds, the Dubya Administration is more interested in the United States acquiring a position of unchallenged dominance. I'm opposed to that on principle: Everyone needs criticism from an equal, or a near-equal, or simply from a group of friends with some standing in your life.
If you accept Todd's premise, then some kind of grand coalition would be a good idea--he suggests a vast and somewhat unlikely Europe-China-India-Iran entente, but a European Union where Britain joined the Franco-German core to share some common points on defense and foreign policy would be sufficient. A vision of a multipolar world, each region more-or-less organized in consensual spheres (Mercosur in South America, SADC in southern Africa, an EU-Russian entente in Europe, et cetera) might be a good idea. I'm not sure that I do accept Todd's premise, though, if only because the policies which he ascribes to the American government (if they even exist) are being carried out very badly. If Todd is right, though, and the United States is departing from its liberal policies towards a more naked struggle from global hegemony, then this confirms Emmott's argument that the United States can only lose if it departs from the relatively benevolent foreign-policy principles of the Cold War and 1990s. Regardless, fascinating books, both of them.
Emmanuel Todd. Aprs l'empire: Essai sur la décomposition du système américain. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2002. 232 pp.
Whenever I examine the prognostications of pundits on the future, I'm always interested to see where they agree. As a rule, I'm skeptical about long-term predictions, which as a rule have proven themselves to be wrong: My favourite example is that of early 20th century demographers in regards to the French population, which was supposed to decline sharply thanks to below-replacement fertility to less than 29 million when in fact in 1985 there were some 55 million French. Still, when two prognosticators using different methods agree on common factors in their future it should mean something.
Emmott (editor of the Economist) and Todd (a French writer and demographer) agree that, after a tumultuous 20th century in which the United States played a vital role by reinforcing generally liberal regimes worldwide against successive totalitarian threats, the United States has acquired a position of unchallenged dominance. The United States maintains a sophisticated and powerful military capable of global deployment; more importantly still, the United States has a first-class economy, a high level of human development, and a high degree of cultural influence that reinforces the United States' power. There is no challenger: Europe remains disunited and concerned by its demographic problems, China is preoccupied by its pressing need for economic development, Japan is still adjusting to its post-boom situation, Russia is far from reclaiming the superpower role it once had, and there are no other plausible contenders. (Todd is less sure of this than Emmott, but more later.)
The two writers do agree, however, that the lead of the United States is overstated. Emmott notes how, in the half-century after the Second World War, the gap in western European and American GDP per capita fell from 2:1 to 1.2:1, while in Japan's case the gap shrunk still more dramatically from 5:1 to 1.1:1. There is, Emmott acknowledges, the disturbing fact that global inequality (as measured by the gap in GDP per capita between the richest 20 nations and the poorest 20 nations) has risen sharply, and that this is destabilizing the world; he points to economic growth in China, however, and hopeful signs elsewhere in the world, to suggest that this gap will, if not close, remain static. The failure of the European Union and Japan to emerge as powerful global geopolitical actors in their own right is not because of innate European and Japanese weaknesses, but rather because of European and Japanese self-interest pointing away from that. (In Emmott's view, a China which is still short of the late Qing Empire's relative share of global power and wealth, and a Russia that may find its future lying more as a semi-subordinated European Union partner than as an independent factor, can't afford to challenge the United States though mistakes--i.e., a Taiwan crisis--could push China into a disastrous collision.) Todd agrees, placing more emphasis on the disunity of the European continent and Chinese reluctance to risk a confrontation than Emmott. Todd also points out that worldwide, standards of human development (as measured by literacy rates, mortality, and fertility, among other demographic indicators) are rising sharply, even in areas like the Muslim world which are thought of being hostile to modernity; Iran and the United States, for instance, now have identical fertility rates. The preeminence once enjoyed by the United States in the world simply cannot last, not when other countries entirely capable of competing with the United States (and winning!) are emerging.
The critical differences between the two authors lies in their perspective on American power. Emmott believes that, barring systematic decades-long mismanagement and a departure from the liberal policies supported by the United States (in the case of the WTO and other multinational organizations, despite the second thoughts of many American politicians), the United States' role as the preeminent global power is secure. To be sure, there is room for the United States to alienate other powers through its hypocrisies (for instance, its half-century long refusal to countenance a WTO to accompany GATT, and its current demand to exclude American soldiers from the purview of the World Court), but the only plausible way for the United States to lose its preeminence (apart from mismanagement) is the relative growth in wealth and cohesion of other powers. The United States, in Emmott's view, might be declining, but it is far from sharing in the experience of post-Second World War Britain, at least so far. Todd, in contrast, argues that the United States' political elites recognize their country's decline but have adopted (in the wake of September 11th) a set of policies aimed at destabilizing the world, by discouraging the growth of rival powers (discouraging European unification, engaging in a massive military building that no competitors can meet) and by establishing strategic footholds elsewhere in the world (Ukraine and Uzbekistan in the Russian sphere, Taiwan in the Chinese sphere, various points in the Middle East). To Todd, the United States has already departed from its liberal principles; he recalls the example of Athens in the Delian League, once a protector of the liberties of the Greek states but soon an aggressive hegemon that made the League into a Warsaw Pact avant la lettre which drew Sparta into a successful fight against Athens to free the Greek states.
Interpreting the role of the United States in the world is difficult at best of times. I've traditionally considered myself Ameriphile, broadly speaking; I'm quite aware of the United States' malfeasances in the world, but all in all the United States is a good global hegemon. Since Iraq, though, I've become more skeptical: Granted that the Hussein regime was evil, and granted that an intervention was a good thing inasmuch as it dislodged that regime, it seems increasingly clear that the intervention was made under false (or at least mistaken) premises. An intervention against Iraq explicitly on humanitarian issues, rather than supposed WMDs which no one has been able to locate, would have neatly undercut the legitimacy of many (if not most) of the invasion's criticisms. It seems, however, that far from trying to reinforce a fragiel international consensus or engage in coalition-building on legitimate grounds, the Dubya Administration is more interested in the United States acquiring a position of unchallenged dominance. I'm opposed to that on principle: Everyone needs criticism from an equal, or a near-equal, or simply from a group of friends with some standing in your life.
If you accept Todd's premise, then some kind of grand coalition would be a good idea--he suggests a vast and somewhat unlikely Europe-China-India-Iran entente, but a European Union where Britain joined the Franco-German core to share some common points on defense and foreign policy would be sufficient. A vision of a multipolar world, each region more-or-less organized in consensual spheres (Mercosur in South America, SADC in southern Africa, an EU-Russian entente in Europe, et cetera) might be a good idea. I'm not sure that I do accept Todd's premise, though, if only because the policies which he ascribes to the American government (if they even exist) are being carried out very badly. If Todd is right, though, and the United States is departing from its liberal policies towards a more naked struggle from global hegemony, then this confirms Emmott's argument that the United States can only lose if it departs from the relatively benevolent foreign-policy principles of the Cold War and 1990s. Regardless, fascinating books, both of them.
