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rfmcdonaldThe Siberian Curse, by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003.
Geographically, Russia is a northern country, like the nation-states of Norden, Canada, and even (to a certain degree, anyway) the United States. Outside of the steppes and plains of the south, Russia's natural environment is characterized by coniferous taiga and intense cold, particularly during winter. In Russia, however, unlike in any of its other northern counterparts, large numbers of people--tens of millions--live in the north, in cities home to hundreds of thousands of people located in fairly inhospitable climes.
Even before the Russian Revolution, Russia was a cold country compared to its European neighbours; most of Russia's major cities and industrial areas were located in the country's west and south. (Many, incidentally, like Rîga in Latvia, Kiev and Odesa in Ukraine, and Baku in Azerbaijan, were located in non-Russian areas now free of Moscow.) Hill and Gaddy's thesis is that Soviet planners had a misguided belief in the ability of Siberia--certainly quite rich in natural resources--to affordably supply the Soviet Union's industrialization. To this end, they encouraged massive industrialization and colonization efforts, building massive mining and industrial complexes not only in the relatively hospitable south of Siberia, but in inhospitable northern Siberia and the Russian Far East.
These investments were unproductive in the long run, of course; but then, the Soviet Union was never run by very good economists. Many of the new cities built by the Soviet Union in the far North and Far East were constructed using slave labour from the gulags; Vorkuta's coal mines, for instance, were opened up by expendable prisoners. This initiated a general trend of massive Soviet subsidies to northern settlements, distributed from the relatively populous and rich (and warm) areas of the western Soviet Union towards Siberia, whether in through massive central government investments or through the recruitment of skilled labourers with promises of high wages.
Needless to say, this all stopped when the Soviet Union broke up and the Russian economy collapsed. The centres of the far North and the Far East were particularly vulnerable to this collapse, given their extreme dependence on external subsidies. The demographic collapse which occurred across Russia was particularly acute in these regions--the most dramatic scenario was that of Chuchotka, where the population dropped by two-thirds since the 1989 Soviet census. Hill and Gaddy argue that the existingoutflow of population is not nearly enough, that given Russia's below-replacement fertility rate, high death rate, and flagging immigation, it needs to concentrate as much of its population as possible--particularly its working-age population in more hospitable and economically profitable centres in the south and west. They point to the rapid growth of Moscow--from nine million people in Soviet times to an estimated 13 million now--as proof of the immense potential for migration that could be unleashed, if only it was legally possible and financially affordable for Siberians to move.
(Incidentally, the authors are skeptical about the prospects of immigration boosting the region's population, for instance of Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East (as![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
satyadasa, optimussven and I discussed a while ago) or of Central Asian immigration into western Siberia. They believe that these immigrants are attracted by decaying regional Soviet-era economies' last few opportunities, and that the final decomposition of the economy will discourage future immigration. At most, they suggest that ghettoes of stranded immigrants might form, left behind by the decay of local industries.)
Their arguments are convincing, and reflect a worldwide trend towards the consolidation and marginalization of unprofitable regional economies. I'm reminded of the Toronto Star's recent story on the problems faced by the Cree of Québec, as they try to develop a viable First World economy in northern Québec, an area with a climate roughly similar to that of Siberia. I've argued myself, in my essays on space colonization (parts one, two, three, four, five, and six are all online), that the colonization of marginal environments will require massive (and generally unprofitable) investments by governments ideologically committed to settlement. If anything, Siberia will be more profitable than Mars, at least until technology advances to the point to make the settlement of either environment affordable, over the long run, at least.
Geographically, Russia is a northern country, like the nation-states of Norden, Canada, and even (to a certain degree, anyway) the United States. Outside of the steppes and plains of the south, Russia's natural environment is characterized by coniferous taiga and intense cold, particularly during winter. In Russia, however, unlike in any of its other northern counterparts, large numbers of people--tens of millions--live in the north, in cities home to hundreds of thousands of people located in fairly inhospitable climes.
Even before the Russian Revolution, Russia was a cold country compared to its European neighbours; most of Russia's major cities and industrial areas were located in the country's west and south. (Many, incidentally, like Rîga in Latvia, Kiev and Odesa in Ukraine, and Baku in Azerbaijan, were located in non-Russian areas now free of Moscow.) Hill and Gaddy's thesis is that Soviet planners had a misguided belief in the ability of Siberia--certainly quite rich in natural resources--to affordably supply the Soviet Union's industrialization. To this end, they encouraged massive industrialization and colonization efforts, building massive mining and industrial complexes not only in the relatively hospitable south of Siberia, but in inhospitable northern Siberia and the Russian Far East.
These investments were unproductive in the long run, of course; but then, the Soviet Union was never run by very good economists. Many of the new cities built by the Soviet Union in the far North and Far East were constructed using slave labour from the gulags; Vorkuta's coal mines, for instance, were opened up by expendable prisoners. This initiated a general trend of massive Soviet subsidies to northern settlements, distributed from the relatively populous and rich (and warm) areas of the western Soviet Union towards Siberia, whether in through massive central government investments or through the recruitment of skilled labourers with promises of high wages.
Needless to say, this all stopped when the Soviet Union broke up and the Russian economy collapsed. The centres of the far North and the Far East were particularly vulnerable to this collapse, given their extreme dependence on external subsidies. The demographic collapse which occurred across Russia was particularly acute in these regions--the most dramatic scenario was that of Chuchotka, where the population dropped by two-thirds since the 1989 Soviet census. Hill and Gaddy argue that the existingoutflow of population is not nearly enough, that given Russia's below-replacement fertility rate, high death rate, and flagging immigation, it needs to concentrate as much of its population as possible--particularly its working-age population in more hospitable and economically profitable centres in the south and west. They point to the rapid growth of Moscow--from nine million people in Soviet times to an estimated 13 million now--as proof of the immense potential for migration that could be unleashed, if only it was legally possible and financially affordable for Siberians to move.
(Incidentally, the authors are skeptical about the prospects of immigration boosting the region's population, for instance of Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East (as
satyadasa, optimussven and I discussed a while ago) or of Central Asian immigration into western Siberia. They believe that these immigrants are attracted by decaying regional Soviet-era economies' last few opportunities, and that the final decomposition of the economy will discourage future immigration. At most, they suggest that ghettoes of stranded immigrants might form, left behind by the decay of local industries.)Their arguments are convincing, and reflect a worldwide trend towards the consolidation and marginalization of unprofitable regional economies. I'm reminded of the Toronto Star's recent story on the problems faced by the Cree of Québec, as they try to develop a viable First World economy in northern Québec, an area with a climate roughly similar to that of Siberia. I've argued myself, in my essays on space colonization (parts one, two, three, four, five, and six are all online), that the colonization of marginal environments will require massive (and generally unprofitable) investments by governments ideologically committed to settlement. If anything, Siberia will be more profitable than Mars, at least until technology advances to the point to make the settlement of either environment affordable, over the long run, at least.
