More on Economics
Dec. 24th, 2002 04:17 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
rfmcdonaldI'll continue here the dialogue between ebeloic and myself. It began with a post on my livejournal, followed by ebeloic's excellent reply on his livejournal. I'll try to respond without embarassing myself. Jeremy's quotes in blockquote and italics.
The term, I believe, has some validity, if only because we (as in the developed countries, and not a few of the underdeveloped countries) can produce large agricultural surpluses using only a tiny fraction of the labour force and a smaller fraction of the land area once required for minimal levels of subsistence. Protectionism in these countries allows their capital- and technology-intensive agriculture to largely avoid competition with agricultural exports from underdeveloped countries. I'm not sure that developing countries export many agriculture goods to developed countries apart from crops which developed countries can't grow for climatic reasons.
It does that, yes, but I'd also argue that the perception of global inequality does play a major role in encouraging people in these societies to turn and blame the core economies for their problems and global inequities. The very poorest countries, only partially integrated into the global economy, seem to care less than the countries on the semiperiphery, particularly those semiperipheral countries which perceive themselves (or at least have perceived themselves) to be culturally distinct from the developed countries. Earlier in the 20th century, it was the semiperipheral contries of Russia, China and Mexico which underwent radical political revolutions explicitly aimed at detaching themselves from the capitalist core as a prelude to the general reconstruction of the global economy; now, early in the 21st century, while relatively few countries advocate like policies, nationalist and religious sentiment in a collection of semiperipheral countries like China and Saudi Arabia would seem to favour their countries (or religious groups) inheriting leadership of the global economy.
Agreed; my imprecision of language, here. Egalitarian in the limited sense that widely different standards of living didn't prevail worldwide, and the cores of different regional economies (the European, the Islamic, the Indian, the Chinese, the Japanese) enjoyed much the same standards of living and levels of economic development.
It's interesting to note that England and the Netherlands were relatively late developers and that until the Renaissance period they were semiperipheral to the Carolingian core of the European economy (and before that, the Mediterranean core of the Roman economy). Compare Prussia's triumph over Austria in the German states, or Japan's precocious industrialization relative to China.
Sorry, typo.
It was.
I disagree, in that I think that the global economy can be described as semi-free, if only because corporations from different countries can enthusiastically collaborate with their peers elsewhere in the world--in developed countries, in developing countries--to exploit resources and workers worldwide, and because the end of formal colonial empires allows for the formation of authentically multinational blocs like the European Union and for somewhat increased freedom of action for semiperipheral countries, in being able to secure entry into these blocs on relatively beneficial terms. So far as I know, in the belle époque--the generation before the First World War--semiperipheral countries and areas weren't able to command this sort of power.
Too, despite all of the regulations hindering the establishment of a truly free global economy, technology and the emerging global division of labour (in industrial goods, at least) has produced a global economy substantially freer than during the Cold War, or in the confused interwar years. There are no more colonial empires which hold the resources and workforces of subject territories as property of the colonial metropole and its collaborators; there is, despite considerable restrictions, a considerable flow of immigrants from poor to rich countries (wealth being determined in relative terms); there has been a substantial diffusion of advanced technology far beyond the North Atlantic core of the belle époque's global economy; the potential exists, in short, for a world economy where power is relatively evenly distributed.
I was thinking of the possibility for the exploitation of immigrants as inexpensive labour in developed countries, with Saudi Arabia as an extreme example. In a world where labourers can migrate freely between countries, unskilled labour would be quite inexpensive, particularly in developed countries which are already suffering shortages of unskilled labourers. It doesn't seem entirely impossible that immigrant-receiving societies could be divided between prosperous natives and relatively poorer immigrants.
1: "post-industrialism?" no. that is one of the bigger neo-liberal myths (i should say, lies) in circulation. the leading "capitalist" (really corporativist) nations can only pretend to be post-industrial in the same sense that feudal aristocrats could pretend to be post-agricultural – we simply have someone else do the dirty work and live off the spoils.
The term, I believe, has some validity, if only because we (as in the developed countries, and not a few of the underdeveloped countries) can produce large agricultural surpluses using only a tiny fraction of the labour force and a smaller fraction of the land area once required for minimal levels of subsistence. Protectionism in these countries allows their capital- and technology-intensive agriculture to largely avoid competition with agricultural exports from underdeveloped countries. I'm not sure that developing countries export many agriculture goods to developed countries apart from crops which developed countries can't grow for climatic reasons.
2: are you so sure that it's the inequality that causes the instability? is it not that the inequality simply exacerbates the already-existing social problems (tribal warfare, aristocracy, violent crime, intolerance) that prevented these societies from liberalizing (not necessarily industrializing, which is the effect of liberal policies, not the cause) in the first place?
It does that, yes, but I'd also argue that the perception of global inequality does play a major role in encouraging people in these societies to turn and blame the core economies for their problems and global inequities. The very poorest countries, only partially integrated into the global economy, seem to care less than the countries on the semiperiphery, particularly those semiperipheral countries which perceive themselves (or at least have perceived themselves) to be culturally distinct from the developed countries. Earlier in the 20th century, it was the semiperipheral contries of Russia, China and Mexico which underwent radical political revolutions explicitly aimed at detaching themselves from the capitalist core as a prelude to the general reconstruction of the global economy; now, early in the 21st century, while relatively few countries advocate like policies, nationalist and religious sentiment in a collection of semiperipheral countries like China and Saudi Arabia would seem to favour their countries (or religious groups) inheriting leadership of the global economy.
1: i never said the pre-industrial world was "egalitarian." what i said was that all countries had comparable standards of living – the conditions between countries were not as extremely different as they are today.
Agreed; my imprecision of language, here. Egalitarian in the limited sense that widely different standards of living didn't prevail worldwide, and the cores of different regional economies (the European, the Islamic, the Indian, the Chinese, the Japanese) enjoyed much the same standards of living and levels of economic development.
that said, there were advocates of liberal policies before the classical economists – they were far rarer and far less consistent in the application of the ideas. to find the real beginnings of the spread of liberalism you have to go back to the renaissance, which is largely characterized by the adoption of (comparatively) more liberal policies in england, in the netherlands, in venice and tuscany. it is only at this time that you see the developing inequality that created the powerhouse nations, and the retardation that prevented other countries from being able to match these commercial peoples.
It's interesting to note that England and the Netherlands were relatively late developers and that until the Renaissance period they were semiperipheral to the Carolingian core of the European economy (and before that, the Mediterranean core of the Roman economy). Compare Prussia's triumph over Austria in the German states, or Japan's precocious industrialization relative to China.
i don't know what you mean by "the creation of the welfare state abroad."
Sorry, typo.
the welfare state was created by the developed nations – it was all pioneered under bismarck (more in the tradition of polizeiwissenschaft than of liberalism). in fact, could the welfare state have ever existed without liberalism? were feudal serfs in any position to lobby for privileges in an organized manner or on a mass scale?
In the half-century after the Black Death, when labour was scarce but the efforts of the peasants to command higher wages were countermanded by state legislation limiting wage increases, the potential did exist.
was it not their comparative prosperity and early steps out of poverty over the 19th century that gave them the time and resources to demand more?
It was.
our global economy is not "semi-free" – it's not free at all. this is the number one lie of neo-liberalism: that american or european "free trade" represents a free market. in fact, what it means is that domestic corporations (each of which is established by law and has special statutory privileges that do not derive from its basic economic function as a firm, rights and prerogatives that don't derive from the specific rights of the individual participants) are no longer prevented by local laws from going overseas and making deals with, say, the army or a rebel group in a "developing" nation. if any of these foreign parties were ever interested in the prosperity of their citizens rather than pure power (which is doubtful in all but a few cases, like the Phillipines or Mexico), they let themselves be cowed by the carrot of "trickledown." All they have to do, the corporations say, is give corporations special privileges and take away the basic rights of the citizens, or at least suspend them in certain circumstances (like within the confines of a maquilladora).
i agree that the inclusive function of the global economy is hindered by the limits on free trade and migration. i just think those limits are a lot more pervasive than you characterize them as being – so pervasive that it doesn't even make sense to say our economy is "semi-free." it's not free at all.
I disagree, in that I think that the global economy can be described as semi-free, if only because corporations from different countries can enthusiastically collaborate with their peers elsewhere in the world--in developed countries, in developing countries--to exploit resources and workers worldwide, and because the end of formal colonial empires allows for the formation of authentically multinational blocs like the European Union and for somewhat increased freedom of action for semiperipheral countries, in being able to secure entry into these blocs on relatively beneficial terms. So far as I know, in the belle époque--the generation before the First World War--semiperipheral countries and areas weren't able to command this sort of power.
Too, despite all of the regulations hindering the establishment of a truly free global economy, technology and the emerging global division of labour (in industrial goods, at least) has produced a global economy substantially freer than during the Cold War, or in the confused interwar years. There are no more colonial empires which hold the resources and workforces of subject territories as property of the colonial metropole and its collaborators; there is, despite considerable restrictions, a considerable flow of immigrants from poor to rich countries (wealth being determined in relative terms); there has been a substantial diffusion of advanced technology far beyond the North Atlantic core of the belle époque's global economy; the potential exists, in short, for a world economy where power is relatively evenly distributed.
why on earth would wealth distribution return to that of internal class distinction?
I was thinking of the possibility for the exploitation of immigrants as inexpensive labour in developed countries, with Saudi Arabia as an extreme example. In a world where labourers can migrate freely between countries, unskilled labour would be quite inexpensive, particularly in developed countries which are already suffering shortages of unskilled labourers. It doesn't seem entirely impossible that immigrant-receiving societies could be divided between prosperous natives and relatively poorer immigrants.
