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rfmcdonaldReadinhg John J. Reilly's blog last week, I came across an interesting note on what he identified as the embrace of Eurasianism by the National Interest. Reilly defines as the "proposition that United States should begin to accommodate itself to a world in which it will take second place to a Eurasian constellation of powers, or at best become a peer in a multipolar world." He goes on to cite three factors weighing against the likelihood of such a substantial American decline.
The last factor is, I feel safe in arguing, a mirage. As I've demonstrated earlier, Muslims in France are not poised for a takeover of France, demographic or otherwise. The influxes of immigrants into Italy and Spain, meanwhile, are easily more Latin American and eastern European than they are Maghrebin, while the only scenarios that would create a much larger Muslim minority in the Netherlands are unlikely indeed (1, 2). Given popular policies hostility towards immigration and Turkish membership in the European Union on top of these demographic realities, the only way that anything approaching Eurabia could possibly exist would require the subordination of the states on the southern and eastern Mediterranean to the European Union, as sources of fuel, other natural resources, and cheap labour (outsourced or imported). Not that it could be otherwise, considering that it's Europe that has the wealthy markets, the advanced technologies, and the abundant capital resources that the Arab world generally lacks. If anything, if it ever happened the peaceful integration of the non-European Mediterranean into the European Union's commercial and otherwise should be celebrated. Better that, surely, than another world war.
The first two factors that Reilly cites, mind, are entirely accurate. Even if the European Union ever managed to transform itself from a network into a coherent state--note the hugeness of this assumption, something I choose to mention in passing for lack of time and space--it still faces more difficult demographic circumstances than the United States, with lower fertility rates and more controversial immigration trends (as the Eurabia fuss demonstrates). Continued growth in some countries (Britain, France, Spain) will be more than counterbalanced by sharp declines in others (Germany, Italy, Poland). With the economic sequelae in this unhappy second class of countries to aging populations and contracting workforces, it would be impractical for Europeans to want to make the European Union as much of a superpower as the United States, never mind to make the Union a competitor. The current good cop/bad cop routine played by the United States and Europeans seems to be the apogee of European aims.
The European Union is the only entity in the world with a population and economy in the same range as that of the United States. If the EU can't do it, how can others seriously challenge the United States? The BRIC combination (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is frequently mentioned, but these countries have their own serious internal problems and are much further behind the United States than even the worst-off major EU member-state. Besides, it won't be long until these countries face demographic problems at least as severe as anything the European Union faces; Russia's already worse off. Much the same can be said of all of the second-tier countries--Mexico and Argentina in Latin America, Iran and Turkey and perhaps Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, Pakistan and Thailand and Indonesia and Vietnam and South Korea in Asia--that could, if things work as these countries might hope, manage to advance significantly relative to the United States.
Even if this progress did take place and, by 2050, half (say) of these countries were as well of relative to the United States as Spain or South Korea are now, what would it change? Spain's prominent on the strength of its ties to Latin America and Europe, and South Korea is a major trading power. Neither state is a military power; neither state is run by people interested in challenging American primacy save on certain local issues; neither is likely to, or capable of doing so. Adding more countries like Spain and South Korea to the world would certainly limit American maneuvering power, but it wouldn't undermine it. Barring some catastrophe, the United States in 2050 would still be uniquely populous, with a population of around 400 million that would compare nicely, in terms of size and age to that of the European Union, and would be substantially wealthier and more internally unified in the bargain. Besides, the United States already has a huge technological advantage over the rest of the world that it's difficult to imagine anyone catching up, or wanting to catch up. The only thing to be hoped of in that regard, if you're expecting the United States to decline sharply, is to imagine that the late adopters might have an advantage in the long run.
Bismarck said that the signal geopolitical reality of his time was the fact that the English language dominated North America. The same could be said of the 20th century; the same will doubtless be said of the 21st. We're stuck with the States, folks, for good and for bad. The United States is just too powerful to ever be dismissed as some people suspect it will be; its relative decline can only go so far.
(1) The demographic decline of China and Europe;
(2) Strategic missile defense
(3) Eurabia.
The last factor is, I feel safe in arguing, a mirage. As I've demonstrated earlier, Muslims in France are not poised for a takeover of France, demographic or otherwise. The influxes of immigrants into Italy and Spain, meanwhile, are easily more Latin American and eastern European than they are Maghrebin, while the only scenarios that would create a much larger Muslim minority in the Netherlands are unlikely indeed (1, 2). Given popular policies hostility towards immigration and Turkish membership in the European Union on top of these demographic realities, the only way that anything approaching Eurabia could possibly exist would require the subordination of the states on the southern and eastern Mediterranean to the European Union, as sources of fuel, other natural resources, and cheap labour (outsourced or imported). Not that it could be otherwise, considering that it's Europe that has the wealthy markets, the advanced technologies, and the abundant capital resources that the Arab world generally lacks. If anything, if it ever happened the peaceful integration of the non-European Mediterranean into the European Union's commercial and otherwise should be celebrated. Better that, surely, than another world war.
The first two factors that Reilly cites, mind, are entirely accurate. Even if the European Union ever managed to transform itself from a network into a coherent state--note the hugeness of this assumption, something I choose to mention in passing for lack of time and space--it still faces more difficult demographic circumstances than the United States, with lower fertility rates and more controversial immigration trends (as the Eurabia fuss demonstrates). Continued growth in some countries (Britain, France, Spain) will be more than counterbalanced by sharp declines in others (Germany, Italy, Poland). With the economic sequelae in this unhappy second class of countries to aging populations and contracting workforces, it would be impractical for Europeans to want to make the European Union as much of a superpower as the United States, never mind to make the Union a competitor. The current good cop/bad cop routine played by the United States and Europeans seems to be the apogee of European aims.
The European Union is the only entity in the world with a population and economy in the same range as that of the United States. If the EU can't do it, how can others seriously challenge the United States? The BRIC combination (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is frequently mentioned, but these countries have their own serious internal problems and are much further behind the United States than even the worst-off major EU member-state. Besides, it won't be long until these countries face demographic problems at least as severe as anything the European Union faces; Russia's already worse off. Much the same can be said of all of the second-tier countries--Mexico and Argentina in Latin America, Iran and Turkey and perhaps Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, Pakistan and Thailand and Indonesia and Vietnam and South Korea in Asia--that could, if things work as these countries might hope, manage to advance significantly relative to the United States.
Even if this progress did take place and, by 2050, half (say) of these countries were as well of relative to the United States as Spain or South Korea are now, what would it change? Spain's prominent on the strength of its ties to Latin America and Europe, and South Korea is a major trading power. Neither state is a military power; neither state is run by people interested in challenging American primacy save on certain local issues; neither is likely to, or capable of doing so. Adding more countries like Spain and South Korea to the world would certainly limit American maneuvering power, but it wouldn't undermine it. Barring some catastrophe, the United States in 2050 would still be uniquely populous, with a population of around 400 million that would compare nicely, in terms of size and age to that of the European Union, and would be substantially wealthier and more internally unified in the bargain. Besides, the United States already has a huge technological advantage over the rest of the world that it's difficult to imagine anyone catching up, or wanting to catch up. The only thing to be hoped of in that regard, if you're expecting the United States to decline sharply, is to imagine that the late adopters might have an advantage in the long run.
Bismarck said that the signal geopolitical reality of his time was the fact that the English language dominated North America. The same could be said of the 20th century; the same will doubtless be said of the 21st. We're stuck with the States, folks, for good and for bad. The United States is just too powerful to ever be dismissed as some people suspect it will be; its relative decline can only go so far.
