Good bye, Mr. Blair
Jan. 23rd, 2003 12:05 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
rfmcdonaldFrom the conservative and not-occasionally silly (thanks Conrad Black!) but still interesting Jerusalem Post:
Jan. 23, 2003
France, Germany give Britain the elbow, By DOUGLAS DAVIS
Germany and France were, not for the first time, marching in lock-step this week as Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Jacques Chirac loudly articulated their joint opposition to a military engagement with Iraq's Saddam Hussein.
The occasion was a Franco-German celebration on Wednesday to mark the 40th anniversary of their post-war friendship treaty. It was a particularly inappropriate occasion for such declarations as both countries owe huge war-related debts to the United States, France, for its liberation from Nazi occupation; Germany, for its postwar economic revival.
But the world of power politics, as France and Germany have demonstrated, is no place for sentiment. As they peered across the Channel at Britain they could, no doubt with a sense of schadenfreude, appreciate the extreme heat that Tony Blair is taking as a result of his commitment to the American lead.
True, he had a week of wobble earlier this month when he realized he could not turn public opinion around and staunch the haemorrhage of support (some polls are showing disapproval running as high as 80 percent), while also realizing that he has gone too far to withdraw, even tactically, without entirely shredding his credibility.
The French and German leaders, sensing similar domestic dangers if they look like cozying up to George W. Bush, have concluded that discretion is the better part of valour and that they cannot afford to be seen to be marching shoulder-to-shoulder with the Americans.
But do they really mean "yes" even as they say "no"? Can they, in the final analysis, really afford to buck the Americans as the cruise missiles go thudding into Baghdad? Probably not. The high-blown rhetoric in Paris on Wednesday was more likely to have been an opening negotiating position than a principled final word.
It would take a fantastic suspension of disbelief to imagine either Chirac or Schroeder mounting the barricades in defense of Saddam Hussein, particularly when the effect will be to poison their relations with Washington. So why all the grandstanding now?
First, because they want to not only make a public demonstration of their restored unity after a lengthy period of estrangement, but also to resume their combined place at the forefront of the European Union.
Second, because they want to avoid the political damage that Blair has incurred during the slow, protracted, build-up to action: They are almost certainly waiting for the foreplay to end before they unsheath their swords.
Third, because they want to tell the world, particularly the Arab world, that unlike Blair they are not simply Washington's poodles. They are no knee-jerk, pro-American war-mongers, but Europeans, tall and proud, masters of their own collective destiny.
And finally, as the actress said to the bishop, they want to establish the price of their complicity. They are not enthusiastic amateurs, as Blair appears to be, but tough pragmatists who will demand a promissory note before the battle rather than rely on American goodwill when the guns fall silent. It's as cynical and opportunist as that.
So what do they have to offer and what do they have to gain?
They have a surprising amount to offer. Both are members of the UN Security Council, France is a permanent member; Germany holds the rotating presidency. If two important European states are prepared to openly defy the Americans, a number of others on the Security Council will find it difficult to support a call to arms.
At the same time, Bush needs to satisfy his own public that America has a measure of international legitimacy for the campaign against Iraq. And if, at the last minute, France and Germany were to change their minds and go along with Washington, albeit reluctantly, they could carry other weaker, more vulnerable states along in their slipstream. Such states would find it extremely uncomfortable to remain isolated and exposed to Washington's wrath.
French and German compliance then assumes both a geopolitical significance and a diplomatic importance that far transcends their intrinsic value. Their contribution to the conflict might be little more than symbolic (logistically, there would be time for little else), but symbolism in international affairs can be as important as substance. Why sell it cheap?
In the circumstances, the Americans would probably be prepared to swallow hard and offer a very substantial reward for the support of the recalcitrant Europeans.
It is a cruel irony that calculating Chirac and Schroeder could earn far greater dividends than steadfast Blair, whose value has been diminished by having coupled his carriage so inexorably to the American train. In the eyes of his critics, particularly on the left, Blair's naivety has made him hostage to the right-wing cowboys in Washington, and it is not entirely inconceivable that, far from being rewarded, he will pay for his commitment with his political life.
For France and Germany, there is the delicious frisson of being seen by their electorates to be resisting and humbling, if not actually humiliating, the Americans in their hour of need. And if, at the last minute, they were to change their minds, any consequent anger would be offset by the appearance that American pressure had become simply irresistible.
Moreover, many Europeans are deeply anti-American and define themselves in contradistinction to their transatlantic cousins. The French and German leaders, anxious to prove themselves equals to America, are likely to be propelled into positions of unassailable leadership in Europe.
And there are other intangible benefits, not least among Arab leaders, who will surely remember (and quite possibly reward) their reluctance to go to war against a fellow-Arab state.
But there are more serious, tangible gains that the two European allies will be seeking directly from Washington.
Both France and Germany felt aggrieved and denied after the 1991 Gulf War. This time, they will want copper-bottom guarantees from Washington that they will receive a significant share of post-war contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq, which is likely to be devastated by air assaults before the ground troops go in.
And both France and Germany (like Russia) are owed huge sums for old deals with Saddam's Iraq. They will demand assurances of priority when Iraqi oil starts flowing and the accountants start sifting through demands for payment of Iraq's past debts.
They might also, though probably with less success, seek a more intrusive role in Middle East peace-making once the dust has settled, a role that Blair was no doubt hoping, equally unrealistically, to secure for himself.
Blair will emerge as the biggest loser. Unlike his European partners, and unlike much of his own party, he is viscerally pro-American. That was evident in his close identification with the United States immediately after the September 11 attacks; in the American-declared war on terrorism; in the campaign to topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime; in the fight against al-Qaida; in the hunt for Osama bin-Ladin, and in the pending confrontation with Iraq.
Blair is unlikely to have nailed down a deal with Washington in exchange for his virtually unconditional support, just as he is unlikely to have closely calculated the domestic political cost of pursuing such a course. The cruel reality is that, having committed himself so completely, his bargaining position has been all but eroded.
He is firmly in the American camp. He has nowhere else to go. All that remains is for the French and German leaders to step in and pick up most of the spoils that Blair must have hoped would be his. European unity is a fickle creature.
Thoughts
Jan. 23, 2003
France, Germany give Britain the elbow, By DOUGLAS DAVIS
Germany and France were, not for the first time, marching in lock-step this week as Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Jacques Chirac loudly articulated their joint opposition to a military engagement with Iraq's Saddam Hussein.
The occasion was a Franco-German celebration on Wednesday to mark the 40th anniversary of their post-war friendship treaty. It was a particularly inappropriate occasion for such declarations as both countries owe huge war-related debts to the United States, France, for its liberation from Nazi occupation; Germany, for its postwar economic revival.
But the world of power politics, as France and Germany have demonstrated, is no place for sentiment. As they peered across the Channel at Britain they could, no doubt with a sense of schadenfreude, appreciate the extreme heat that Tony Blair is taking as a result of his commitment to the American lead.
True, he had a week of wobble earlier this month when he realized he could not turn public opinion around and staunch the haemorrhage of support (some polls are showing disapproval running as high as 80 percent), while also realizing that he has gone too far to withdraw, even tactically, without entirely shredding his credibility.
The French and German leaders, sensing similar domestic dangers if they look like cozying up to George W. Bush, have concluded that discretion is the better part of valour and that they cannot afford to be seen to be marching shoulder-to-shoulder with the Americans.
But do they really mean "yes" even as they say "no"? Can they, in the final analysis, really afford to buck the Americans as the cruise missiles go thudding into Baghdad? Probably not. The high-blown rhetoric in Paris on Wednesday was more likely to have been an opening negotiating position than a principled final word.
It would take a fantastic suspension of disbelief to imagine either Chirac or Schroeder mounting the barricades in defense of Saddam Hussein, particularly when the effect will be to poison their relations with Washington. So why all the grandstanding now?
First, because they want to not only make a public demonstration of their restored unity after a lengthy period of estrangement, but also to resume their combined place at the forefront of the European Union.
Second, because they want to avoid the political damage that Blair has incurred during the slow, protracted, build-up to action: They are almost certainly waiting for the foreplay to end before they unsheath their swords.
Third, because they want to tell the world, particularly the Arab world, that unlike Blair they are not simply Washington's poodles. They are no knee-jerk, pro-American war-mongers, but Europeans, tall and proud, masters of their own collective destiny.
And finally, as the actress said to the bishop, they want to establish the price of their complicity. They are not enthusiastic amateurs, as Blair appears to be, but tough pragmatists who will demand a promissory note before the battle rather than rely on American goodwill when the guns fall silent. It's as cynical and opportunist as that.
So what do they have to offer and what do they have to gain?
They have a surprising amount to offer. Both are members of the UN Security Council, France is a permanent member; Germany holds the rotating presidency. If two important European states are prepared to openly defy the Americans, a number of others on the Security Council will find it difficult to support a call to arms.
At the same time, Bush needs to satisfy his own public that America has a measure of international legitimacy for the campaign against Iraq. And if, at the last minute, France and Germany were to change their minds and go along with Washington, albeit reluctantly, they could carry other weaker, more vulnerable states along in their slipstream. Such states would find it extremely uncomfortable to remain isolated and exposed to Washington's wrath.
French and German compliance then assumes both a geopolitical significance and a diplomatic importance that far transcends their intrinsic value. Their contribution to the conflict might be little more than symbolic (logistically, there would be time for little else), but symbolism in international affairs can be as important as substance. Why sell it cheap?
In the circumstances, the Americans would probably be prepared to swallow hard and offer a very substantial reward for the support of the recalcitrant Europeans.
It is a cruel irony that calculating Chirac and Schroeder could earn far greater dividends than steadfast Blair, whose value has been diminished by having coupled his carriage so inexorably to the American train. In the eyes of his critics, particularly on the left, Blair's naivety has made him hostage to the right-wing cowboys in Washington, and it is not entirely inconceivable that, far from being rewarded, he will pay for his commitment with his political life.
For France and Germany, there is the delicious frisson of being seen by their electorates to be resisting and humbling, if not actually humiliating, the Americans in their hour of need. And if, at the last minute, they were to change their minds, any consequent anger would be offset by the appearance that American pressure had become simply irresistible.
Moreover, many Europeans are deeply anti-American and define themselves in contradistinction to their transatlantic cousins. The French and German leaders, anxious to prove themselves equals to America, are likely to be propelled into positions of unassailable leadership in Europe.
And there are other intangible benefits, not least among Arab leaders, who will surely remember (and quite possibly reward) their reluctance to go to war against a fellow-Arab state.
But there are more serious, tangible gains that the two European allies will be seeking directly from Washington.
Both France and Germany felt aggrieved and denied after the 1991 Gulf War. This time, they will want copper-bottom guarantees from Washington that they will receive a significant share of post-war contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq, which is likely to be devastated by air assaults before the ground troops go in.
And both France and Germany (like Russia) are owed huge sums for old deals with Saddam's Iraq. They will demand assurances of priority when Iraqi oil starts flowing and the accountants start sifting through demands for payment of Iraq's past debts.
They might also, though probably with less success, seek a more intrusive role in Middle East peace-making once the dust has settled, a role that Blair was no doubt hoping, equally unrealistically, to secure for himself.
Blair will emerge as the biggest loser. Unlike his European partners, and unlike much of his own party, he is viscerally pro-American. That was evident in his close identification with the United States immediately after the September 11 attacks; in the American-declared war on terrorism; in the campaign to topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime; in the fight against al-Qaida; in the hunt for Osama bin-Ladin, and in the pending confrontation with Iraq.
Blair is unlikely to have nailed down a deal with Washington in exchange for his virtually unconditional support, just as he is unlikely to have closely calculated the domestic political cost of pursuing such a course. The cruel reality is that, having committed himself so completely, his bargaining position has been all but eroded.
He is firmly in the American camp. He has nowhere else to go. All that remains is for the French and German leaders to step in and pick up most of the spoils that Blair must have hoped would be his. European unity is a fickle creature.
Thoughts
