[BRIEF NOTE] Russia 2010 in 2008
Jul. 31st, 2008 05:18 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
rfmcdonaldDuring my recent trip to Prince Edward Island, I was able to come across Yergin and Gustafson's 1993 book Russia 2010, an attempt to come up with scenarios to plot and react to some of the major possible trajectories of post-communist Russia. How does it stand up, fifteen years later? (I know that I should wait another year and a half, but still.)
The book begins with an overview of the different influential factions within Russia at the time: the mafiya, the government at various levels in conflict with each other conflictual levels, the military, other post--Soviet states, and so on. The authors then go on to product several scenarios.
What happened? Russia spent most of the 1990s in the Muddling Down scenario, in fact having a worse time than Yergin and Gustafson predicted (they predicted Russia's doldrums would end in the mid-1990s, when they actually ended in the late 1990s). After Yeltsin's resignation, judging, looks like combination of Two-Headed Eagle with Chudo. The economic growth predicted in Chudo was based much more on higher valued added exports than on natural resource exports, though, but conflict involving ethnic minorities, particularly in Chechnya but also in the wider North Caucasus.
The authors also come up with a number of wildcard scenarios. Some of them are incorrect. Russia, for instance, is not, has not, and will not fight a missile war with Iran over Azerbaijan. They still come up with a couple of hits.
Finally, the authors make the interesting assumption that Estonia's Russophones can be mobilized when he predicts the evolution of an almost Cyprus-like partition of Estonia into a Russophone northeast and the rest of the country. These Russophones, divided and relatively disadvantaged, aren't posing a threat to the integrity of the Estonian state. In Georgia, however, Russia is involved in supporting the Abkhazian and South Ossetian autonomists. Georgia's fragility was evident at the time of the book's publication, yet the authors missed this.
Russia 2010 has the standard mixture of ill-footed guesses, but overall it was quite interesting to read this book and see how the authors did or did not predict our world fifteen years later. As a minor fan of futurology, I think it worthwhile reading if only for the way in which the authors lay out their assumptions.
The book begins with an overview of the different influential factions within Russia at the time: the mafiya, the government at various levels in conflict with each other conflictual levels, the military, other post--Soviet states, and so on. The authors then go on to product several scenarios.
- Muddling Down sees continued government chaos and economic decline, as the government proves itself incapable of either promoting economic growth or providing things like a social safety net or a non-degraded physical environment. In this environment, political radicals become popular, private businesses gradually emancipate themselves from a weak government, and relative freedom prevails.
- The Two Headed Eagle sees a growing consolidation of state on law-and-order principles, using the excuse that crime among with ethnic minorities poses a serious threat. A new centralized and centrist government develops, with an awkward and half-hearted transition to a modern capitalist eocnomy with balance. During this period, confrontations are avoided with Russia's neighbours, and the foundations for a more liberal social order are laid down
- The Time of Troubles scenario witnesses a radical weakening of the central goverment, with different republics and regional federations gaining power. Eventually, nationalist reaction prompts a reconsolidation of Russia.
- The Russian Bear scenario sees a military coup and constitution of a militantly nationalist and authoritarian government that prompts international severance of economic relations with West. The regime eventually transforms into someething like the Two Headed Eagle, but at the expense of Russia's trajectories.
- The Chudo scenarios sees a Russian economic miracle, as by 2000 the fear of mass unemployment and collapse of in the old economy is happily overcome by the investment of private capital--under friendlier regulations--in the economy and the growth of an export economy. Towards the end of thie book's period, the Russian economy starts to grow at 9% per annum, thanks to strength of high-tech industry and applied science along with growing consumer demand.
What happened? Russia spent most of the 1990s in the Muddling Down scenario, in fact having a worse time than Yergin and Gustafson predicted (they predicted Russia's doldrums would end in the mid-1990s, when they actually ended in the late 1990s). After Yeltsin's resignation, judging, looks like combination of Two-Headed Eagle with Chudo. The economic growth predicted in Chudo was based much more on higher valued added exports than on natural resource exports, though, but conflict involving ethnic minorities, particularly in Chechnya but also in the wider North Caucasus.
The authors also come up with a number of wildcard scenarios. Some of them are incorrect. Russia, for instance, is not, has not, and will not fight a missile war with Iran over Azerbaijan. They still come up with a couple of hits.
- In one of their wildcard scenarios, the authors are correct in estimating the scope of Russia's HIV/AIDS epidemic orrectly estimates the general scope of the disease (a million HIV-positives by 2010 and three hundred thousand dead) but substantially overestimate the impact of the virus on Russi society. There are, so far as I can tell, no panics, no masssacres of ethnic minorities or gastarbeiter, nothing equivalent to (say) the stigmatization of Haitians in the 1980s.
- Similarly, the authors predict both problems in bilateral Russian-Ukrainian tensions and within Ukraine between Ukrainophone and Russophone
areas. Orange revolution, anyone? The authors also seem to underestimate the extent to which a common Ukrainian identity exists among both language groups. Again, this is a fair misjudgement of the situation given the appearance of Ukraine's fragility.
Finally, the authors make the interesting assumption that Estonia's Russophones can be mobilized when he predicts the evolution of an almost Cyprus-like partition of Estonia into a Russophone northeast and the rest of the country. These Russophones, divided and relatively disadvantaged, aren't posing a threat to the integrity of the Estonian state. In Georgia, however, Russia is involved in supporting the Abkhazian and South Ossetian autonomists. Georgia's fragility was evident at the time of the book's publication, yet the authors missed this.
Russia 2010 has the standard mixture of ill-footed guesses, but overall it was quite interesting to read this book and see how the authors did or did not predict our world fifteen years later. As a minor fan of futurology, I think it worthwhile reading if only for the way in which the authors lay out their assumptions.
