[REVIEW] Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom
Aug. 5th, 2008 11:31 pmPrussia, annihilated after the Second World War by Allied powers eager to eradicate the militarism that led to the Third Reich, is undergoing something of a revival in historical writing, with works like Christopher Clark's Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1700-1947 demonstrating a decidedly impressive reediting of the traditional blood-and-war narrative associated with Prussia. I'm not alone: Writers like Daniel Johnson at The Telegraph, Volker Ulrich at Sign and Sight, Patrick White at The Guardian, and William Grimes at The New York Times (1, 2, 3, 4).
Put briefly, Clark makes a convincing case that Prussia's Hohenzollerns responded to the devastation inflicted on Brandenburg, lacking defensible frontiers,during the Thirty Years War and pragmatically, developing an efficient military-driven state to defend Brandenburg (and East Prussia) effectively in the middle of a Germany that was still a contested buffer zone. The Hohenzollern dynasty that, in an amusing echo of Ernest Renan's argument that a nation is constituted by a continuous referendum on the part of its citizens, willed their state into existence did create a dynamic and pragmatically tolerant (Huguenots are mentioned, as are Jews) state that, after several rounds of reforms and substantial territorial expansions, first into Poland in the last quarter of the late 18th century and then in Germany in the first quarter of the late 19th, became the dominant German state. Eventually, the pragmatism of Prussian statesmen like Bismarck placed the Kingdom at the heart of a wider German Empire, The basic militarized insecurity that was the institutionalized flaw of Prussia, Clark continues, unfortunately infected the emergent German state with a malign reputation rooted in an innately reactionary Prussia that, in many cases, did not exist given an advanced economy and a fair degree of social liberalism. Even after the First World War, when a republicanized Free State of Prussia became a federal unit lucky enough to enjoy more efficient and competent government than Germany as a whole, Prussia's reputation followed it. The Second World War and the post-war partition of Prussia annihilated the existence of a political unit that by the time of the Nazi takeover, governed more people than France, and Prussia's historical units from west to east followed their own directions.
I really don't want to, and to some extent can't, criticize the The Iron Kingdom very much, apart from noting that this well-written tome with its compelling arguments is supported by an impressively diverse array of sources, covering a diverse subdivision of history at a diverse, from international power politics to the lived experience of the common people. The only contention thing that I can bring against this book is an observation that the sort of militarism that may have aided in the state's survival could quickly extend into wars of outright aggression that, well, actually did earn Prussia a reputation as a militarily aggressive state interested in territorial expansions out of proportino to its size, the War of the Austrian Succession triggered by Frederick the Great's occupation of Silesia being a case in point. I suspect that this is not entirely fair given the actions of other great powers, but well.
Put briefly, Clark makes a convincing case that Prussia's Hohenzollerns responded to the devastation inflicted on Brandenburg, lacking defensible frontiers,during the Thirty Years War and pragmatically, developing an efficient military-driven state to defend Brandenburg (and East Prussia) effectively in the middle of a Germany that was still a contested buffer zone. The Hohenzollern dynasty that, in an amusing echo of Ernest Renan's argument that a nation is constituted by a continuous referendum on the part of its citizens, willed their state into existence did create a dynamic and pragmatically tolerant (Huguenots are mentioned, as are Jews) state that, after several rounds of reforms and substantial territorial expansions, first into Poland in the last quarter of the late 18th century and then in Germany in the first quarter of the late 19th, became the dominant German state. Eventually, the pragmatism of Prussian statesmen like Bismarck placed the Kingdom at the heart of a wider German Empire, The basic militarized insecurity that was the institutionalized flaw of Prussia, Clark continues, unfortunately infected the emergent German state with a malign reputation rooted in an innately reactionary Prussia that, in many cases, did not exist given an advanced economy and a fair degree of social liberalism. Even after the First World War, when a republicanized Free State of Prussia became a federal unit lucky enough to enjoy more efficient and competent government than Germany as a whole, Prussia's reputation followed it. The Second World War and the post-war partition of Prussia annihilated the existence of a political unit that by the time of the Nazi takeover, governed more people than France, and Prussia's historical units from west to east followed their own directions.
I really don't want to, and to some extent can't, criticize the The Iron Kingdom very much, apart from noting that this well-written tome with its compelling arguments is supported by an impressively diverse array of sources, covering a diverse subdivision of history at a diverse, from international power politics to the lived experience of the common people. The only contention thing that I can bring against this book is an observation that the sort of militarism that may have aided in the state's survival could quickly extend into wars of outright aggression that, well, actually did earn Prussia a reputation as a militarily aggressive state interested in territorial expansions out of proportino to its size, the War of the Austrian Succession triggered by Frederick the Great's occupation of Silesia being a case in point. I suspect that this is not entirely fair given the actions of other great powers, but well.