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rfmcdonaldThe death Monday of Omar Bongo, long-time president of the oil-rich Francophone central African state of Gabon, is symbolic in more ways than one: Not only is Gabon without its long-time leader, but the last regional leader in Africa beholden to the French has gone.
Gabon hasn't benefited substantially from its oil, almost the contrary.
The term "Françafrique" was used to describe the close ties of France with the newly independent Francophone states of Africa under the Gaullist regime, using all manner of personal, economic, military, and other connections to keep France involved in the area. Regional leader's like Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouet-Boigny and Gabon's Bongo were used as supporters of French influence regionally, often channeling French resources through their own networks into neighbouring states. This is something that François Xavier Veschave, a writer critical of these networks, did not like.
"Françafrique" is breaking down. Not only does the current Sarkozy government express disinterest in the concept, at least as it was traditionally expressed--France remains heavily invested in Nigerien uranium, for instance. Official France also favours links with non-Francophone states of note like Nigeria, Angola and South Africa, but the growing interest of other countries--the United States and China notably--in the petrochemical resources of many Francophone African states is eroding French commercial hegemony.
The same is true for the role of France in la francophonie, which, it's important to note, never really functioned as a vehicle for French hegemony. rather, it was an initiative taken jointly by the leaders of various Francophone African states like Senegal and Tunisia, along with a newly assertive Québec, to promote multilateral relations rather than one-on-one ties. The Francophonie helped African states diversify their foreign relations, looking to Canada and to Québec, to Belgium and its French community, even to Switzerland. As the number of second- and even first-language speakers of France grows, French influence diminishes proportionally.
Bongo had kept a tight grip on power in the oil-rich former French colony since he became president in 1967, and his ruling party has dominated the country's parliament for decades. Opposition parties were only allowed in 1990, amid a wave of pro-democracy protests.
Elections since then have been marred by allegations of rigging and unrest. In 2003, parliament — dominated by his supporters — removed presidential term limits from the constitution.
While most Gabonese genuinely feared Bongo and there was little opposition, many accepted his rule because he had kept his country remarkably peaceful and governed without the sustained brutality characteristic of many dictators.
Bongo, meanwhile, amassed a fortune that made him one of the world's richest men, according to Freedom House, a private Washington-based democracy watchdog organization, although nobody really knows how much he was worth.
Earlier this year, a French judge decided to investigate Bongo and two other African leaders over accusations of money laundering and other alleged crimes linked to their wealth in France.
The probe followed a complaint by Transparency International France, an association that tracks corruption. French media have reported that Bongo's family owns abundant real estate in France — at one time owning more properties in Paris than any other foreign leader.
Gabon hasn't benefited substantially from its oil, almost the contrary.
Gabon is the No. 5 oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa, and Bongo built a vast system of patronage, doling out largesse in part through the salaries and benefits that came with Cabinet posts.
But oil dependency means the country has more oil pipeline — 886 miles (1,425 kilometers) — than paved roads _582 miles (936 kilometers). Only 1 percent of its land is cultivated and Gabon produces virtually no food.
Instead, basics such as tomatoes are imported from France, the former colonial master, and neighboring Cameroon, pushing prices so high that Libreville, the capital, is the world's eighth most expensive city, according to Employment Conditions Abroad International.
The term "Françafrique" was used to describe the close ties of France with the newly independent Francophone states of Africa under the Gaullist regime, using all manner of personal, economic, military, and other connections to keep France involved in the area. Regional leader's like Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouet-Boigny and Gabon's Bongo were used as supporters of French influence regionally, often channeling French resources through their own networks into neighbouring states. This is something that François Xavier Veschave, a writer critical of these networks, did not like.
Over the course of four decades, hundreds of thousands of euros misappropriated from debt, aid, oil, cocoa… or drained through French importing monopolies, have financed French political-business networks (all of them offshoots of the main neo-Gaullist network), shareholders’ dividends, the secret services’ major operations and mercenary expeditions.
Undermined in 1990 by the growth in democracy and "Sovereign national conferences", Françafrique very quickly came up with an arsenal of constitutional manipulation and ballot rigging which enabled it to transform the massive electoral rejection of dictatorships into approval. This double talk (French aid finances the elections ; French networks reverse the results) had a profoundly debilitating effect and resulted in the legitimisation of dictatorships in Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, Djibouti, the Comoros and the Congos.
With "Angolagate" and such people as Pierre Falcone or Arcadi Gaydamak, we are seeing the beginnings of globalised management of the flows of unofficial money come from the predation of raw materials, from debt fraud and from arms-sales commissions - under the "control" of the secret services. The financial layers generated in this way, sheltered in tax havens, are beginning to interconnect ; the networks and treasures of Françafrique are connecting to those of their American, British, Russian, Israeli, Brazilian, etc. counterparts. In short, we are witnessing Françafrique gradually joining a mafiafrique.
"Françafrique" is breaking down. Not only does the current Sarkozy government express disinterest in the concept, at least as it was traditionally expressed--France remains heavily invested in Nigerien uranium, for instance. Official France also favours links with non-Francophone states of note like Nigeria, Angola and South Africa, but the growing interest of other countries--the United States and China notably--in the petrochemical resources of many Francophone African states is eroding French commercial hegemony.
The same is true for the role of France in la francophonie, which, it's important to note, never really functioned as a vehicle for French hegemony. rather, it was an initiative taken jointly by the leaders of various Francophone African states like Senegal and Tunisia, along with a newly assertive Québec, to promote multilateral relations rather than one-on-one ties. The Francophonie helped African states diversify their foreign relations, looking to Canada and to Québec, to Belgium and its French community, even to Switzerland. As the number of second- and even first-language speakers of France grows, French influence diminishes proportionally.
