Wow. I'd hope that Gideon Rachman was wrong in his evaluation of the source, but, wow.
Thoughts?
[Author Ron] Asmus doesn’t quite spell it out [in his book A Little War that Shook the World. But the key passages clearly point in that direction. He writes that the White House considered “limited military options to stem the Russian advance”, including “the possibility of bombardment and the sealing of the Roki Tunnel as well as other surgical strikes to reduce Russian military pressure.”
He also writes that there was a disagreement between Steve Hadley, George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser and Dick Cheney, the vice-president. Hadley “thought Russia was focused only on Georgia”, while “Cheney had a different and harder-edged view of Moscow’s goals.” Asmus adds - “Both Hadley and Cheney’s staff had also considered the question of considering limited military options. Hadley had pushed them to think hard about the consequences of any proposed military steps…He was convinced they would lead quickly to a US-Russia military confrontation. But he concluded that is was necessary for Bush to know what his closest advisers, Cheney in particular, thought and for the president to have an open discussion with his key cabinet members …on whether the United States should consider using its military power to help the Georgians.”
That discussion took place on August 11th, 2009. But Asmus records that - “There was a clear sense around the table that almost any military steps, could lead to a confrontation with Moscow, the outcome of which no one could predict …The United States had taken a considered look at the military option and decided against it.”
Thoughts?