While discussion about the reasons for Canada's failed bid for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council is ongoing, emphasizing Canadian foreign policy,
absinthe_ca pointed me to some surprisingly intelligent analyses of the situation from David Frum. Canadian foreign policy may have contributed, but broader international politics played a critical role. Canada belongs to a voting bloc that includes western European countries, like (say) winners Germany and Portugal; this has complications.
Meanwhile, Brazil's geopolitical heft may have led to the United States' not choosing between Canada and its Lusophone European ally.
The Western European and others group nominated not the requisite two candidates, but instead three: Germany and Portugal, as well as Canada. By nominating three, the Western European and Others bloc forfeited its right of decision. That looks like an unwise act. Why did it happen?
The answer has nothing to do with Kyoto or Israel, and everything to do with the internal politics of the European Union. It’s the European Union countries that dominate the Western bloc. Increasingly, the EU countries have been negotiating these UN nominations among themselves first. They decide that they want Germany and Portugal — and then they muscle their way through the rest of the bloc onto the UN floor.
[. . .]
European Union bloc voting gives the EU unintended clout within the Security Council. Remember, Eastern Europe is also a bloc, and it gets one seat on the Security Council, currently held by Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not yet a EU member, but it would dearly like to be, and so would other members of the Eastern European group. The EU can pressure EU applicants into complying with EU wishes, even against a supposed EU ally like Canada.
Meanwhile, Brazil's geopolitical heft may have led to the United States' not choosing between Canada and its Lusophone European ally.
Of the five seats that open in January 2011, one belongs to the Latin American bloc.
This seat will go to Colombia. The seating of Colombia is a deserved accolade for a democracy that has successfully battled terrorism and drug gangs. Colombia’s seating also represents a diplomatic victory for the United States: Colombia is a close U.S. ally and a target of subversion from Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.
How did the United States score this victory? Answer: with a lot of help from rising regional heavyweight, Brazil. (Brazil also helped the United States stop a Venezuelan bid for the Security Council back in 2006. The seat went instead to Guatemala.)
But when a country like Brazil offers help, it usually expects some kind of payback. Portuguese-speaking Brazil feels a special relationship with its former metropole, Portugal. And we know that Brazil campaigned hard for Portugal in the General Assembly vote.
[. . .]
In the early 2000s, Germany had launched a quixotic bid for a permanent Security Council seat. That bid went nowhere. But as a consolation prize the other European countries agreed to give Germany another early turn in a temporary seat — even though Germany had had a turn very recently, in 2003-2004.
Accelerating Germany’s next turn in this way threatened to displace small country Portugal, which had not had a turn since the 1990s. Portugal declined to stand down.
The United States might have tried to pressure Portugal — but didn’t, because it needed Brazil’s help with the Colombian nomination. Thus, two Western European candidacies went forward at the same time as Canada’s.
Although the United States preferred Canada’s nomination over Portugal’s, the deal with Brazil required the United States to stay neutral between Portugal and Canada both in Brussels and then at the General Assembly.