[LINK] "Dutch cabinet considering training mission in Afghanistan"

[rfmcdonald]

Lennart Breuker's Invisible College post raises the subject of Dutch training missions under NATO in Afghanistan. For Canadians facing similar issues, this post is uncomfortably relevant.

[An observer] asserts that US pressure on the Dutch cabinet to train Afghan police forces is directly linked to the considerably more violent approach the US military has taken under Petraeus. He states that the US government aims to expand the Afghan police forces from 100.000 to 134.000 in 2011. To this end the training period will be shortened from 8 to 6 weeks, much to the horror of the European allies.

The 'little soldiers' are not only often deployed at night raids, but also at heavy engagements with the Taliban and at isolated places that have just been (re)captured. They do so without armored vehicles, often without helmets or bullet proof vests, resulting in a casualty rate three times higher than regular Afghan soldiers. US general Caldwell confirms that 47 % defects after their training, and it is assumed that many join up with the Taliban, or sell their weapons to them.

This account is disconcerting for several reasons. Not only would the Dutch government co-operate with a policy of a questionable ethical nature by producing a cheap army to face situations for which it is neither adequately trained nor equipped. It would also assist the implementation of a policy which will further alienate the Afghan people from the NATO forces by crude and indiscriminate military actions and a high amount of civilian casualties. This would be in stark contrast with the relative success the Dutch military achieved in containing violence in the province of Uruzgan by marking diplomacy and development as key components in a counterinsurgency strategy, in stead of sheer military power.

Moreover, the resort to 'little soldiers' might even fuel the conflict in a way that humanitarian aid is often accused of. That is, the goal may be legitimate – providing humanitarian relief – but the result is plainly that many resources are taken by a warring faction which allows them to sustain their war efforts and thus to prolong the suffering that humanitarian aid seeks to mitigate. In a similar vein, the allied forces in Afghanistan are providing the Taliban with personnel and weapons by the huge defection rate of the 'little soldiers'.

In addition, the current military attitude towards the war in Afghanistan and towards the Afghan people is uncomfortably reminiscent of how the US military conducted its business in South East Asia several decades ago. One would assume that the experiences in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would have taught the US military that an increased civilian death toll by indiscriminate air strikes will drive the population into sympathy for and co-operation with the resistance. The bombing campaign in Cambodia is widely acknowledged as an essential condition for the exponential growth and subsequent success of the Khmer Rouge movement, whose recruitment efforts greatly benefited from the death and destruction reaped by American bombs. In combination with the poor quality of the regular Cambodian army, the numbers of which were tremendously inflated by the use of so-called 'twenty-four-hour' soldiers – cheap soldiers without proper training and equipment [...] - the US backed Cambodian regime succumbed to the hugely expanded Khmer Rouge movement in a few years time.

Go, read the post in full.