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rfmcdonaldLooking at the website of the Institut National des Études Démographiques, I noticed an interesting observation in Populations and Sociétés issue number 388, "La population de la France en 2002" (in PDF format). My translation:
It looks like France and the United States are more alike than we thought. They are both countries of historically massive immigration; they both possess universalistic republican traditions that clash on the Scylla and Charybdis of national self-interest and strong foreign nationalisms; France are simply smaller. In turned out that French and American birth rates aren't too different: While France's estimated fertility rate in 2002 of 1.88 children born per woman is somewhat below the American rate in the same year of roughly 2.1 (still placing France far above the European average, behind only Iceland and New Zealand in the OECD), French women have children later in life than their American counterparts, pushing American figures up and French figures down. When this factor is taken into account, the two countries have similar birth rates. If the French population is growing more slowly than the American, it's because France has a much more restrictive immigration policy than the United States. The French fertility rate is the highest of any major European state; it is beaten only by countries like Albania and Turkey whicha re on the cultural-geographic peripheries of Europe. And France's baby boom of late hasn't escaped press notice.
Too, French fertility rates might be underestimated and American fertility rates might be overestimated by the tendency of French women to give birth late and American women to give birth early. In his paper "Fertility and Reproductive Preference in Post-Transitional Societies" (PDF format), John Bongaarts calculated that once the age differences of French and American mothers are taken into account the French have a higher fertility rate than Americans. It will take a very long while for the French to catch up with the Americans, though. Let's settle for examining the implications for the French role in Europe.
France, since the 18th century at least, has been demographically distinctive in Europe: the French fertility rate fell below replacement levels in the 1870's and the total population remained stable only because of massive immigration from pays limitrophes such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy; after the Second World War, France had the largest baby boom in continental Europe. Assuming that the current restrictive immigration policies remain in effect, the French population will remain stable and even grow somewhat, while populations of European Union member-states throughout southern and central Europe will plummet.
Thus, French power inside Europe will increase sharply. So long as French GNP per capita growth remains at the European average rate of GNP per capita growth, France will be an increasingly important state inside the European Union in terms of power projection--French and Italian GNP per capita might both grow at 2.5% an annum, but if the French population grows at 0.5% per annum while the Italian population shrinks at 0.5% per annum, France will have more money in total available at its disposable to throw around at its geopolitical plans. Things will be slightly different in central Europe, of course, as the central European states move towards western European standards of living: Is the Czech Republic really less powerful relative to its western European neighbours in 2053 than in 2003 if its population falls 20% but GDP per capita triples? Central European states, though, will be coming from the rear, moving from a position of relative weakness to one of relative strength, and save for Poland none will approach the size of the European Union's big five (United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy).
This analysis of French demographic strength in Europe does not take into account some kind of liberalization of immigration (in one case, say, relatively free migration from "safe" regions like the former Soviet Union and South America), things will change even more; France, as that article notes, is growing quickly despite the lowest rate of net immigration in the Fifteen. Boost it to American (never mind Canadian) levels, and, well, it wouldn't be altogether impossible that by 2050, France--not Germany--will be the largest member-state of the European Union by population and by GNP. As is, the gap between the two historic poles of the European Union will be narrowed sharply.
The new Europe of the Twenty-Five that will be produced by enlargement can never be dominated by France alone, or by a Franco-German alliance, in the same way that the Europe of the Fifteen (never mind the Twelve, the Nine, the Six) was. As time passes, though, and France alone of the major European states remains demographically stable, it will be placed in a strong position relative to its neighbours. This, if nothing else, should make some Americans worried.
French population growth, unique in Europe
The population of the 15 countries of the European Union grew 0.4 % in 2002, reaching 378 million on 1 January 2003, after the latest estimations of Eurostat. Births were slightly more numerous than deaths, creating a natural increase of 310 thousand people (0.1% of the population). But this surplus accounted for only a quarter of the total population growth of the Union: migration is the main motor of growth. With net population growth estimated at a bit more than one million people, migration represents three-quarters of growth. The Fifteen all saw their population grow in 2002, but at speeds and according to mechanisms which differed very greatly. Growth was highest in Ireland (more than 1%), whereas it was lowest in Germany and in Italy (around 0.1% and 0.2%). France and the Netherlands had similar rates of growth which placed them a bit above the European average. But France was distinct for having the lowest rate of net migration of the Fifteen. In contrast to most European countries, population growth in France is due principally to the excess of births above deaths. The phenomenon is visible in net form if one compares the total absolute demographic growth of the 15. The two leading countries are France and Spain, which each grew between 250 thousand and 300 thousand people in 2002. The United Kingdom and Italy came next, with increases of roughly 150 thousand people, and Germany was at the tail end of the big five with 115 thousand more people. The excess of births over deaths in France, which rose to 220 thousand people in 2002, is unique in Europe. It represents more than two-thirds of the total net increase of the Fifteen. The stunning situations of Spain and Portugal should be underlined; very recently countries of emigration, their populations grew substantially in 2002 because of rates of net immigration which were among the highest of the Fifteen, while the excess of births over deaths became weak. Without immigration, the populations of Greece, Italy, and Germany would have fallen while the population of Sweden would have been static.
The ten new countries which will join the European Union in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) constitute a population of 75 million people, nearly 20% of the total of the Fifteen. This population shrunk 0.2% in 2002 because of the combined factors of excesses of deaths over births and of emigration over immigration.
It looks like France and the United States are more alike than we thought. They are both countries of historically massive immigration; they both possess universalistic republican traditions that clash on the Scylla and Charybdis of national self-interest and strong foreign nationalisms; France are simply smaller. In turned out that French and American birth rates aren't too different: While France's estimated fertility rate in 2002 of 1.88 children born per woman is somewhat below the American rate in the same year of roughly 2.1 (still placing France far above the European average, behind only Iceland and New Zealand in the OECD), French women have children later in life than their American counterparts, pushing American figures up and French figures down. When this factor is taken into account, the two countries have similar birth rates. If the French population is growing more slowly than the American, it's because France has a much more restrictive immigration policy than the United States. The French fertility rate is the highest of any major European state; it is beaten only by countries like Albania and Turkey whicha re on the cultural-geographic peripheries of Europe. And France's baby boom of late hasn't escaped press notice.
Too, French fertility rates might be underestimated and American fertility rates might be overestimated by the tendency of French women to give birth late and American women to give birth early. In his paper "Fertility and Reproductive Preference in Post-Transitional Societies" (PDF format), John Bongaarts calculated that once the age differences of French and American mothers are taken into account the French have a higher fertility rate than Americans. It will take a very long while for the French to catch up with the Americans, though. Let's settle for examining the implications for the French role in Europe.
France, since the 18th century at least, has been demographically distinctive in Europe: the French fertility rate fell below replacement levels in the 1870's and the total population remained stable only because of massive immigration from pays limitrophes such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy; after the Second World War, France had the largest baby boom in continental Europe. Assuming that the current restrictive immigration policies remain in effect, the French population will remain stable and even grow somewhat, while populations of European Union member-states throughout southern and central Europe will plummet.
Thus, French power inside Europe will increase sharply. So long as French GNP per capita growth remains at the European average rate of GNP per capita growth, France will be an increasingly important state inside the European Union in terms of power projection--French and Italian GNP per capita might both grow at 2.5% an annum, but if the French population grows at 0.5% per annum while the Italian population shrinks at 0.5% per annum, France will have more money in total available at its disposable to throw around at its geopolitical plans. Things will be slightly different in central Europe, of course, as the central European states move towards western European standards of living: Is the Czech Republic really less powerful relative to its western European neighbours in 2053 than in 2003 if its population falls 20% but GDP per capita triples? Central European states, though, will be coming from the rear, moving from a position of relative weakness to one of relative strength, and save for Poland none will approach the size of the European Union's big five (United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy).
This analysis of French demographic strength in Europe does not take into account some kind of liberalization of immigration (in one case, say, relatively free migration from "safe" regions like the former Soviet Union and South America), things will change even more; France, as that article notes, is growing quickly despite the lowest rate of net immigration in the Fifteen. Boost it to American (never mind Canadian) levels, and, well, it wouldn't be altogether impossible that by 2050, France--not Germany--will be the largest member-state of the European Union by population and by GNP. As is, the gap between the two historic poles of the European Union will be narrowed sharply.
The new Europe of the Twenty-Five that will be produced by enlargement can never be dominated by France alone, or by a Franco-German alliance, in the same way that the Europe of the Fifteen (never mind the Twelve, the Nine, the Six) was. As time passes, though, and France alone of the major European states remains demographically stable, it will be placed in a strong position relative to its neighbours. This, if nothing else, should make some Americans worried.
