[ISL] "Why Did Medvedev Go to the Kurils Again?"

[rfmcdonald]

RIA Novosti's Fyodor Lukyanov has some interesting analysis of the import of the visit several days ago of Russian Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev to the Kuril Islands, Japanese until 1945 when the island chain was annexed by the Soviet Union and retained by post-Communist Russia. He's probably right to conclude that the Russian-Japanese dispute over these islands is preventing the sort of cooperation that might be useful in counterbalancing China, and that only an authoritarian government in Russia would have the ability to cede Russian territory (though it's open to question to me whether it would have the legitimacy to do so).

I've multiple posts over the dispute, and my opinion remains that Japan should get over the territorial losses. Other Axis powers suffered much greater territorial losses to their neighbours--to Russia, to Poland, to Yugoslavia, to their own liberated colonies--and have yet managed to move beyond these losses and develop profitable and peaceful relations with these beneficiairies of the Second World War. If Japan wanted to, I think it could follow suit.

The situation has not improved since [Medvedev]'s previous visit in 2010, so he can make similar statements on the results of his visit. As for urging ministers to visit the region, he has done that before and besides, as prime minister he can simply order them to go there. Instead of indicating the region’s importance, his second visit merely highlights how little has been done there in the last two years. Japan’s reaction is predictable: no government is going to ignore such actions, which means that Medvedev’s visit will complicate bilateral relations. On the other hand, this result could be a deliberate part of policy, though the reason for it remains unclear. Two years ago the reason was understood, but not this time.

Russian-Japanese relations are heavily dependent on this territorial dispute, and there are no prospects on the horizon for resolving it. The heaps of historical documents substantiating their claims to ownership of the islands that both sides have accumulated offer no realistic solution to the conflict. If the dispute is to be resolved at all, it must come through a political deal (both parties will need to find historical arguments to justify their decision in the eyes of the public, but that is a technicality). But a deal of this kind is highly unlikely, since it is a matter of national prestige for both Russia and Japan, and those types of issues are the most painful to resolve.

But if we admit that a compromise is possible, its timeframe will be limited by two factors: the political situation in Russia and in the Pacific region, which hinges on changes in China’s geopolitical weight.

In terms of domestic policy, a compromise with Japan, which will entail giving up some of the islands, is more likely when the authorities do not have to take public opinion into account. In other words, this kind of decision can be taken by an authoritarian government. If the choice is made in favor of a democratic expression of will (Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has mentioned the possibility of a referendum on the issue of the Kuril Islands), the result is almost certain to be a resolute ‘no’: people are unlikely to vote for giving anything up. The situation was most favorable eight years ago when Putin hinted at the possibility of a compromise because the Russian authorities were sufficiently authoritarian then and also confident of their standing in the foreseeable future. The situation is less certain now, but there is still a chance.

The second factor concerns China. The balance of forces and influence in Russian-Chinese relations is not in Russia’s favor. If current trends persist, in five to seven years’ time Russia’s foreign policy, at least in the Asia-Pacific region, will have to take much more account of China’s opinion. In other words, Russia’s ability to make decisions which China could interpret as infringing on its sphere of interests will be limited. And China is unlikely to be pleased with a Russian-Japanese compromise on the territorial issue, which would create a precedent (China has territorial disputes with nearly all of its neighbors in East and Southeast Asia) and also indicate rapprochement between two major regional powers.

By all objective indicators, economic, geopolitical and security-based, Russia and Japan need good relations. The territorial dispute is the biggest obstacle in this respect. It cannot be resolved now, but at least the two sides could abstain from fueling tensions without good reason.