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rfmcdonaldI was planning to write this on Canada Day, or better yet the Fourth of July, but reality intervened. The point, though, deserves to be made regardless of the time of the year.
Canadians--English Canadians, rather, since Québécois have a clearly-defined national identity of their own, thank you very much--have a perennial fear that Canadian nationhood is fragile. This despite the fact that the trend over the past two centuries has been for a growing separation of English-speaking areas in Canada from the United States. Late 18th century English Canada was almost entirely the product of immigration/refugee movements from the American interior and New England to the Canadas and Nova Scotia; English Canada's component regions were integrated with each other only because they all shared a common loyalty to the British Crown, in other respects remaining satellites of their parent regions. English Canada has since evolved into a more-or-less united entity in the two centuries since its foundation--don't we all share a common disdain of Toronto (or if you're in Toronto, Bay Street)? Aren't Maritimers looking for work much more likely to move to Ontario or Alberta, now, than New England or the American Midwest? Don't we have shared dialects of English?
Still, English Canada and the United States do share much in common. Québécois have the comfort of knowing that they are sharply distinguished by language and culture from our southern neighbours. Possibly, our cultural similarities could act against the preservation of a distinct English Canada.
When the Soviet Union began to decline with increasing speed in the late 1980s, and after the 1989 revolution in Romania, many observers expected that the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic would shortly unify with a decommunized Romania. After all, despite Soviet attempts to create a Moldavian language the large majority of residents of Moldavia (now Moldova) cotninued to see themselves as Romanian-speakers, while between 1918 and 1940 most of Moldavia was part of Romania. In an era when Germany was reunifying, why would Romanian reunification be impossible? In actual fact, however, even after the Soviet Union dissolved independent Moldova did not unite with Romania, and it has not yet shown any signs of moving towards Romania politically--if anything, Moldova has fallen into a Russian sphere of influence.
Why? Well, a separate history, for one thing:
And when Moldova was united with Romania, the experience wasn't good:
Anyways, the current generation of Moldovans grew up in a time when they lived inside a Moldovan state, whether Soviet territory or independent republic. A Moldovan political identity has formed, despite the Romanian language spoken by most Moldovans. If the question of the Romanian-Moldovan relationship will ever be resolved, this fact will have to be taken into account.
If Romanian-Moldovan unification--whether in a unitary state or in some kind of federation--is still a possibility, one decade after the post-Soviet failure to consummate that union, it is because of economic reasons. Romania is one of the poorest countries in Europe west of the former Soviet Union. Moldova, though, is probably the poorest country in all of Europe (Albania has enjoyed substantial remittance-driven economic growth in recent years). During the Soviet era, Moldova came to enjoy a modest level of prosperity--a million Moldovans took part in the Soviet Union's internal labour migrations, a million emigrating to Russia in pursuit of better-paying work, but Moldovans living at home enjoyed a modest degree of prosperity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, though, and the consequent destruction of Moldova's planned economy, Moldova has done very badly; the civil war caused by the attempted secession of the Russophone and Slavic Transnistria region (never part of Romania, but added to Moldova after Soviet annexation) has made things much worse. Moldovans have responded to this economic crisis by mass migration--perhaps 600 thousand Moldovans have emigrated to western Europe since Moldova gained its independence, some in very difficult conditions. A Moldovan passport, however, does not gain its holders much; a Romanian passport, now, does. Perhaps a half-million Moldovans--out of a total national population of more than four million people--now hold Romanian passports. Moldovans might well unite with a Romania well on its way to European Union membership if only to give Moldovans access to the EU and all of its potential.
(Then again, there's no reason why Moldova couldn't join the European Union in its own right [PDF format link]. After all, if Albania and FYROM can join, why not Moldova?)
The Romanian-Moldovan situation, though, is very radically different from the American-English Canadian situation. There is a gap between American and Canadian living standards, but as these things go it's a relatively small gap; in terms of overall human development, the two countries are at comparable high levels. Canada's quite capable of functioning as an international actor on its own, if not in terms of military power-projection then in terms of trade and migration and even culture. Canada is a functioning state, just as much as the United States.
So. We're safe.
Canadians--English Canadians, rather, since Québécois have a clearly-defined national identity of their own, thank you very much--have a perennial fear that Canadian nationhood is fragile. This despite the fact that the trend over the past two centuries has been for a growing separation of English-speaking areas in Canada from the United States. Late 18th century English Canada was almost entirely the product of immigration/refugee movements from the American interior and New England to the Canadas and Nova Scotia; English Canada's component regions were integrated with each other only because they all shared a common loyalty to the British Crown, in other respects remaining satellites of their parent regions. English Canada has since evolved into a more-or-less united entity in the two centuries since its foundation--don't we all share a common disdain of Toronto (or if you're in Toronto, Bay Street)? Aren't Maritimers looking for work much more likely to move to Ontario or Alberta, now, than New England or the American Midwest? Don't we have shared dialects of English?
Still, English Canada and the United States do share much in common. Québécois have the comfort of knowing that they are sharply distinguished by language and culture from our southern neighbours. Possibly, our cultural similarities could act against the preservation of a distinct English Canada.
When the Soviet Union began to decline with increasing speed in the late 1980s, and after the 1989 revolution in Romania, many observers expected that the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic would shortly unify with a decommunized Romania. After all, despite Soviet attempts to create a Moldavian language the large majority of residents of Moldavia (now Moldova) cotninued to see themselves as Romanian-speakers, while between 1918 and 1940 most of Moldavia was part of Romania. In an era when Germany was reunifying, why would Romanian reunification be impossible? In actual fact, however, even after the Soviet Union dissolved independent Moldova did not unite with Romania, and it has not yet shown any signs of moving towards Romania politically--if anything, Moldova has fallen into a Russian sphere of influence.
Why? Well, a separate history, for one thing:
Originally annexed by imperial Russia in 1812, the Moldovan territory east of the Prut River remained isolated during the entire process of Romanian nation-building that affected western Romanian-speaking territories [. . .] Because of this, it did not participate in the consolidation and latinization of the standard Romanian language. [. . .] During the Tsarist occupation, new urban and industrial areas were intentionally populated with russophone and germanophone minorities. As a result, the few Romanian speakers with access to education and political power were forced to adopt Russian, while the majority remained
powerless peasants. These peasants maintained the ancient Moldovan identity, due to their forced exclusion from both Romanian and Russian identities.
And when Moldova was united with Romania, the experience wasn't good:
The historical record of Romanian rule also gave Moldovans pause. When Bucharest took power in Moldova after World War I, it sharply curtailed local sovereignty. Romania also imposed excessive taxes, contributing to economic stagnation. And, as Moldovans vividly recalled, carpetbaggers had rushed in to
take government positions at the expense of local jobseekers. It had hardly been a golden age, as even irredentists admitted. Why would a future Greater Romania be any better for Moldova than the past one?
Anyways, the current generation of Moldovans grew up in a time when they lived inside a Moldovan state, whether Soviet territory or independent republic. A Moldovan political identity has formed, despite the Romanian language spoken by most Moldovans. If the question of the Romanian-Moldovan relationship will ever be resolved, this fact will have to be taken into account.
If Romanian-Moldovan unification--whether in a unitary state or in some kind of federation--is still a possibility, one decade after the post-Soviet failure to consummate that union, it is because of economic reasons. Romania is one of the poorest countries in Europe west of the former Soviet Union. Moldova, though, is probably the poorest country in all of Europe (Albania has enjoyed substantial remittance-driven economic growth in recent years). During the Soviet era, Moldova came to enjoy a modest level of prosperity--a million Moldovans took part in the Soviet Union's internal labour migrations, a million emigrating to Russia in pursuit of better-paying work, but Moldovans living at home enjoyed a modest degree of prosperity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, though, and the consequent destruction of Moldova's planned economy, Moldova has done very badly; the civil war caused by the attempted secession of the Russophone and Slavic Transnistria region (never part of Romania, but added to Moldova after Soviet annexation) has made things much worse. Moldovans have responded to this economic crisis by mass migration--perhaps 600 thousand Moldovans have emigrated to western Europe since Moldova gained its independence, some in very difficult conditions. A Moldovan passport, however, does not gain its holders much; a Romanian passport, now, does. Perhaps a half-million Moldovans--out of a total national population of more than four million people--now hold Romanian passports. Moldovans might well unite with a Romania well on its way to European Union membership if only to give Moldovans access to the EU and all of its potential.
(Then again, there's no reason why Moldova couldn't join the European Union in its own right [PDF format link]. After all, if Albania and FYROM can join, why not Moldova?)
The Romanian-Moldovan situation, though, is very radically different from the American-English Canadian situation. There is a gap between American and Canadian living standards, but as these things go it's a relatively small gap; in terms of overall human development, the two countries are at comparable high levels. Canada's quite capable of functioning as an international actor on its own, if not in terms of military power-projection then in terms of trade and migration and even culture. Canada is a functioning state, just as much as the United States.
So. We're safe.
