[ARTICLE] Yet another geopolitical shift?
Nov. 14th, 2003 01:33 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
rfmcdonaldFrom the EU Observer, the article "[Comment] FrancoGermans at the forefront":
FRANCK BIANCHERI - "This is a major phenomenon in contemporary European history, and in part also as it is part of a crucial international evolution" (Photo: Europe2020)
EUOBSERVER / DEBATE - For the first time since the creation of Germany in 1870/71, the French and the Germans have found themselves on the same side, in the front line, at the time of a major international crisis. Not only were they together, but they also defended a position which turns out to have reflected the opinion of a vast majority of Europeans, from Romania to Ireland - and a position which every day seems a bit more justified as none of the arguments advanced for legitimising the war against Iraq today seem to be grounded.
For every observer of the European integration process, the phenomenon which this historic partnership between the French and Germans represents should not be under-estimated. This is in part because it constitutes a major phenomenon in contemporary European history, and in part also as it is part of a crucial international evolution.
A major threshold in European integration is passed
What happened in these last months between France and Germany is not an accident of history, nor an isolated event. On the contrary, it manifests a political reality which goes beyond the elites and leaders, and involves the people and which builds on the process started in the fifties, which was then symbolised by the European Community and the Elysée Treaty.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that this acceleration of Franco-German integration is taking place at the same time as the Community project is entering into a new phase in its own history - that of governing a united Europe, and no longer that of building one (with the draft European Constitution, and the conclusion of the vague principle of enlargement). Franco-German relations, like the Community project are simultaneously negotiating the consequences of both the European Coal and Steel Community (initiated in 1951) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (in 1989)
In Europe, just as in the rest of the world, it is the established post-1945 order which is disintegrating before our eyes: a first half disappeared peacefully in 1989, thanks to the particular help of one Mikhail Gorbatchev; the second half is disappearing right now thanks to the activities of one George Bush Jr.
Europe frees itself from its historic sponsors
That these two men were simply tools in the hand of history is fully possible. Nevertheless, their actions have served as catalysts with regards to trends that have been emerging over the last decades.
On the one side, the leader of the soviet camp tried to infuse new dynamism into a bureaucratic regime which was running out of steam given its bureaucracy, internal immobility, and loss of external power. On the other side, the US leader has tried to establish durable global power, something that contradicts the limited and ephemeral nature of such power.
The two super-powers emerged from the same global conflict, are therefore confronted with the limits of their founding act: their ascension to the front row of history was rendered possible by the failure of other actors who were driven by that same desire for power, and unable to measure the extent to which history had over the decades changed the balance of power in the world.
The advent of FrancoGermany establishes the political maturity of Europe
These two events reinforce each other and play a major role in the emergence of FrancoGermany. The first shock, the collapse of the communist bloc, destabilised Franco-German relations which had been founded on a French political leadership that had been accepted by Germany, and that was balanced by an alignment with Washington on all security issues.
With the end of the Soviet threat, and the balance of power between the blocks, France's "added value" was no longer interesting. The political mistakes committed by France at the time of reunification reinforced a Germany searching for political maturity. In brief, the Germans undertook from 1990 to emerge from the post-1945 shadow, whereas the French, on the contrary, tried in vain to hang on to the past for a few more years. The evolution of the French position was, in addition, delayed by a succession of spells where different parties held the Presidency and government, which paralysed new thought and initiatives.
With the arrival of Gerhard Schroeder at the federal Chancellery, this German desire for displaying political maturity took the shape of seeking to break free from the constraints of post-1945 : firstly an affirmation of strength in the Franco-German couple, which was considered unbalanced and hence unsatisfactory (this is the incident of the "third way" notably with the UK).
In parallel, in France, the intellectual vacuum surround the elites led to nightmares of the country being marginalized. These two tendencies, one of Germany as a powerful leader of Europe, and France falling into the memory bin of history, were particularly reinforced by a vision coming from Washington, and widely relayed by US media and American made "experts" on Europe.
This was the incarnation of "wishful thinking" which characterised the analysis of Europe and the world in Washington for the previous decade (in think-tanks, media, universities and government - of both Republican and Democratic persuasion) and was based on the central tenet that Germany would dominate Europe by virtue of its superior GDP, and because it had a central geographical role, abutting as it was onto the future Member States of the EU - and of course also because it was a loyal ally of the US. France, on the other hand, was out, as it had a smaller GDP, and was not on the new enlargement frontier - and moreover was a difficult and often changing partner for the US.
Reality comes home to roost, destroying the delusions of the experts
From the colloquia, seminars and reference books which constitute the essence of American production in the last ten years on the evolution of Europe are based solely on the three ideas which even a fifteen year old European, knowing a modicum of history and geography of the content, could fault intellectually : on the level of the EU, the difference of GDP is marginal. Neither of the two are sufficiently large to dominate the trend. France is at the heart of wealthy and populous Europe, and the new frontier which is really being created is the one being constructed on the field of common policies : enlargement is nothing more than the reunification of the continent.
As for Germany, "loyal ally", one did not have to be a great sage or sorcerer to imagine that the affirmation of German political maturity was likely to include a rejection of its former tutors which included not just France, but also the United States. A decade was needed to find a new modus-vivendi with the former, the coming decade will be needed to establish a new relationship with the latter.
And the most amusing part of the story is that far from contributing to re-think Franco-German relations and their implications for other Europeans and the US, our lovely European intellectual elites are happy to continue reproducing the analyses propagated in Washington, too busy begging their invitations to appear on the major US campuses, in their publications and the reviews "that count", or be at the seminars "where one has to be seen". It is simpler (and more "profitable") to repeat the "truths" which are well known than to show an ounce of imagination and thus contribute actively to the internal political debate on the future of Europe. The treachery of the European clerks is still a current subject!
The return of politics on the European scene
Let's forget therefore these disappointing intellectual elites, and look at what has produced the current state of affairs: a political and democratic phenomenon. It is the political leaders at the highest level, Schroeder and Chirac, and the citizens who have opened the path to the future.
The former, badly prepared, have often had to feel their way, following their instincts as extraordinary tacticians (as they both are) before starting to understand that they were "making history" in the same way as their predecessors De Gaulle and Adenauer did with the Elysée Treaty, Giscard and Schmidt with the monetary snake, or Kohl and Mitterand with the Euro. However, this time, a new actor is also part of the game: public opinion.
None of the previous stages of Franco-German relations was pushed for by the people. On the contrary, the political and economic elites were the driving forces, sometimes in the face of profound doubts with the public. This time, it is possible to say that the people have contributed as much, if not more to the crossing of a new threshold.
There is no doubt that Schroeder and Chirac are politicians preoccupied with winning elections. But honestly, I know very few politicians in a democracy who really want to lose them (and it is not George Bush Jr. Who will deny this). That they followed their public opinions is certain, and in a democracy there is nothing shocking in this. The recurrent affirmations in recent months that Jose Maria Aznar or Kazniewsky are really major Statesmen because they did the opposite of what their citizens wanted, or that they avoid parliamentary debates on subjects where they risk being put in difficulty seems very doubtful… or perhaps one means that they would be great in non-democratic regimes?
And the meaning of European integration returns
Naturally, the fact that Schroeder left Chirac to speak in the name of Germany at a recent European summit was purely symbolic, and clever public relations. But who conducts politics, without PR? And who makes history without symbolism? Moreover, to be meaningful the symbolism must be backed by a certain reality: and that was certainly the case in this European summit. After all, if it were that simple to do, why did other German or French leaders not do this before?
This shows an important change: it did not happen before because then the people of these countries would have not understood it. Now all you need to do is to talk with the people from these two lands, and everybody understands what it means: in being together for the first time in a major crisis, France and Germany have crossed a new threshold, starting to close the gap that opened so bloodily at the time of German unification in 1870/71. One would have to be blind to the feelings of people, and to their collective memories not to understand the importance of this change.
If this is so insignificant, why do Messrs. Berlusconi and Aznar or Blair and Aznar not do the same? After all, these are three past-masters at public relations.
The reality is that this Franco-German symbolism is now becoming a part of the everyday facts of power politics and that in the view of younger generations, those who will start to replace the baby-boomers from 2005 onwards, this is not be something that the will reverse.
Or is there a supreme manipulator in the tandem? Some see Schroeder in this role, using France and its dreams of greatness in order to affirm the political maturity of Germany vis-à-vis the United States in order tomorrow to build a new US-German relationship on the global level and thence to obtain a seat on the Security Council of a reformed UN?
Others put Chirac in this role, using Schroeder, and German pacifism to serve French goals that aim to "boot America out of Europe" (Chirac in that case would be a hybrid of Joan of Ark and Machiavelli--quite an act) in order to dominate the continent (indeed the world!).
The German and French peoples would in this scenario be pure by-standers, unable to identify their interests or unable to influence the agendas of others who are purely egotistically motivated. Lets be clear, not only do these analyses reflect intellectual laziness on the part of their authors, who are unable to comprehend current affairs without use of outdated paradigms, but also they show these authors real vision of democracy and public opinion.
What these changes mean for tomorrow's Europe
Finally, (and once again our "nice experts" and "charming intellectual elites" are not included in the number who do this) how can one integrate this new Franco-German relationship into the European project ? The limits and errors of the Schroeder-Chirac tandem basically reflect this aspect of the matter. FrancoGermany will not exist without other Europeans. It constitutes a catalyst of many European mixtures, corresponding to priorities, interests and projects of different categories of Member States.
The EU in the decade to come will be a "shaker" which produces different cocktails depending on the barman who uses it. As the shaker is quite heavy, the barman will have to be quite strong. Today only FrancoGermany has the muscles needed to do the shaking. Will FrancoGermany have enough ideas in order to develop cocktails with other Europeans and which please the majority, as well as effectively responding to the objective challenges facing Europe, notably including the reinvention of relations with our American friends ?
Even if this is the subject for another article (and for the entirety of the activities of Europe 2020), one can be optimistic that when one reflects on the Iraq crisis, as FrancoGermany managed to produce a cocktail which pleased 80% of Europeans, in reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in international relations (certainly this has to be adapted to the needs of the 21st Century), on the primacy of international law, and the refusal of the middle-ages concept of preventative war.
The coming generations of Europeans must a priori be good `EuroBarmen': lets not forget that this is the Erasmus generation. From 20 years of age, they have learned to make- and appreciate - good European cocktails together--in which case Chirac and Schroeder have to catch up.
Franck Biancheri - is Director of Studies and Strategy at the foundation Europe 2020 and President of the transatlantic organisation TIESweb. In 2002-2003 he conducted the Newropeans Democracy Marathon, a tour around Europe to debate with public audiences in 100 towns in 25 pays. The intensity and duration of his activity in favour of an integrated and democratic Europe was recognised when he was elected a Hero of the year in by readers of TIME in Spring 2003. He also co-ordinated the publication in June 2003 of the report "Vision Europe 2020".
I'm sure that the Dubya administration will be pleased as punch with the latest French foreign-policy initiative put forward by de Villepin.
FRANCK BIANCHERI - "This is a major phenomenon in contemporary European history, and in part also as it is part of a crucial international evolution" (Photo: Europe2020)
EUOBSERVER / DEBATE - For the first time since the creation of Germany in 1870/71, the French and the Germans have found themselves on the same side, in the front line, at the time of a major international crisis. Not only were they together, but they also defended a position which turns out to have reflected the opinion of a vast majority of Europeans, from Romania to Ireland - and a position which every day seems a bit more justified as none of the arguments advanced for legitimising the war against Iraq today seem to be grounded.
For every observer of the European integration process, the phenomenon which this historic partnership between the French and Germans represents should not be under-estimated. This is in part because it constitutes a major phenomenon in contemporary European history, and in part also as it is part of a crucial international evolution.
A major threshold in European integration is passed
What happened in these last months between France and Germany is not an accident of history, nor an isolated event. On the contrary, it manifests a political reality which goes beyond the elites and leaders, and involves the people and which builds on the process started in the fifties, which was then symbolised by the European Community and the Elysée Treaty.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that this acceleration of Franco-German integration is taking place at the same time as the Community project is entering into a new phase in its own history - that of governing a united Europe, and no longer that of building one (with the draft European Constitution, and the conclusion of the vague principle of enlargement). Franco-German relations, like the Community project are simultaneously negotiating the consequences of both the European Coal and Steel Community (initiated in 1951) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (in 1989)
In Europe, just as in the rest of the world, it is the established post-1945 order which is disintegrating before our eyes: a first half disappeared peacefully in 1989, thanks to the particular help of one Mikhail Gorbatchev; the second half is disappearing right now thanks to the activities of one George Bush Jr.
Europe frees itself from its historic sponsors
That these two men were simply tools in the hand of history is fully possible. Nevertheless, their actions have served as catalysts with regards to trends that have been emerging over the last decades.
On the one side, the leader of the soviet camp tried to infuse new dynamism into a bureaucratic regime which was running out of steam given its bureaucracy, internal immobility, and loss of external power. On the other side, the US leader has tried to establish durable global power, something that contradicts the limited and ephemeral nature of such power.
The two super-powers emerged from the same global conflict, are therefore confronted with the limits of their founding act: their ascension to the front row of history was rendered possible by the failure of other actors who were driven by that same desire for power, and unable to measure the extent to which history had over the decades changed the balance of power in the world.
The advent of FrancoGermany establishes the political maturity of Europe
These two events reinforce each other and play a major role in the emergence of FrancoGermany. The first shock, the collapse of the communist bloc, destabilised Franco-German relations which had been founded on a French political leadership that had been accepted by Germany, and that was balanced by an alignment with Washington on all security issues.
With the end of the Soviet threat, and the balance of power between the blocks, France's "added value" was no longer interesting. The political mistakes committed by France at the time of reunification reinforced a Germany searching for political maturity. In brief, the Germans undertook from 1990 to emerge from the post-1945 shadow, whereas the French, on the contrary, tried in vain to hang on to the past for a few more years. The evolution of the French position was, in addition, delayed by a succession of spells where different parties held the Presidency and government, which paralysed new thought and initiatives.
With the arrival of Gerhard Schroeder at the federal Chancellery, this German desire for displaying political maturity took the shape of seeking to break free from the constraints of post-1945 : firstly an affirmation of strength in the Franco-German couple, which was considered unbalanced and hence unsatisfactory (this is the incident of the "third way" notably with the UK).
In parallel, in France, the intellectual vacuum surround the elites led to nightmares of the country being marginalized. These two tendencies, one of Germany as a powerful leader of Europe, and France falling into the memory bin of history, were particularly reinforced by a vision coming from Washington, and widely relayed by US media and American made "experts" on Europe.
This was the incarnation of "wishful thinking" which characterised the analysis of Europe and the world in Washington for the previous decade (in think-tanks, media, universities and government - of both Republican and Democratic persuasion) and was based on the central tenet that Germany would dominate Europe by virtue of its superior GDP, and because it had a central geographical role, abutting as it was onto the future Member States of the EU - and of course also because it was a loyal ally of the US. France, on the other hand, was out, as it had a smaller GDP, and was not on the new enlargement frontier - and moreover was a difficult and often changing partner for the US.
Reality comes home to roost, destroying the delusions of the experts
From the colloquia, seminars and reference books which constitute the essence of American production in the last ten years on the evolution of Europe are based solely on the three ideas which even a fifteen year old European, knowing a modicum of history and geography of the content, could fault intellectually : on the level of the EU, the difference of GDP is marginal. Neither of the two are sufficiently large to dominate the trend. France is at the heart of wealthy and populous Europe, and the new frontier which is really being created is the one being constructed on the field of common policies : enlargement is nothing more than the reunification of the continent.
As for Germany, "loyal ally", one did not have to be a great sage or sorcerer to imagine that the affirmation of German political maturity was likely to include a rejection of its former tutors which included not just France, but also the United States. A decade was needed to find a new modus-vivendi with the former, the coming decade will be needed to establish a new relationship with the latter.
And the most amusing part of the story is that far from contributing to re-think Franco-German relations and their implications for other Europeans and the US, our lovely European intellectual elites are happy to continue reproducing the analyses propagated in Washington, too busy begging their invitations to appear on the major US campuses, in their publications and the reviews "that count", or be at the seminars "where one has to be seen". It is simpler (and more "profitable") to repeat the "truths" which are well known than to show an ounce of imagination and thus contribute actively to the internal political debate on the future of Europe. The treachery of the European clerks is still a current subject!
The return of politics on the European scene
Let's forget therefore these disappointing intellectual elites, and look at what has produced the current state of affairs: a political and democratic phenomenon. It is the political leaders at the highest level, Schroeder and Chirac, and the citizens who have opened the path to the future.
The former, badly prepared, have often had to feel their way, following their instincts as extraordinary tacticians (as they both are) before starting to understand that they were "making history" in the same way as their predecessors De Gaulle and Adenauer did with the Elysée Treaty, Giscard and Schmidt with the monetary snake, or Kohl and Mitterand with the Euro. However, this time, a new actor is also part of the game: public opinion.
None of the previous stages of Franco-German relations was pushed for by the people. On the contrary, the political and economic elites were the driving forces, sometimes in the face of profound doubts with the public. This time, it is possible to say that the people have contributed as much, if not more to the crossing of a new threshold.
There is no doubt that Schroeder and Chirac are politicians preoccupied with winning elections. But honestly, I know very few politicians in a democracy who really want to lose them (and it is not George Bush Jr. Who will deny this). That they followed their public opinions is certain, and in a democracy there is nothing shocking in this. The recurrent affirmations in recent months that Jose Maria Aznar or Kazniewsky are really major Statesmen because they did the opposite of what their citizens wanted, or that they avoid parliamentary debates on subjects where they risk being put in difficulty seems very doubtful… or perhaps one means that they would be great in non-democratic regimes?
And the meaning of European integration returns
Naturally, the fact that Schroeder left Chirac to speak in the name of Germany at a recent European summit was purely symbolic, and clever public relations. But who conducts politics, without PR? And who makes history without symbolism? Moreover, to be meaningful the symbolism must be backed by a certain reality: and that was certainly the case in this European summit. After all, if it were that simple to do, why did other German or French leaders not do this before?
This shows an important change: it did not happen before because then the people of these countries would have not understood it. Now all you need to do is to talk with the people from these two lands, and everybody understands what it means: in being together for the first time in a major crisis, France and Germany have crossed a new threshold, starting to close the gap that opened so bloodily at the time of German unification in 1870/71. One would have to be blind to the feelings of people, and to their collective memories not to understand the importance of this change.
If this is so insignificant, why do Messrs. Berlusconi and Aznar or Blair and Aznar not do the same? After all, these are three past-masters at public relations.
The reality is that this Franco-German symbolism is now becoming a part of the everyday facts of power politics and that in the view of younger generations, those who will start to replace the baby-boomers from 2005 onwards, this is not be something that the will reverse.
Or is there a supreme manipulator in the tandem? Some see Schroeder in this role, using France and its dreams of greatness in order to affirm the political maturity of Germany vis-à-vis the United States in order tomorrow to build a new US-German relationship on the global level and thence to obtain a seat on the Security Council of a reformed UN?
Others put Chirac in this role, using Schroeder, and German pacifism to serve French goals that aim to "boot America out of Europe" (Chirac in that case would be a hybrid of Joan of Ark and Machiavelli--quite an act) in order to dominate the continent (indeed the world!).
The German and French peoples would in this scenario be pure by-standers, unable to identify their interests or unable to influence the agendas of others who are purely egotistically motivated. Lets be clear, not only do these analyses reflect intellectual laziness on the part of their authors, who are unable to comprehend current affairs without use of outdated paradigms, but also they show these authors real vision of democracy and public opinion.
What these changes mean for tomorrow's Europe
Finally, (and once again our "nice experts" and "charming intellectual elites" are not included in the number who do this) how can one integrate this new Franco-German relationship into the European project ? The limits and errors of the Schroeder-Chirac tandem basically reflect this aspect of the matter. FrancoGermany will not exist without other Europeans. It constitutes a catalyst of many European mixtures, corresponding to priorities, interests and projects of different categories of Member States.
The EU in the decade to come will be a "shaker" which produces different cocktails depending on the barman who uses it. As the shaker is quite heavy, the barman will have to be quite strong. Today only FrancoGermany has the muscles needed to do the shaking. Will FrancoGermany have enough ideas in order to develop cocktails with other Europeans and which please the majority, as well as effectively responding to the objective challenges facing Europe, notably including the reinvention of relations with our American friends ?
Even if this is the subject for another article (and for the entirety of the activities of Europe 2020), one can be optimistic that when one reflects on the Iraq crisis, as FrancoGermany managed to produce a cocktail which pleased 80% of Europeans, in reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in international relations (certainly this has to be adapted to the needs of the 21st Century), on the primacy of international law, and the refusal of the middle-ages concept of preventative war.
The coming generations of Europeans must a priori be good `EuroBarmen': lets not forget that this is the Erasmus generation. From 20 years of age, they have learned to make- and appreciate - good European cocktails together--in which case Chirac and Schroeder have to catch up.
Franck Biancheri - is Director of Studies and Strategy at the foundation Europe 2020 and President of the transatlantic organisation TIESweb. In 2002-2003 he conducted the Newropeans Democracy Marathon, a tour around Europe to debate with public audiences in 100 towns in 25 pays. The intensity and duration of his activity in favour of an integrated and democratic Europe was recognised when he was elected a Hero of the year in by readers of TIME in Spring 2003. He also co-ordinated the publication in June 2003 of the report "Vision Europe 2020".
I'm sure that the Dubya administration will be pleased as punch with the latest French foreign-policy initiative put forward by de Villepin.
