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rfmcdonaldEarlier this week, I was rereading my two-volume abridgement of Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History when I noticed his treatment of Islamic civilization. Contra Huntington, he doesn't think that a single Islamic civilization exists. Rather, he believes that the Islamic lands, like the Christian lands, are divided into two civilizations, one Arabic and one Iranic. Iranic civilization, as the name suggests, is defined by Toynbee as a civilization centered upon Iran and Persian culture. As the unreliable but useful Mihan Foundation notes, in A Study of History
Toynbee further compared the relationship between Iranic and Arabic civilizations within Islam with the relationship between Western and Eastern Orthodox civilizations within Christendom. In his theory of history, the Arabic and Eastern Orthodox civilizations were, later overtaken and subjugated by the later converts to their religion on their geographical fringes. Thus, Westerners eventually sacked Constantinople; the Turks conquered the Arab world and the influence of the Persian court led to the growth of Persian as a Muslim lingua franca alongside or even supplanting Arabic, connecting lands as far separated as Anatolia, Turkestan, and North India.
Now, a lot of things are wrong with this theory, which like other macrohistorical theories overlooks the seemingly small details that make all the difference. (Googling, I note that the very annoying Stephen Schwartz has made a similar argument.) Nonetheless, Toynbee's argument got me to thinking about Iran and Turkey, and the many ways in which they are similar, and the critical differences between the two.
There are fairly broad similarities between Turkey and Iran. In crude demographic terms, for instance, The World in 2005 reports that there are 71 million Iranians versus 73.3 million Turks; in the meantime, the Iranian (PDF format) and Turkish (PDf format) populations have mostly completed the demographic transition; as INED describes, Iran and Turkey are unique among the large countries of the Middle East in this respect. Similarly, the two countries have GDPs of similar size measured at purchasing power parity (though not on international exchange rates; Iran's partial disconnect from the global economy ensures that its economy and GDP per capita is only half that of Turkey's).
Far more important than the statistical similarities are the profound historical similarities. In the 20th century, both countries have seen long-established imperial dynasties (the Ottomans and the Qajars, respectively) fall under the general of aggressive foreign imperialisms and the more contingent pressures of the First World War. These dynasties were replaced by aggressively modernizing regimes (Ataturk's republic and the Pahlavi monarchy), which sought to develop nationalisms on the European model as a way to consolidate emergent nation-states: the Anatolian core of the Ottoman empire became the republican nation-state of Turkey, ancient Persia renamed itself Iran to reflect a new sense of its Indo-European origins as distinct from its Islamic roots. (It's interesting to compare the transition from Persia to Iran in the Middle East with the comparable transition from Siam to Thailand in Southeast Asia, inasmuch as both name changes occurred in penetrated though nominally sovereign monarchical states which sought explicitly to foster radical new nationalist movements.) These two regimes experienced some degree of success in modernizing on the Western model, but were hostile to radical Arab movements; this hostility, along with considerable pressure from the Soviet Union, caused them to attach themselves to Western powers, particularly the United States, in status quo alliances. Since the Second World War, the two countries have managed to modernize fairly thoroughly, becoming mass consumer societies with largely literate populations which in turn support comparatively large scientific and industrial establishments. Neither country has managed to close entirely the gap with Europe, or the United States, or even a much-diminished Russia. The gap is closing, though; Turkey and Iran have each achieved, in their increasingly divergent ways, a certain level of success that makes them difficult to ignore or underestimate.
The main difference between the two is that Iran has been notably less successful. The Pahlavi monarchy was never as successful a regime, nor (as Ryszard Kapuscinski famously described in Shah of Shahs) was it as competent as Ataturk's Turkey in modernizing. Turkey seems to be making the transition to a secular and fully democratic polity without major hiccups apart from a worrying tradition of military coups by secularist generals; Iran's transition has been much more tumultuous and costly, shifting in the past generation from an authoritarian monarchy to a wartime-totalitarian Islamic theocracy to the current soft-theocratic regime, accumulating a large death toll along the way. Turkey's 20th century history was certainly marked by a terribly high death toll: from the genocide of the Armenians and the expulsion of the Greeks in the 1920s to the Ataturkish republic's ongoing troubles with the Kurds and the intermittant sufferings of the political prisoners under military (most famously the executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes), millions have died and millions more have suffered. The worst of that suffering, though, is in the past.
Why such a difference? Geography, mainly. The question of whether or not Turkey constitutes a European state is the main issue blocking Turkey from membership in the European Union. In many ways (its demographic structure, its predominant religion, its comparative poverty and non-modernity) Turkey is a poor fit for Europe. Nonetheless, since the 15th century some kind of Turkish state has been a major participant in the European state system. From the mid-18th century on, when Austria and Russia began to push back Ottoman frontiers in southeastern Europe and the Black Sea with increasing impunity, the Ottoman regime entered a period of pronounced decline, accelerated by the nationalist secessions of its Christian minorities and Egypt. It did remain, up until its destruction, a major force, if only (at worst) as a negative factor capable of destabilizing the whole system; it remained minimally competitive.
Then-Persia wasn't so fortunate. Buffered from the full impact of Europe by the hostile Ottoman and Russian empires, not until the growth of British influence (via India) in the 19th century was Iran brought into full contact with the Western state system. By this time, the Iran of the Qajar dynasty had definitely entered a pronounced decline, losing the modern-day South Caucasus to the Russian Empire, experiencing economic decline and depopulation, and suffering a breakdown of the state. Despite the capitulations and the establishment of autonomous principalities on its European fringes like Eastern Rumelia and Crete, the Ottoman Empire remained nominally sovereign throughout its territories. In 1912, Iran was divided into formal British and Russian spheres of influence. Too, Iran remains ethnically a more heterogeneous society than Turkey, with large Turkic and other minorities lying on the fringes of Iran; in 1945-6, the Soviet Union attempted to exploit this fissiparousness by establishing a satellite republic in Iranian Azerbaijan, withdrawing only under Anglo-American presusre. Compare this to the contemporary and notably unsuccessful Soviet attempt to pressure Turkey into ceding Kars and Ardahan. Turkey's economic growth after the Second World War was disappointing inasmuch as Turkey failed to achieve the levels of economic development achieved even by adjacent Greece, never mind southern Europe; it was fundamentally more stable than Iran's, however, which remains excessively dominated by oil and natural gas and their related industries. As for their political systems, a secular and moderately pluralistic republic--no matter how caught up it is by French-style laicism--is fundamentally more stable than an ideologized system that can accept no serious compromise.
In the 21st century, Iran and Turkey may see some degree of convergence. Iran's not at all likely to join the European Union of 2050, of course; the Canadian and Argentine applications for membership would likely be more welcome, and less difficult to manage. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the likely absence of Iraq as a factor, the impending chaos of Saudi Arabia, and the case that Bernard-Henry Lévy makes for Pakistan, Iran stands a reasonable chance of being the only regional power of note. Certainly it has enough assets working in its favour, with an economy that compares quite well to almost all of its neighbours, and a relatively large, well-educated and healthy population.
And the future for Iranian religion and the theocracy? All that I can say--likely, all that needs to be said--is that in society after society, it has proven impossible for a bankrupt ideological system to repress an educated and mobilized population indefinitely. That, and the fact that converting a strain of religious belief once notable for its principled opposition to corrupt power into an aggressive ideology closely associated with oppression, terror, and death is a very good way indeed to delegitimize it. It wouldn't surprise me if the next Iranian regime tended towards French-style laicism. Hey, that system has worked well enough in Turkey so far.
Toynbee shows that prior to the advent of Shah Isma’il the founder of Safavid dynasty, Iran was the real literary and cultural center through which the Saljuqs, Osmanlis, Transoxanians, and the Indian Muslims drew their inspiration and power.
In this vast area that Toynbee calls "Iranic World," the people had discarded Arabic in favor of Farsi as its secular literary vehicle.
The territories which were conquered from Orthodox Christendom by the Seljuqs and the Osmanlis were a kind of colonial extension of the Iranic World, and the representatives of the Iranic society in these partibus infidelim, like its representatives in Hindustan, depended for the maintenance of their culture upon a study flow of arts and ideas, and of immigrants to import them from the homelands of the Iranic civilization in Iran itself.
Toynbee further compared the relationship between Iranic and Arabic civilizations within Islam with the relationship between Western and Eastern Orthodox civilizations within Christendom. In his theory of history, the Arabic and Eastern Orthodox civilizations were, later overtaken and subjugated by the later converts to their religion on their geographical fringes. Thus, Westerners eventually sacked Constantinople; the Turks conquered the Arab world and the influence of the Persian court led to the growth of Persian as a Muslim lingua franca alongside or even supplanting Arabic, connecting lands as far separated as Anatolia, Turkestan, and North India.
Now, a lot of things are wrong with this theory, which like other macrohistorical theories overlooks the seemingly small details that make all the difference. (Googling, I note that the very annoying Stephen Schwartz has made a similar argument.) Nonetheless, Toynbee's argument got me to thinking about Iran and Turkey, and the many ways in which they are similar, and the critical differences between the two.
There are fairly broad similarities between Turkey and Iran. In crude demographic terms, for instance, The World in 2005 reports that there are 71 million Iranians versus 73.3 million Turks; in the meantime, the Iranian (PDF format) and Turkish (PDf format) populations have mostly completed the demographic transition; as INED describes, Iran and Turkey are unique among the large countries of the Middle East in this respect. Similarly, the two countries have GDPs of similar size measured at purchasing power parity (though not on international exchange rates; Iran's partial disconnect from the global economy ensures that its economy and GDP per capita is only half that of Turkey's).
Far more important than the statistical similarities are the profound historical similarities. In the 20th century, both countries have seen long-established imperial dynasties (the Ottomans and the Qajars, respectively) fall under the general of aggressive foreign imperialisms and the more contingent pressures of the First World War. These dynasties were replaced by aggressively modernizing regimes (Ataturk's republic and the Pahlavi monarchy), which sought to develop nationalisms on the European model as a way to consolidate emergent nation-states: the Anatolian core of the Ottoman empire became the republican nation-state of Turkey, ancient Persia renamed itself Iran to reflect a new sense of its Indo-European origins as distinct from its Islamic roots. (It's interesting to compare the transition from Persia to Iran in the Middle East with the comparable transition from Siam to Thailand in Southeast Asia, inasmuch as both name changes occurred in penetrated though nominally sovereign monarchical states which sought explicitly to foster radical new nationalist movements.) These two regimes experienced some degree of success in modernizing on the Western model, but were hostile to radical Arab movements; this hostility, along with considerable pressure from the Soviet Union, caused them to attach themselves to Western powers, particularly the United States, in status quo alliances. Since the Second World War, the two countries have managed to modernize fairly thoroughly, becoming mass consumer societies with largely literate populations which in turn support comparatively large scientific and industrial establishments. Neither country has managed to close entirely the gap with Europe, or the United States, or even a much-diminished Russia. The gap is closing, though; Turkey and Iran have each achieved, in their increasingly divergent ways, a certain level of success that makes them difficult to ignore or underestimate.
The main difference between the two is that Iran has been notably less successful. The Pahlavi monarchy was never as successful a regime, nor (as Ryszard Kapuscinski famously described in Shah of Shahs) was it as competent as Ataturk's Turkey in modernizing. Turkey seems to be making the transition to a secular and fully democratic polity without major hiccups apart from a worrying tradition of military coups by secularist generals; Iran's transition has been much more tumultuous and costly, shifting in the past generation from an authoritarian monarchy to a wartime-totalitarian Islamic theocracy to the current soft-theocratic regime, accumulating a large death toll along the way. Turkey's 20th century history was certainly marked by a terribly high death toll: from the genocide of the Armenians and the expulsion of the Greeks in the 1920s to the Ataturkish republic's ongoing troubles with the Kurds and the intermittant sufferings of the political prisoners under military (most famously the executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes), millions have died and millions more have suffered. The worst of that suffering, though, is in the past.
Why such a difference? Geography, mainly. The question of whether or not Turkey constitutes a European state is the main issue blocking Turkey from membership in the European Union. In many ways (its demographic structure, its predominant religion, its comparative poverty and non-modernity) Turkey is a poor fit for Europe. Nonetheless, since the 15th century some kind of Turkish state has been a major participant in the European state system. From the mid-18th century on, when Austria and Russia began to push back Ottoman frontiers in southeastern Europe and the Black Sea with increasing impunity, the Ottoman regime entered a period of pronounced decline, accelerated by the nationalist secessions of its Christian minorities and Egypt. It did remain, up until its destruction, a major force, if only (at worst) as a negative factor capable of destabilizing the whole system; it remained minimally competitive.
Then-Persia wasn't so fortunate. Buffered from the full impact of Europe by the hostile Ottoman and Russian empires, not until the growth of British influence (via India) in the 19th century was Iran brought into full contact with the Western state system. By this time, the Iran of the Qajar dynasty had definitely entered a pronounced decline, losing the modern-day South Caucasus to the Russian Empire, experiencing economic decline and depopulation, and suffering a breakdown of the state. Despite the capitulations and the establishment of autonomous principalities on its European fringes like Eastern Rumelia and Crete, the Ottoman Empire remained nominally sovereign throughout its territories. In 1912, Iran was divided into formal British and Russian spheres of influence. Too, Iran remains ethnically a more heterogeneous society than Turkey, with large Turkic and other minorities lying on the fringes of Iran; in 1945-6, the Soviet Union attempted to exploit this fissiparousness by establishing a satellite republic in Iranian Azerbaijan, withdrawing only under Anglo-American presusre. Compare this to the contemporary and notably unsuccessful Soviet attempt to pressure Turkey into ceding Kars and Ardahan. Turkey's economic growth after the Second World War was disappointing inasmuch as Turkey failed to achieve the levels of economic development achieved even by adjacent Greece, never mind southern Europe; it was fundamentally more stable than Iran's, however, which remains excessively dominated by oil and natural gas and their related industries. As for their political systems, a secular and moderately pluralistic republic--no matter how caught up it is by French-style laicism--is fundamentally more stable than an ideologized system that can accept no serious compromise.
In the 21st century, Iran and Turkey may see some degree of convergence. Iran's not at all likely to join the European Union of 2050, of course; the Canadian and Argentine applications for membership would likely be more welcome, and less difficult to manage. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the likely absence of Iraq as a factor, the impending chaos of Saudi Arabia, and the case that Bernard-Henry Lévy makes for Pakistan, Iran stands a reasonable chance of being the only regional power of note. Certainly it has enough assets working in its favour, with an economy that compares quite well to almost all of its neighbours, and a relatively large, well-educated and healthy population.
And the future for Iranian religion and the theocracy? All that I can say--likely, all that needs to be said--is that in society after society, it has proven impossible for a bankrupt ideological system to repress an educated and mobilized population indefinitely. That, and the fact that converting a strain of religious belief once notable for its principled opposition to corrupt power into an aggressive ideology closely associated with oppression, terror, and death is a very good way indeed to delegitimize it. It wouldn't surprise me if the next Iranian regime tended towards French-style laicism. Hey, that system has worked well enough in Turkey so far.
