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rfmcdonaldSolzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I. Letter to the Soviet Leaders. Trans. Hilary Sternberg. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 59 pp.
I am of two minds on Solzhenitsyn. It is certainly quite true that Solzhenitsyn is an excellent author and that he was a courageous dissident against the Soviet hierarchy. His novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich is one of the best--that is, both moving and informative--examinations of the Stalin's camp system, certainly a far better work than Adam Hochshild's competent but overanalytical The Unquiet Ghost. It is also true that Solzhenitsyn has failed to find himself a role in post-Communist Russia, that when he is not advocating an unrealistic return to an idealized pre-Tsarist peasant society he is championing a new Russian imperialism--in Kazakstan, in the North Caucasus, in eastern Europe--that can only lead to hardship. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn can be best thought of as a 20th century Tolstoy lacking Tolstoy's Russian audience and--perhaps--Tolstoy's credibility.
Letter to the Soviet Leaders is the work--a non-fiction letter, a philosophical-cum-historical examination of the Russian present and Russia's future that was boldly mailed to the Soviet leadership--that made Solzhenitsyn's exile to Vermont inevitable. It is the definitive statement of Solzhenitsyn's worldview; as such, it evidences both the best and the worst elements of his thought. The Letter is concerned with limits. In the introduction, Solzhenitsyn states that he does not expect his letter's recipients to take note of his ideas, valuably frank as they might be coming outside of the Soviet bureaucracy, but that he hopes--forlornly--that they will share his concern for the future of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. This conscious awareness of his limits as a writer is matched by his statement of the Soviet Union's limits. Yes, he does agree with the Soviet leaders, it is true that western Europe is unwilling to challenge Soviet might, and that the United States is reeling from the Vietnam experience, and that Western civilization is generally experiencing a spiritual and moral crisis; yes, it is true that the Soviet Union has achieved a degree of power that the hopelessly incoherent Tsarist regime could never have hoped. (Solzhenitsyn wrote in the 1970's, much of the time in internal exile in Estonia. Perhaps he was inspired by his perusal of Western broadcasts.)
In Solzhenitsyn's view, the Soviet Union is based on the flawed implementation of the flawed Western ideology of Marxism, and like the rest of Western civilization the Soviet Union is faced with the impending arrival of natural limits (ecological, demographic, resource-related) to traditional patterns of unrestrained growth. The West proper is dynamic enough to adjust to the arrival of these limits; the Soviet Union is too inflexible, too committed to the archaic Western concept of growth at all costs and to its messianic ideology, and will likely fall. And then, there is the threat of a war with China, fought over ideological minutiae and sure if previous wars are any evidence to decimate the rising generation of Russians and destroy Russia. Something must be done to save Russia.
Solzhenitsyn counsels, quite simply, that the Soviet Union retreat from its ideological pretensions. Let China take up the burden of global challenger to the United States--with luck, the Chinese will also realize the faults of their messianic Marxism-Leninism, but for the time being Russia must be concerned with its own salvation. Russia, in a 21st century sure (from Solzhenistyn's Limits to Growth-inspired perspective) to be characterized by hunger for land, has ample land in the "Russian Northeast", in uncolonized and under exploited Siberia; through this colonization movement (which might impinge upon the sensibility of the native peoples, but then their existence has always been marginal and sins of the past cannot be righted. In this way, Russia will redeem itself and become a moral exemplar.
Letter to the Soviet Leaders is flawed. Solzhenitsyn was too open to Western predictions of the impending near-term collapse of society after the flawed Limits to Growth simulation, just as he was too open to Soviet and Western predictions of the impending demoralization and collapse of Western society. Moreover, I find his cavalier attitude towards the native peoples of Siberia equally infuriating (if it isn't acceptable for the Soviet regime to destroy Russian traditions why is it acceptable for the Russian regime to destroy Siberian native traditions?) and humorous (in the post-Soviet era Siberia's natives are recovering their heritage even as the resident Russian communities are depopulated by emigrants fleeing for the south).
Perhaps the most significant fault of the Letter lies in its idealization of the pre-modern Russian village in particular and of the past in general. Orlando Figes' A People's Tragedy alone provides ample evidence that the Russian villages to which Solzhenitsyn looks for a model for Russia's future were hardly pleasant places to live. The break from tradition to modernity is never easy, and Russia's break was more difficult than most, but to most moderns and post-moderns (and yes, Russia is peopled by these) the closed static ways of village life are intolerable. Once people have been introduced to the joys of mass culture and urban living, it will be very difficult to get them to become pioneers, unless you forcethem, of course. Solzhenitsyn, it seems, has never made that break.
Some people--like the reviewer Robert Kraychak for the conservative monthly First Things--might acclaim Solzhenitsyn as a moral visionary, a "political Augustinian," who challenges the secular post-modernist status quo. I fear, though, that Solzhenitsyn's thought suffers fatally from a refusal to accept his wilful archaicism and consequent irrelevancy to 21st century Russia. Perhaps it's just as well: Solzhenitsyn's desire to restore Russia to the boundaries of the Slavic-populated areas of the Soviet Union has been described as alternatively "nationalist isolationist" and "imperialistic," and judging by Canada's First Nations I doubt that the Yakut and Chukchi appreciate being colonized so as to save Russia's soul. It's still a pity, though.
I am of two minds on Solzhenitsyn. It is certainly quite true that Solzhenitsyn is an excellent author and that he was a courageous dissident against the Soviet hierarchy. His novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich is one of the best--that is, both moving and informative--examinations of the Stalin's camp system, certainly a far better work than Adam Hochshild's competent but overanalytical The Unquiet Ghost. It is also true that Solzhenitsyn has failed to find himself a role in post-Communist Russia, that when he is not advocating an unrealistic return to an idealized pre-Tsarist peasant society he is championing a new Russian imperialism--in Kazakstan, in the North Caucasus, in eastern Europe--that can only lead to hardship. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn can be best thought of as a 20th century Tolstoy lacking Tolstoy's Russian audience and--perhaps--Tolstoy's credibility.
Letter to the Soviet Leaders is the work--a non-fiction letter, a philosophical-cum-historical examination of the Russian present and Russia's future that was boldly mailed to the Soviet leadership--that made Solzhenitsyn's exile to Vermont inevitable. It is the definitive statement of Solzhenitsyn's worldview; as such, it evidences both the best and the worst elements of his thought. The Letter is concerned with limits. In the introduction, Solzhenitsyn states that he does not expect his letter's recipients to take note of his ideas, valuably frank as they might be coming outside of the Soviet bureaucracy, but that he hopes--forlornly--that they will share his concern for the future of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. This conscious awareness of his limits as a writer is matched by his statement of the Soviet Union's limits. Yes, he does agree with the Soviet leaders, it is true that western Europe is unwilling to challenge Soviet might, and that the United States is reeling from the Vietnam experience, and that Western civilization is generally experiencing a spiritual and moral crisis; yes, it is true that the Soviet Union has achieved a degree of power that the hopelessly incoherent Tsarist regime could never have hoped. (Solzhenitsyn wrote in the 1970's, much of the time in internal exile in Estonia. Perhaps he was inspired by his perusal of Western broadcasts.)
In Solzhenitsyn's view, the Soviet Union is based on the flawed implementation of the flawed Western ideology of Marxism, and like the rest of Western civilization the Soviet Union is faced with the impending arrival of natural limits (ecological, demographic, resource-related) to traditional patterns of unrestrained growth. The West proper is dynamic enough to adjust to the arrival of these limits; the Soviet Union is too inflexible, too committed to the archaic Western concept of growth at all costs and to its messianic ideology, and will likely fall. And then, there is the threat of a war with China, fought over ideological minutiae and sure if previous wars are any evidence to decimate the rising generation of Russians and destroy Russia. Something must be done to save Russia.
Solzhenitsyn counsels, quite simply, that the Soviet Union retreat from its ideological pretensions. Let China take up the burden of global challenger to the United States--with luck, the Chinese will also realize the faults of their messianic Marxism-Leninism, but for the time being Russia must be concerned with its own salvation. Russia, in a 21st century sure (from Solzhenistyn's Limits to Growth-inspired perspective) to be characterized by hunger for land, has ample land in the "Russian Northeast", in uncolonized and under exploited Siberia; through this colonization movement (which might impinge upon the sensibility of the native peoples, but then their existence has always been marginal and sins of the past cannot be righted. In this way, Russia will redeem itself and become a moral exemplar.
Letter to the Soviet Leaders is flawed. Solzhenitsyn was too open to Western predictions of the impending near-term collapse of society after the flawed Limits to Growth simulation, just as he was too open to Soviet and Western predictions of the impending demoralization and collapse of Western society. Moreover, I find his cavalier attitude towards the native peoples of Siberia equally infuriating (if it isn't acceptable for the Soviet regime to destroy Russian traditions why is it acceptable for the Russian regime to destroy Siberian native traditions?) and humorous (in the post-Soviet era Siberia's natives are recovering their heritage even as the resident Russian communities are depopulated by emigrants fleeing for the south).
Perhaps the most significant fault of the Letter lies in its idealization of the pre-modern Russian village in particular and of the past in general. Orlando Figes' A People's Tragedy alone provides ample evidence that the Russian villages to which Solzhenitsyn looks for a model for Russia's future were hardly pleasant places to live. The break from tradition to modernity is never easy, and Russia's break was more difficult than most, but to most moderns and post-moderns (and yes, Russia is peopled by these) the closed static ways of village life are intolerable. Once people have been introduced to the joys of mass culture and urban living, it will be very difficult to get them to become pioneers, unless you forcethem, of course. Solzhenitsyn, it seems, has never made that break.
Some people--like the reviewer Robert Kraychak for the conservative monthly First Things--might acclaim Solzhenitsyn as a moral visionary, a "political Augustinian," who challenges the secular post-modernist status quo. I fear, though, that Solzhenitsyn's thought suffers fatally from a refusal to accept his wilful archaicism and consequent irrelevancy to 21st century Russia. Perhaps it's just as well: Solzhenitsyn's desire to restore Russia to the boundaries of the Slavic-populated areas of the Soviet Union has been described as alternatively "nationalist isolationist" and "imperialistic," and judging by Canada's First Nations I doubt that the Yakut and Chukchi appreciate being colonized so as to save Russia's soul. It's still a pity, though.
