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[personal profile] rfmcdonald
One thing that I didn't mention, but should have, in my review of Hugh Pope's Sons of the Conquerors, was the abundant potential of pan-Turkish sentiment to lead its proponents down all sorts of nasty alleys. Although modern-day Turkey is overwhelmingly Turkish and Muslim in language and religion, Turkey was not repopulated by Turkish nomads when they entered Anatolia. Rather, Turks assimilated the populations, mainly Greek and Orthodox Christians, who they came to rule over. If Greeks are Europeans, this fact alone surely ensures that Turks should be considered Europeans. More, as Andrew Mango observed in his biography Ataturk, Turks' European ancestries were reinforced by the waves of refugees which fled southeastern Europe as Ottoman power contracted.



At the end of the nineteenth century, the ruling Muslim community of the Ottoman empire was gripped by anxiety. Every time a province was lost, waves of Muslim refugees poured into the sultan's remaining possessions. In the Balkans, the first mass flight of Muslims followed the Greek rising of 1821 and the establishment of the Greek kingdom under European protection in 1830. This migration of Muslims was dwarfed by the influx of refugees during and after the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-8. Muslims flooded in from Bulgaria, which became independent in all but name. They came from Thessaly, which was ceded to Greece, a country not involved in the war, but deemed by the European great powers to deserve compensation for the gains achieved by countries which had been.

Even more refugees had come from the lands conquered by Russia in its advance on the south. Although most of these lands had been under Ottoman suzerainty only briefly, their inhabitants saw in the Ottoman state their protector and their refuge. First came hundreds of thousands of Turkic-speaking Tartars from the Crimea and the surrounding steppes, then the majority of Circassians and Abkhazians from the western Caucasus, and large numbers of Chechens from the northern slopes of the Caucasus, of Lezgis and other Dagestanis from its eastern slopes, of Muslim Georgians from Transcaucasia (10-11).




All of these refugees came from Europe, whether from countries now belonging to the European Union (Greece, Cyprus), from countries expected to join shortly (Romania and Bulgaria), from countries hoping to join shortly (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, soon both Montenegro and Kosova), or from countries which claim European Union membership as their long-range goals (Ukraine and Georgia). It isn't too difficult to imagine that in western Turkey, both the most structurally "European" area of Turkey and the closest region to the refugees' homelands, these involuntary migrants formed a disproportionately large share of the population. Might it be that at least part of Turkey's fear of being rejected by European, being considered non-European, come from the traumas passed down to the descendants of these refugees expelled by European nation-states in the making?

Turks are Europeans, then, but most other speakers of Turkic languages are not. At best, the speakers of Turkic languages in independent Central Asia and the Russian Federation might well qualify for membership in "greater Europe" based on the Soviet history they share with Russians, Ukrainians, and other post-Soviet peoples, but that's it. Note that I'm not arguing that Turks and non-Turks cannot be united by their languages. Turkic languages do unite diverse peoples: Turks in Anatolia and Anatolia's region, Azeris and smaller peoples in the Caucasus and Iran, Tatars and Bashkirs in Russia, Uzbeks, Kazaks and others in Central Asia, Uighurs in China. To the extent that these languages unite these diverse peoples, pan-Turkish sentiments reflect reality; to the extent that comparable historical experiences unite these peoples, pan-Turkish sentiment can help cement productive bonds. The francophonie is hardly a dangerous organization, after all. To the extent that pan-Turkish sentiments are used to argue in favour of homogeneous ancestry, they are dangerous. To the extent that they are used to justify the bringing together of these diverse peoples into a single state, regardless of the cost to others, they are dangerous. Indeed, as Ian S. MacIntosh wrote in June 2003 in Cultural Survival Quarterly, pan-Turkish sentiments played a crucial role in the Armenian genocide and play a crucial role in modern Turkey's anti-Armenian sentiments.



When independent Turkey was born at the end of World War I, it had no place for rival nationalities like Christian Armenians. All citizens were Turks, including the so-called “mountainous Turks,” or Kurds. Pan-Turkism was a policy that was to link all the Turkish-speaking peoples from Istanbul to the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a Pan-Islamic drive, the Ottomans before them had consigned all things Turkish to oblivion.

Turkey’s new rulers had to look back 600 years to reestablish the idea of their Turkishness. To facilitate the historical “cleansing” process that ushered in the new Turkish republic, all talk of the armenian genocide was forbidden. The official line was (and is) that Turkey emerged from a period of upheaval from which a “new personality was created from nothing.” The Latin alphabet was introduced in 1928 and future generations were thus barred from easy access to the testimony of the past that was written in a completely different script. The result is that Turkey now lacks a historical consciousness. No memory exists of the atrocities of 1915, or even of similar massacres that occurred in the 1890s. The contemporary Turkish citizen arguing against the case of the Armenians dwells only upon supposed Armenian wealth and duplicity, and the enduring terrorist threat, as evidenced in places such as Nagorno Karabagh in 1988, when 800,000 Azeri (“Turk”) refugees fled and 30,000 died at the hands of Armenians during the campaign to return the province to the hands of the majority Armenians.




Hannah Arendt argued in her 1951 The Origins of Totalitarianism that Pan-movements subverted the traditional and ideal European model of the nation-state with internal class variegation guided by the rule of law, that by assuming a homogeneous origin of related peoples and arguing for a necessarily homogeneous and united future they sought to subvert these norms, to justify almost any act as historically necessary. That's what the pan-Serb movement did in the 1980s, with documents like the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It seems like that's what Dr. Sedat Laciner wants, at least based on his badly-translated article in The Journal of the Turkish Weekly, "Armenia: A Neighbor from Hell?"



Contrary to the Azerbaijani and Georgian policies, Yerevan chose a different path after the collapse of the Soviet Union : strangely approached the Russians to become independent because Armenians thought that independence equals more territories. Nationalist Armenians dreamed to establish a greater . Jevahiti (Georgia), Nakhcivan and Karabakh () were the first to be conquered. opened more and more its territories to the Russian forces. ’s economic, military and political influence rocketed in , possibly became higher than the Soviet period. Armenians found another friend in time: . The so-called Islamist Iran supported in many ways instead of Muslim Azerbaijan in many areas including Karabakh issue.

It is obvious that is like a ‘neighbor from hell’ in the Caucasus for almost all Caucasian states. However criticizes and other neighbors. The Armenian leader argues that “ is not true European”. He asks the EU leaders not to accept till it recognises the Armenian ‘genocide’ allegations. It is really difficult to understand. How a leader could be so obsessive with the past while the current problems are growing and growing. Armenian politicians should understand that they are not history lecturer or a priest. Real world needs real leaders. All we respect the tragedy Armenians experienced and we expect the same respect for our tragedies. But past is past and we should not sacrifice today for the past or politicians obsessions. is ready to discuss the historical disputes with . Ankara declared that it is ready to open the borders with. However Armenians have taken no concrete step. They just insist on the well-known allegations.

[. . .]

What says or makes is not important for the Armenians. Their answer has always been the same: “genocide, genocide, genocide”...

[. . .]

Brussels should to decide whether or the whole Caucasus is more important for the EU… And should give up the childish policies like preventing pipeline projects or railways. should focus on constriction peace, stability and regional economy instead of obsession of prevention or de-constructing.




The Armenians, it seems, are in the way of Turkey's historic destiny, both as a European state and as the leader of the Turkic states. We know what happened the last time.

Pan movements can work--the European Union is a sterling case in point--but they do so if they are made to work humanely. It's best that Turkey and its putative allies be strongly encouraged to confront pan-Turkism's pathologies before they and their neighbours face future unpleasantness.
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