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rfmcdonaldThe recent article Washington Post article "Brazil-Bolivia Relations Go South" touches upon the two causes for the recent sharp deterioration in Brazilian-Bolivian relations. Not only has the Bolivian government demanded a renegotiation of the terms of natural gas sales to Brazil and threatened to nationalize Petrobras' investments in Bolivia, but the tenure of Bolivian land held by Brazilian farmers has been called into question. Brazil's foreign minister has warned of a potential break in diplomatic relations if things continue to deteriorate.
The department of Santa Cruz in the east of Bolivia is the locus. Santa Cruz is in many wayus atypical by Bolivian standards, a territory that occupies lowland plains instead of Andean plateaus and with a generally mestizo population, with a relatively dynamic capitalist economy. Last year, Jonathan Edelstein suggested that the Santa Cruz situation was akin to eastern Ukrainian regionalism, at least inasmuch as Santa Cruz was a relatively wealthy region with a distinctive regional identity that was closely associated to that of the neighbouring country. As noted in The Economist in April 2005, the basic principles of Evo Morales' populist movement don't sit well with the people of Santa Cruz.
Though the natural gas issue is obviously emotive in an age of energy geopolitics, it seems to be the land question that has the greatest potential emotional effect on Bolivian. Jeb Blount touches upon this in his Bloomberg News Service article "Bolivia's Nationalism Threatens Property of Brazilian Settlers"
What Blount doesn't mention is the resentment felt by Bolivia towards the neighbours responsible for the annexation of much of its national territory. The loss of Bolivia's Pacific coastline to Chile is well-known, but what isn't as well-known is the extent of Bolivia's territorial losses to a Brazil with a long history of westward expansion as described this past March.
The Brazilian state of Acre was annexed from Bolivia at the beginning of the 20th century. It's not at all surprising that, given Brazil's emergence as a global economic power of note and Bolivia's profound weakness, that the question of Santa Cruz' allegiance in the context of Brazilian investment and Brazilian immigration at least appears to be open to question. Democratic 21st century Brazil is almost certainly unlikely to press any territorial claims against Bolivia, not least because it would be inconsistent with its professed "Good Neighbor" policy, but the fear of domination must seem plausible. And so, the popularity of the attitudes expressed by one Bolivian quoted by Blount:
Needless to say, this doesn't augur good things for South American integration.
The department of Santa Cruz in the east of Bolivia is the locus. Santa Cruz is in many wayus atypical by Bolivian standards, a territory that occupies lowland plains instead of Andean plateaus and with a generally mestizo population, with a relatively dynamic capitalist economy. Last year, Jonathan Edelstein suggested that the Santa Cruz situation was akin to eastern Ukrainian regionalism, at least inasmuch as Santa Cruz was a relatively wealthy region with a distinctive regional identity that was closely associated to that of the neighbouring country. As noted in The Economist in April 2005, the basic principles of Evo Morales' populist movement don't sit well with the people of Santa Cruz.
[Morales' supporters] expect the constituent assembly to prise open institutions, possibly with quotas, and redistribute wealth, largely through land reform. This stirs alarm above all in Santa Cruz, where big landholdings underpin both entrepreneurial agriculture and feudal privilege. The province has some good reasons for wanting autonomy: the central government's power of appointment extends from school-teachers to provincial governors. La Paz province, with roughly the same population as Santa Cruz, has seven times the number of policemen, says Óscar Ortiz, of the regional chamber of trade and industry. But the most emotive issue is land. The regionalist cause attracted 400,000 people, a fifth of the province's population, to a rally in January. The confrontation between them and the social movements is a “catastrophic stalemate,” says Álvaro Linera, a sociologist in La Paz.
Though the natural gas issue is obviously emotive in an age of energy geopolitics, it seems to be the land question that has the greatest potential emotional effect on Bolivian. Jeb Blount touches upon this in his Bloomberg News Service article "Bolivia's Nationalism Threatens Property of Brazilian Settlers"
Brazilian farmers, who have helped make Brazil the world's second-largest soybean producer and exporter after the U.S., found it easy to move across the border and open up land in Bolivia.
[. . .]
For Oscar Flores, who left his depressed Andean highland town for Santa Cruz four years ago, the lowlands sometimes seem like another country.
``I know this is Bolivia, but everything is different, hardly anyone speaks Quechua,'' said Flores, 22, referring to the modern-Inca language spoken in his hometown of Sucre. ``The women dress differently and there are so many foreigners.''
Resentment among the poverty-stricken Indians who inhabit Bolivia's highland plateau and provide the base of Morales's support, may be behind land redistribution plans for the relatively wealthy lowlands, said Walter Guevara, 65, a political scientist and former superintendent of Bolivia's civil service board.
[. . .]
For Flores, who struggles to survive on the $2 that farmers around Santa Cruz pay for a day's labor, the redistribution would be an answer to his prayers.
``It's my dream to have my own farm, plant soybeans, corn, potatoes,'' said Flores, who speaks Spanish as well as Quechua. ``It's not fair that so many foreigners own so much land.'
What Blount doesn't mention is the resentment felt by Bolivia towards the neighbours responsible for the annexation of much of its national territory. The loss of Bolivia's Pacific coastline to Chile is well-known, but what isn't as well-known is the extent of Bolivia's territorial losses to a Brazil with a long history of westward expansion as described this past March.
In Brazilian history the occupation of the Amazon played a role similar to the United States' expansion to the Pacific. The long march west began as soon as the first Portuguese colonists put foot on solid ground, quickly spilling over the boundaries set forth by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) between Spain and Portugal, which fixed the limits at a maximum of 600 kilometers from the eastern tip of the continental coast. The impressive expansion to the West reached the slopes of the Andean mountain range and the Silver River Basin. It was led by colonists from San Pablo who organized major expeditions to the interior ( las bandeiras ) in search of Indians for slaves, gold, and precious metals. By forging partnerships with these bandeirantes , poor colonists who saw the adventure as a way to improve their situation gave shape to the borders of what would become an independent Brazil in 1822.
Although formally incorporated as part of national territory, the Amazon was an immense green desert—remote and difficult to access. In the mid-twentieth century Couto e Silva described the area as “the marginal part of Brazil, in large part unexplored, devitalized by its lack of people and creative energy, but deserving to be earnestly incorporated into the nation.” With over 1.5 million square miles, the Amazon makes up nearly half of the country's territory and is its greatest source of potential energy, fresh water, minerals, and biodiversity. Between 1850 and 1950, Brazil's “Amazonian territory” doubled at the cost of its neighbors; Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela lost portions of their land during that timeframe. In the 1865 Triple Alliance War (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay against Paraguay) alone, Brazil made off with almost 35,000 square miles of Paraguay's territory. But the expansion continued to be a basically irregular process that required populating isolated regions and entailed a systematic disregard for international law, in addition to blatant military force.
The Brazilian state of Acre was annexed from Bolivia at the beginning of the 20th century. It's not at all surprising that, given Brazil's emergence as a global economic power of note and Bolivia's profound weakness, that the question of Santa Cruz' allegiance in the context of Brazilian investment and Brazilian immigration at least appears to be open to question. Democratic 21st century Brazil is almost certainly unlikely to press any territorial claims against Bolivia, not least because it would be inconsistent with its professed "Good Neighbor" policy, but the fear of domination must seem plausible. And so, the popularity of the attitudes expressed by one Bolivian quoted by Blount:
``The Brazilians have become very arrogant; they think our natural gas, forests, mines and farmlands are theirs to use as they please,'' said Alejandro Colanzi, 47, a lawyer and legislator, whose Union Nacional party supports Morales's plan to boost government control of oil, gas and mining ventures, said in an interview in his office in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. ``Morales is ending our complicity in this exploitation, he's recovering our dignity and self esteem.''
Needless to say, this doesn't augur good things for South American integration.
