![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
rfmcdonaldDoubtless inspired by the predicted strength of the separatist Scottish National Party's showing in the upcoming election for the Scottish Parliament, a recent article in The Economist ("Scotland's Eurodreams", 19 April 2007) took a look at the SNP's promises that an independent Scotland could automatically accede to European Union membership. After arguing out that this isn't so, that Scotland would have to make an application for membership once it was separate from the rump United Kingdom, the author makes the easy observation that politics would inevitably get involved.
While it would be in the interest firstly of Scots, secondly of Britons, and generally of Europeans to come quickly to a fair settlement in the event of a clear majority referendum in favour of Scottish independence, then, politics would complicate a swift transition to one extent or another depending on all manner of variables. In other words, Scotland's future is entirely defined by what Scotland and its partners want.
Surprise, surprise. A simple comparison of the dissolutions of the federations of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s makes that princple quite clear: Even though both federations were shared a common status as relatively prosperous multinational Communist states where unity was threatened by difficult transitions to the western European model of democracy, Czechoslovakia dissolved itself peacefully while Yugoslavia came apart rather violently. There were deep reasons for these differences, but there were highly contingent events which defined these two breakups, even no small amount of choices. Some sort of a peaceful, negotiated transition in Yugoslavia is conceivable assuming different Yugoslav politics in the last two or three decades of Yugoslavia's existence; a violent breakup of Czechoslovakia is much more unlikely, especially given the lack of claims made by the Czechs and the Slovaks against the other's territories.
Equally, in the case of Scottish independence, it's possible to imagine anything from the rump United Kingdom's assent to Scotland's transformation into the next (28th?) member-state of the European Union to an Anglo-Spanish axis that kept Scotland out for fear of further domestic consequences and a desire for a better settlement. (I'm excluding the idea of a reassertion of British sovereignty over Scotland on grounds of implausibility; others' mileage may vary, but I can't imagine how.) How should the rest-of-the-United Kingdom react to a hypothetical Scottish mandate for independence? I'd hope that enlightened self-interest would come heavily into play--if Scotland wanted out of the United Kingdom it wouldn't be an obviously good idea to force Scotland to stay in, and the United Kingdom would be well-advised to avoid Irish precedents from the early 20th century and maintain a friendly relationship with a newly independent Scotland. Though that choice remains (as always) up to the Scots and other Britons to make, I'd like to believe that they'd make a sensible choice: The world doesn't need a Yugoslavia by the North Sea.
Nobody doubts that Scotland would eventually get in, but this could take time. And even if Scotland were excused the set-piece process of full-blown membership negotiations, the EU treaties would at the very least need to be tweaked to decide such matters as how many members of the European Parliament and votes in the Council of Ministers Scotland should have. Yet any change to the treaties needs the unanimous approval of all the current members, giving every single country a chance to veto Edinburgh. Who knows whether some government or other might not fancy a wrangle over fish or the EU budget? The Spanish government might not want to nod Scotland through, for fear of encouraging its own separatists. As one EU diplomat puts it: “If your sole question is, would you like to have Scotland in the EU, everyone would say yes. But it's not as simple as that.” In Brussels high-level questions of law are often settled by low-level questions of horsetrading.
While it would be in the interest firstly of Scots, secondly of Britons, and generally of Europeans to come quickly to a fair settlement in the event of a clear majority referendum in favour of Scottish independence, then, politics would complicate a swift transition to one extent or another depending on all manner of variables. In other words, Scotland's future is entirely defined by what Scotland and its partners want.
Surprise, surprise. A simple comparison of the dissolutions of the federations of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s makes that princple quite clear: Even though both federations were shared a common status as relatively prosperous multinational Communist states where unity was threatened by difficult transitions to the western European model of democracy, Czechoslovakia dissolved itself peacefully while Yugoslavia came apart rather violently. There were deep reasons for these differences, but there were highly contingent events which defined these two breakups, even no small amount of choices. Some sort of a peaceful, negotiated transition in Yugoslavia is conceivable assuming different Yugoslav politics in the last two or three decades of Yugoslavia's existence; a violent breakup of Czechoslovakia is much more unlikely, especially given the lack of claims made by the Czechs and the Slovaks against the other's territories.
Equally, in the case of Scottish independence, it's possible to imagine anything from the rump United Kingdom's assent to Scotland's transformation into the next (28th?) member-state of the European Union to an Anglo-Spanish axis that kept Scotland out for fear of further domestic consequences and a desire for a better settlement. (I'm excluding the idea of a reassertion of British sovereignty over Scotland on grounds of implausibility; others' mileage may vary, but I can't imagine how.) How should the rest-of-the-United Kingdom react to a hypothetical Scottish mandate for independence? I'd hope that enlightened self-interest would come heavily into play--if Scotland wanted out of the United Kingdom it wouldn't be an obviously good idea to force Scotland to stay in, and the United Kingdom would be well-advised to avoid Irish precedents from the early 20th century and maintain a friendly relationship with a newly independent Scotland. Though that choice remains (as always) up to the Scots and other Britons to make, I'd like to believe that they'd make a sensible choice: The world doesn't need a Yugoslavia by the North Sea.
