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Writing in response to a claim of an Indian government minister that Sanskrit could eventually displace English as India's common language, The Hindu's Data column argues that such a dream is completely unrealistic. There aren't even enough second-language speakers of Sanskrit to pose a challenge; Sanskrit's descent Hindi would be infinitely better-placed.

Anecdotally, we’d all agree that the last ten years are likely to have seen a huge jump in the number of English-speakers; English is now the second biggest language of instruction in primary schools after Hindi.

So India’s official language numbers, over ten years old now, are almost certainly an underestimation of the number of English speakers. Even so, there is little comparison between the number of English and Sanskrit speakers.

In terms of primary languages – what we commonly understand as the “mother tongue” – both English and Sanskrit were miles away from India’s Top 10. Of the123 primary languages counted by the Census – 23 scheduled and 100 non-scheduled – Sanskrit was fifth from bottom in terms of primary languages spoken, with only Persian, Chakhesang, Afghani/ Kabuli and Simte less commonly spoken. English, meanwhile, was the 45th most commonly spoken primary language.


Charts at the site.
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  • 3 Quarks Daily writes about the ways in which Cuba, and Havana, have been seen in the American imagination.

  • Antipope Charlie Stross solicits suggestions as to what he should print with a 3-D printer.

  • Crooked Timber is alarmist about the United States, making comparisons to Pakistan and to Weimar Germany.

  • The Dragon's Gaze links to a paper examining the simulated atmospheres of warm Neptunes.

  • The Dragon's Tales notes that Russians are leaving France without their Mistral carriers and that Russia is talking about building its own space station.

  • Joe. My. God. notes that an Argentine court has given an orangutan limited rights.

  • Lawyers, Guns and Money notes that transgendered workers now have legal protection in the United States.

  • Marginal Revolution reflects on the new Nicaragua Canal and is skeptical about Cuba's economic potential.

  • Personal Reflections' Jim Belshaw links to an essay examining how New Zealand set the global 2% inflation target.

  • The Search looks at one effort in digitizing and making searchable centuries of book images.

  • Towleroad looks at Taiwan's progress towards marriage equality and notes the refusal of the archbishop of Canterbury to explain the reasons for his opposition to equal marriage.

  • Window on Eurasia notes the different effects of the collapse in oil prices on Russia's different reasons, looks at language conflicts in the Russian republics, and observes the revival of Belarusian nationalism.

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  • 3 Quarks Daily links to an essayist wondering why people talked about Gaza not the Yezidis as a way to dismiss Gaza.

  • The Broadside Blog's Caitlin Kelly notes how Americans subsidize Walmart's low wages by givibng its employees benefits.

  • The Dragon's Tales notes that Chinese plans to reforest Tibet could accelerate the dessication of its watershed since trees suck up water, observes the existence of a new Chinese ICBM and links to a report of a Chinese drone, notes that the ecologies of Europe are especially vulnerable to global warming owing to their physical fragmentation, and notes that Canadian-Mexican relations aren't very friendly.

  • Eastern Approaches notes Russia's reaction to the shootdown of the MH17 flight over eastern Ukraine and observes the issues with Poland's coal industry.

  • Geocurrents' Martin Lewis calls for American military intervention to protect the Yezidis from genocide.

  • Lawyers, Guns and Money looks at the plight of the Yezidi, examines the undermining of liberal Zionism, wonders how Russian relations with Southeast Asia will evolve, and after noting the sympathy of some Americans on the left for Russia analyses the consequences of a Russian-Ukrainian war.

  • Marginal Revolution wonders if Russia's food import ban is a sign of a shift to a cold war mentality, notes the collapse of the Ukrainian economy, wonders about the strategy of Hamas, and comments on the weakness of the economy of Ghana.

  • The New APPS Blog comments on the implications of the firing of American academic Steven Salaita for his blog posts.

  • The Pagan Prattle looks at allegations of extensive coverups of pedophilia in the United Kingdom.

  • Personal Reflections' Jim Belshaw notes the decreasing dynamism of the ageing Australia economy.

  • The Power and the Money's Noel Maurer doesn't think there's much of a crisis in Argentina following the debt default, notes ridiculous American efforts to undermine Cuba that just hurt Cubans, examines implications of energy reform and property rights in Mexico, has a good strategy shared with other for dealing with the Islamic State.

  • Understanding Society's Daniel Little contends with Tyler Cowen's arguments about changing global inequality, and studies the use of mechanisms in international relations theory.

  • The Volokh Conspiracy touches upon Palestine's case at the ICC against Israel, looks at Argentina's debt default, and wonders if Internet domain names are property.

  • Window on Eurasia has a huge set of links, pointing to the rivalry of Russian Jewish organizations in newly-acquired Crimea, looking at Ukrainian ethnic issues in Russia, suggests that the Donbas war is alienating many Ukrainians in the east from Russia, notes Islamization in Central Asia, suggests that Russia under sanctions could become as isolated as the former SOviet Union, suggests Ukrainian refugees are being settled in non-Russian republics, wonders if Ukraine and Georgia and Moldova will join Turkey as being perennial EU candidates, suggests that Belarusians are divided and claims that Belarusian national identity is challenging Russian influence, looks at the spread of Ukrainian nationalism among Russophones, looks at the consequences of Kurdish independence for the South Caucasus, and notes that one-tenth of young Russians are from the North Caucasus or descend from the region.

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  • Centauri Dreams notes the thinking of Martin Rees and Freeman Dyson on the diaspora of life beyond Earth, noting that it's going to require as much adaptation to new environments as it will (would?) the adaptation of existing environments.

  • D-Brief notes theory about planetary system formation suggesting that suggestive gaps in protoplanetary discs of gas and dust don't necessarily reveal planets.

  • The Dragon's Tales' Will Baird links to the recent paper suggesting that tide-locked red dwarf planets are much more likely to be habitable than previously thought.

  • Geocurrents analyses the possibility that Iran might be divided between a conservative Persian-speaking core and reformist peripheries.

  • GNXP's Razib Khan notes evidence from Ethiopia suggesting that there has been immigration into Africa as well out of the continent.

  • Registan describes a Chinese copper mining project in Afghanistan that never quire took off.

  • Savage Minds' Rex reviews William McNeill's biography of historian Arnold J. Toynbee.

  • Strange Maps maps the leading causes of death by continent.

  • Supernova Condensate describes the possibility of life-supporting environments on Europa, not only in the subsurface ocean but in lakes located in the ice crust.

  • Window on Eurasia quotes a Tatar nationalist who argues that Tatarstan can be to Russia what Lithuania was to the former Soviet Union, i.e. the unit which breaks the country apart.

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  • Bag News Notes isn't impressed by the scandal aroused by Arne Svenson's photos of New York City condo dwellers taken through their windows--they are open, aren't they?

  • Beyond the Beyond links to an interview with Chinese science fiction writer Fei Dao about that genre in China.

  • Burgh Diaspora's Jim Russell writes about the problems of rural America in keeping talent.

  • The Dragon's Tales and Jonathan Crowe both link to the new cartographic map of Saturn's moon Titan.

  • Far Outliers' quotes from Chinua Achebe's latest book, this quote a recounting of the geographic and social origins of nationalism in Nigeria.

  • Geocurrents notes the patterns and causes of Stalin's deportation of ethnic minorities from frontier zones, from Finland through to Siberia.

  • Terrible news from Normblog's Norman Geras, who is currently being hospitalized for prostate cancer.

  • Torontoist reports on the multimedia efforts of a Torontonian looking for a cat lost at College and Dovercourt.

  • The Way the Future Blogs' Frederik Pohl writes about Brooklyn's joys.

  • Window on Eurasia notes that Kyrgyzstan is the latest former Soviet state to downgrade the status of the Russian language.

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I've been mulling over Ulf Laessing's Reuters article recounting general despair among Egypt's Copts that they can ever find themselves at home in their country, and that to save themselves they must leave, since the article's publication on the 11th of this month. Is there some exaggeration afoot, or are things really that irresolvably bad? (I will note that Mubarak's regime was hardly especially kind to Christians, either; ongoing issues with religious freedom in Egypt seem to long predate 2011.)

When Egyptian Christian Kerollos Maher watched on television as petrol bombs and rocks rained on Cairo's Coptic Orthodox Cathedral he had only one thought - emigration.

"Egypt is no longer my country," said the 24-year-old construction worker, standing in the courtyard of the country's largest cathedral where one Copt and one Muslim died in sectarian clashes this week.

"The situation of Christians is worsening from day to day. I've given up hope that things will improve," he said.

Christians, who make up a tenth of Egypt's 84 million people, have been worrying about the rise of militant Islamists since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.

But after days of fighting at the cathedral and a town outside Cairo killing eight - the worst sectarian strife since Islamist President Mohamed Mursi was elected in June - many Copts now question whether they have a future in Egypt.

An angry young fringe of a community that has lived in Egypt since the earliest days of Christianity may also be turning to violence.

"The attack on the cathedral was the crossing of a red line," said Michael Sanouel, a 23-year old technician in a steel plant. Sanouel rushed to the cathedral "to defend it" when he heard about the clashes that lasted more than five hours.

"I have been looking for a while for a job abroad, in Italy or Germany," he said, standing next to a piece of charred wood from a tree hit by a petrol bomb hurled over the compound wall.

"I have two children but I don't want them to grow up under a Muslim Brotherhood regime," said Sanouel, who slept in the cathedral compound like dozens of others after the clashes, ready to defend it if more confrontations erupted.
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  • Charlie Stross starts a discussion about the possible consequences of the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. (He's against.)

  • Will Baird, at The Dragon's Tales, celebrates the 4000th post at his blog by imagining what an updated version of Jerry Pournelle's CoDominium future history would be. A Sino-Indian alliance eventually at odds with transhumanists is fun.

  • Daniel Drezner doesn't think much of gold fetishism.

  • Eastern Approaches notes rising nationalism in Slovakia.

  • At A Fistful of Euros, Edward Hugh thinks that the ongoing crises of the Eurozone might be handled for the time being by the policies advocated by Mario Draghi. For the time being.

  • Geocurrents observes, drawing from the example of Punjabi, the blurry nature of dialect continua.

  • Language Hat points to an online compendium of Canadianisms in English.

  • Torontoist notes that if you now search for a book on the Toronto Public Library catalogue, you'll find links inviting you to buy the book at Indigo. (The library is expecting about $C 20 000 from this.

  • Understanding Society's Daniel Little asks what happened to Detroit and comes to the conclusion that the severe racial polarization certainly didn't help.

  • Window on Eurasia notes that many of the smallest nationalities in Russia, indigenous peoples of Siberia mainly, are fast losing their numbers to assimilation.

  • Yorkshire Ranter Alex Harrowell seems skeptical about a Kickstarter project aiming at buying a communications satellite and making it available to the Third World. Apparently the lack of suitable satellite modems is an issue.

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In 2009 and 2010, I mentioned the ban brought in by Catalonia on bullfighting, ostensibly purely out of a concern for the well-being of the animals killed in the ring for humans' amusement but also out of a rejection of this, a signal marker of Hispanic identity. Now, Giles Tremlett in The Guardian reports that, at a time of growing separatist sentiment in Catalonia, the Spanish government hopes to overturn this ban.

Spain's parliament is expected on to take the first steps towards declaring bullfighting a key part of the country's cultural heritage in an attempt to revitalise a dwindling, if gory, tradition.

A popular petition, signed by 590,000 people, seeks to have the bullfight formally categorised as an asset of cultural interest - a move that would give promoters tax breaks and allow them to flout a ban imposed by local authorities in the eastern region of Catalonia.

The conservative People's party of prime minister Mariano Rajoy, which holds an absolute majority in parliament, has already said it will back the petition and start the process of turning it into law.

This comes as figures released by the culture ministry show bullfighting is in the middle of an historic decline, with Spaniards gradually turning their backs on it and recession seeing public money to fund fights dry up.

Between 2007 and 2011, the number of fights dropped from 3,650 a year to just 2,290. Of the latter, top class fights involving professional bullfighters or horse-borne rejoneadores and bulls aged three or above accounted for just 1,120 fights. Only 560 fights were of top rank matadors against full-grown bulls.

Numbers are believed to have dropped further in 2012, when Spain fell back into a double-dip recession, public austerity saw even less public funding for bullfights and the Catalan ban came into effect.


(This after the bullrings have been imaginatively repurposed by designers.)

Expatica's coverage touches upon the regional and separatist dimensions of this move, noting that the explicit effort of the Spanish central government to overturn a locally popular decision in Catalonia is going to inflame things still further. (I've mentioned in the past that there's an emergent separatist majority in Catalonia, right?)

Way to go, guys, Way to go.
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  • The Burgh Diaspora notes that the migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland United States has continued, accelerated by the global economic crisis, the only new thing being the concentration of later migrants in Florida as opposed to New York.

  • James Bow disagrees strongly with the Clarity Act and the Liberals' take on it and and the NDP policy on national unity. Were he writing the laws, he might require 50%+1 of the total electorate--not just the total of voters turning out--to enact constitutional change.

  • Daniel Drezner notes that enthusiasm for Chinese ports on the Pakistani coast is limited to Pakistanis, and that the Chinese don't really seem very invested in it.

  • Eastern Approaches takes a look at the site of the Sochi Olympics, noting that migrants from across the former Soviet Union and even Serbia a) are present in large numbers and b) have apparently been short-changed on pay.

  • Marginal Revolution's Tyler Cowen thinks that a bailout of Cyprus could be risky. If not Cyprus, why not the rest of southern Europe?

  • Itching for Eestimaa's Giustino wonders why Estonia supports Georgia's push for European Union and NATO membership so strongly.

  • At The Power and they Money, Noel Maurer notes that as prominent the flaring of natural gas from North Dakota fields might be from orbit, it doesn't actually consume that much gas.

  • Savage Minds' Thomas Strong reflects at length on what he sees as the lack of moral self-reflexivity in Zero Dark Thirty.

  • Inspired by the ongoing events in Egypt, the Volokh Conspiracy's starts a discussion about what should be done if anti-democratic forces look like they'll win a democratic election or vote.

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This news item seems to have gotten more attention in Canada than in the United Kingdom, perhaps because of Québec's longer history of active separatism, perhaps because of Québec's long history foreign entanglements and connections. Scottish and British readers?

Pauline Marois says she looks forward to chatting about independence next week — not to helping achieve it.

She will meet with Scotland's first minister, Alex Salmond, during a stop in Edinburgh on Jan. 29.

Marois says she knows his pro-independence Scottish National Party has observed her Parti Québécois with interest and she's ready to answer any questions Salmond might have.

"I will obviously not interfere in their politics or decisions," Marois told a news conference Tuesday.

"But you know they have observed Quebec quite a bit, and our experiences. Mr. Salmond will surely have some questions to ask me."

So what is the meeting's objective?

"My objective is not necessarily to make a contribution, to have an influence, but it's really an exchange between political people who have similar perspectives on certain subjects, such as achieving more powers and on the means for achieving powers or becoming independent," she said.

Unlike the Scottish nationalists, the PQ has already held two referendums in failed attempts at independence over the years but currently has no timetable for a third such vote.

The SNP, on the other hand, is now planning to hold its first such referendum after being elected with a majority government for the first time since the creation of the modern Scottish parliament.

Although the PQ and the SNP have forged ties over the years, it will be the first time their respective leaders meet while in power.

Their movements do share a familiar obstacle: less-than-favourable polls.

Surveys peg support for Scottish independence at levels that suggest it might be hard to achieve when the referendum takes place in the fall of 2014.
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  • At Beyond the Beyond, Bruce Sterling points towards the first step of the exact role that the famed underground tunnels of Gaza have on the political economy of that territory.

  • Crooked Timber's John Holbo argues that the legacies of coded racism used by many Republicans in the United States continues to make the party not credible among non-whites.

  • At The Dragon's Tales, Will Baird points to a new study arguing that stars richer in heavy elements than our own (elements like uranium) are likely to have planets that have more heavy elements than our Earth, meaning more geologically active planets on account of the additional energy.

  • Eastern Approaches notes the ongoing deterioration of Serbian-Croatian relations.

  • At False Steps, Paul Drye profiles the nearly successful Hermes spaceplane planned by the European Space Agency for the 1990s, undermined by technical challenges and the costs of German reunification.

  • Far Outliers quotes J.H. Elliott on the Catalonial rebellion of 1640, coinciding at the time with rebellion against Spanish rule in Portugal.

  • At Normblog, Norman Geras links to a tribunal set up by Iranian exiles to gather evidence about crimes committed by the Islamic Republic.

  • Registan's Casey Michel wonders if claims that Kazakhstan in 1992 turned down a proposal by Libya's Gaddafi to keep its nuclear weapons are being publicized to distract from Kazakhstan's authoritarian government.

  • Steve Munro gives a positive review of a TTC-themed play.

  • The Volokh Conspiracy notes Pat Robertson's statement that young-earth creationism is not biblical. Robertson knows, I suspect, that linking any belief system to something incredible undermines the belief system.

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Montreal Gazette guest columnist Harry McGrath (a Scottish-Canadian, to be sure) comes up with a new international comparison for a hypothetical independent Scotland. Don't think of an independent Scotland as being like Ireland, or like a Nordic country--think of it as being like Canada.

From a Scots-Canadian perspective, the closest parallel between Scotland and anywhere else is not Quebec, Ireland, Iceland, or Norway — it’s Canada. Indeed, it is Groundhog Day for people like me who lived in Canada for many years and live in Scotland now.

Scottish government rhetoric in favour of multiculturalism and immigration distinguishes it from other parts of the British body politic, but is very familiar to Canadian ears.

Ditto a recent consultation on gay marriage that unleashed exactly the same apocalyptic arguments against it that were heard in Canada before it was legalized in 1995.

Ditto the headline debate at the last Scottish National Party conference that confirmed party policy on withdrawing nuclear weapons from Scotland but voted in favour of membership of NATO. That debate raged in Canada from the 1960s until the squadron at Comox on Vancouver Island flew the last nuclear weapons back to the United States in 1984, leaving Canada a non-nuclear member of NATO.

This paralleling of the Canadian experience in Scotland has gone largely unnoticed on both sides of the Atlantic. Over here, comparisons between Scotland and Canada tend to be seen as historical rather than contemporary; in Canada anything with the words ‘independence’ or ‘referendum’ attached to it is viewed through the prism of Quebec.

However, there is definitely something going on, even if it is subliminal. It’s almost de rigueur in Scotland for politicians and others to use the saying “Work as if you lived in the early days of a better nation” and attribute it to Scottish writer Alasdair Gray. In fact, Gray paraphrased it from a line in Canadian Dennis Lee’s iconic poem Civil Elegies published in the early 1970s. Back then, Pierre Trudeau was reinventing Canada as a European-style social democracy with a unique maple-leaf twist.
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Hosted at the website of the Institute for Policy Studies, John Feffer's extended interview with Serbian human rights activist Sonia Biserko, about the collapse of Yugoslavia, the peculiarities of Serbian nationalism, and Serbia's prospects for the future (grim, she thinks, unless there's change and honest recognition of past ills), makes for interesting reading.

The war in Yugoslavia began as a conflict over state structure. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nationalist movements in the republics championed greater autonomy only to be suppressed in turn by Tito, who then went on to incorporate many of their demands in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic signaled his intentions to assert Serbian dominance within the federation by removing the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. When I was in the region the following year, debate raged over the nature of the Yugoslav federation: should it be a loose confederation, a more democratic federation, or a state in which Serbia reigned first among equals.

In 1990, Sonja Biserko was in the very middle of these debates. She was working in the Yugoslav foreign ministry at the time, an ideal vantage point for witnessing the disintegration of the federation. She ultimately resigned her position and embarked on a career in human rights through the organization she founded, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. As one of the early critics of Milosevic, she has also been resolute in her critique of Serbian nationalism. She worked to document war crimes and promote dialogue with Kosovo. These positions were not popular, to the say the least, among right-wing extremists and their more mainstream supporters, but Biserko has bravely continued to speak her mind.

She points out that Milosevic and his team were fundamentally anti-institutional and relied on the power of the mob. “This was how they destroyed not only the Yugoslav federation and its institutions but also Serbian institutions,” she points out. “We are now still living in this provisional state. We don’t have a modern state.” Serbia, in other words, is still struggling with the legacy of Milosevic. And the same policies that tore apart the federal structure of Yugoslavia are now threatening Serbia itself, as Belgrade treats provinces like Vojvodina much as it did the republics of Slovenia and Croatia during the Milosevic era.

Biserko does not mince words about what Serbia must do to change course. First of all, Serbians have to grapple with the nationalist project, spelled out back in 1986 in an infamous memo from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science, which contributed so much to the war and suffering of the 1990s. “In order to put the region in order, Serbia has the most homework to do,” she says. “Other countries also have homework to do, but they won’t do it until they see that Serbia has started the process. This doesn’t mean putting Serbia in a corner. But we should know, especially the young generation, why it happened. People have to understand what was behind all this.”
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This Agence France-Presse article speaks to an interesting phenomenon. Is sentiment for a Greater Albanian state including all the major Albanian-populated areas of the western Balkans actually growing?

The leaders of Albania and Kosovo vowed to achieve unity for ethnic Albanians in the region during the centennial celebration of Albania's independence in the Macedonian capital Sunday but said it should be "within EU boundaries".

"Through the European Union we are going to realise the project of our national unity," Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha told some 10,000 people in Skopje.

Berisha insisted that states bordering Albania should not fear this unity.

"I urge all the neighbours to understand that the national unity of Albanians is nothing wrong," he said, cheered by a crowd chanting "Great Albania" and waving Albanian red flags.

His words were echoed by Kosovo prime minister Hashim Thaci, who said that Albanians in the region, including the minorities in Serbia and Macedonia, were "stronger than ever and should work together."

[. . .]

No incidents were reported during the celebration, which has heightened tensions in Macedonia, prompting police to step up security and Interior Minister Gordana Jankuloska to appeal for calm amid fears of possible inter-ethnic violence.

Several incidents had been reported in recent days, with youths setting ablaze the flags of rival communities in Skopje and the Albanian-dominated northwestern town of Tetovo.

A leader of Macedonia's ethnic Albanians and former guerilla leader-turned-politician, Ali Ahmeti, whose party organised Sunday's celebration, also called for respect because "a nation that seeks its rights can not disrespect the rights of others."
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Fernando Vallespín's Open Democracy essay covers territory I'm familiar with from discussions of Québec's status in Canada: most Catalans identify themselves as both Catalans and Spanish, and so are naturally not inclined towards separatism, but if they feel forced to choose between the two identity's they'd opt for the identity they experience most regularly over the one they don't, i.e. for independence.

I've been following Catalonian separatism's revival for some time, back in September 2010 with a post when the crisis began and then last month as support for separatism reached majority levels. The prospects for a united Spain in 2012 is at least as worrisome as the prospects for a united Canada in 1994, before the second referendum, all the more so since there at least seem to be strong economic arguments in favour of Catalonia's independence from Spain./

[W]hy independence, and not a qualitative change within Spain’s territorial arrangement, a new federal pact, a middle ground between real independence and the present situation? This would be consistent with the fact that two thirds of Catalans still consider themselves according to the polls as both Catalan and Spanish in one measure or another. And, in any case, it will certainly lead to greater consensus in Spain and Europe. It would also insure us against the risks of uncertainty that we always face when confronted with emotionally loaded conflicts, as is always the case with the clash of national sentiments. Or, at least, weaken their impact. In general, we know how these conflicts start, but not how they are definitively put to rest.

On the other hand – and on this Pere Vilanova’s article was quite enlightening- the burdensome conditions for changing the European treatises in order to make room for another European state resulting from the secession of a member state makes the result of this process quite unpredictable. It would never succeed with a Spanish veto, and hardly anyone in Catalonia would be willing to exchange Europe for total sovereignty. Without full Spanish compliance, both internally and on the European front, it could end in mayhem. The answer, independence, is thus turned into a question: why independence and not something else?

The Catalan answer would though be, and I would agree with them on this, that they have already tried it out, but were never really heard. A majority of Spaniards would never accept what needs to be done in order to implement a smooth accommodation of Catalan’s self-understanding within the Spanish state. As is well-known, part of Catalonia’s present frustration is due to the rejection of a small but significant portion of its new Statute of Autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court. This statute had already been severely expurgated of its most salient self-governing features by the Spanish parliament. After that, the sentiment among a large part of the Catalan population was something like the title of that song by The Who: we won’t be fooled again!

In any case, there is one thing that cannot be denied. The levels of self-government already being implemented in Catalonia throughout the last decades were effectively directed towards the creation of a nation-building process. The use of the Catalan language in both the public sphere and ordinary life became dominant, and a new generation has been slowly socialized within national sentiments that to a certain extent ignore its link to overall Spain. The ‘uncoupling’ of the country that I referred to before was already almost a social fact, although without its constitutional equivalent. It could be said, that ‘sociological Catalonia’ no longer corresponds with ‘official Catalonia’.

It has been a matter of time until that underlying contradiction was made explicit. And the catalyst for it was, of course, the economic crisis. The sense of grievance regarding the investment policies in infrastructures of the central state, Madrid, plus the burden of Catalonia’s contribution to the rest of Spain in the midst of savage austerity measures did the job. This was also fuelled by the deployment of an effective rhetoric of Spanish ‘plundering’ of Catalonia’s resources, and, contrary to what is happening in the rest of Spain, where these somber times are felt as the shattering of all illusions, independence gives its people a hope, a collective project, a light beyond the tunnel, both to their unrealized national aspirations and to the regaining of prosperity. Fortuna, the crisis, gave Artur Mas, Catalonia’s Premier, the Machiavellian occasione for a jump forward towards full (?) national sovereignty.

[. . .]

Nevertheless, it takes two for a divorce, and there are no velvet secessions. Spain is not the Sweden of 1905 that let Norway go, nor a semi-artificial nation such as post-soviet Czechoslovakia. Just as Catalonia is neither Norway nor the two other states that split. And no matter how the conflict is resolved, it might affect other European countries as well. There is, though, one thing for sure; it will take time and a lot of political subtlety and leadership on all parts if it is to end well. And besides, it comes at the worst time possible, within a critical moment in European integration and under the worst economic, social and institutional crisis that Spain has experienced since its transition to democracy. As so often happens in history, what to some Catalans seems to be a chance - occasione - is a nightmare to Spain and, I should think, to Europe as well. At least at this specific juncture.
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I've blogged a fair bit in the past Catalonia because that Spanish region had seemed to settle on a viable model, as a self-governing territory and self-defined nation within a wider Spanish state. Catalan separatism, despite its long history, has lacked the mass support and publicly conflictual history of Basque separatism at the other end of the Pyrenees; Catalonia seemed to have managed the transition from Franco without major traumas. That's why I'm very surprised by the news that the Spanish economic crisis, aggravated by the broader Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and given a hard political edge by a Spanish government unsympathetic to Catalonian autonomism, has made separatism massively popular--some surveys I've come across suggest that at this moment, a majority of Catalonians would prefer their region become an independent state.

Louis Emmanuel writing in The Independent does a good job outlining the recent developments.

The tide is turning, Catalan filmmaker Josep Citutat tells me. "Something is changing so fast. A lot of people around me, family and friends, who weren't independent – now they are." Record numbers marching on the streets outside his flat in Barcelona confirm his judgment.

Around 1.5 million people were thought to have filled the streets of the Catalan capital last earlier this month. Independentistes poured in from around the region, creating a sea of yellow and red up and down the famous boulevards.

The strength of the protest was no surprise given the dire economic condition in the debt-addled region of a country suffering the worst of the eurozone crisis. As Europe has seen before, economic suffering is feeding nationalist sentiment.

History aside, a portion of this growing antagonism has its origins in the imbalance between what Catalans contribute to central government in Madrid and what they get back in return. The idea that they are supporting the rest of Spain, which is close to collapse, breeds resentment and mirrors similar reactions in northern Europe over the eurozone crisis in general.

[. . .]

Laid bare, Catalonia accounts for approximately 20 per cent of Spain’s economic output, but holds 15 per cent of the population. Economists estimate that Catalonia pays €12bn more in taxes per year to Madrid than it gets back to spend. Many Catalans put this estimation as high as €16bn.

Catalans also pay more than anywhere else in Spain, on average, for property conveyances, health care, vehicle registration, highway tolls and income tax (which rests at 49 per cent in the highest bracket).

Just last month the region asked Madrid for a €5bn bailout, despite cutting faster and deeper than many of the other 17 autonomous regions.

And all this amid Catalonia’s own crisis. Just last month the region asked Madrid for a €5bn bailout, despite cutting faster and deeper than many of the other 17 autonomous regions. The anger caused by the cuts makes Catalans feel they are subsidising Spain more than ever - galvanising the independence movement further.


I'd go so far as to say that Catalonian independence may be more likely than Québec independence for two reasons.


  • Catalonia, unlike Québec, is a "have" territory within its country and continent; it's economically more productive than any Spanish region apart from the Basque Country, contributes more to the Spanish federal budget than it receives. Questions of economic viabiility that might be fairly raised for Québec don't obviously appear for Catalonia.
  • Catalonia, unlike Québec, is embedded in a regional federation of states of varying sizes and levels of development, none clearly dominant over the others, to which an independent Catalonia could plausibly join. Outside of the Canadian federation, the United States could be potentially overwhelming. Catalonia in the European Union isn't implausible.



Couple this with a semi-plausible argument that Catalonian nationhood, culture, and language is threatened by the territory's continued submergence in an unsympathetic Spanish state, and you could easily get a referendum result in support of independence.

Against this, David Roman writing at the Wall Street Journal argues that Catalonian separatism is fundamentally a bluff since the Spanish government is much more hostile to a separatist bid on the part of Catalonia than (his comparison) the British government is with Scotland's separatism.

The key issue here is that the threat of independence is very much empty. Unlike Scotland’s case, there is no political deal to break in Spain. Catalonia never accepted terms for a union with other parts of Spain, but was one of four regions brought into the Spanish fold through the merger of the crowns of Castille and Aragon, in the 15th century.

The U.K.’s unwritten constitution, for all its merits, is no brake to Scottish independence. The Spanish constitution, verbose as it is, includes specific provisions against the independence of any of the country’s regions. These provisions would also block a vote for such a move—unless it is held in the whole of Spain, as the constitution establishes all Spaniards are holders of indivisible sovereignty.

Beyond legal stuff, then there’s political reality. Catalonia is the largest economy of any Spanish region, and larger than Greece’s, but depends heavily on trade with the rest of Spain.

Javier Díaz-Giménez, a IESE business school professor, says economists have a term for this: “local goods bias.” Catalonia-based businesses know perfectly well that their economic ties with Spain after a potential independence would be very much frayed. That’s why the head of the main Spanish business association, a Catalan, last week openly came out against independence.

Politically, the odds are also against Mr. Mas.

Catalonia, like the rest of Spain, is strongly pro-European Union. But the one immediate, obvious and undeniable effect of Catalan independence would be secession from the EU, a group of countries of which the state of Catalonia is not a member.


I don't think his points hold as arguments relevant to the success or failure of separatism. They don't directly, or at least credibly, address the basic economic, cultural and political concerns which are propelling the movement to its current heights. Rather, I think they relate to the likelihood that a Catalonian consensus on independence from Spain could be badly mishandled. If anything, a hard line by the Spanish state against Catalonia could well make separatism more popular.

(I wonder. What will happen in the Basque Country, especially with that region's long history of separatism and its actual success in avoiding the worst of the Spanish economic bubble?)
rfmcdonald: (Default)

  • At Geocurrents, Martin Lewis explains why the mistaken theory tracing Indo-European origins to prehistoric Anatolia is so important as to merit nearly a half-dozen posts.

  • Language Hat quotes an interesting argument arghuing that sub-Saharan African ethnicities in the era of transatlantic slavery can be rediscovered, and must be rediscovered, to understand the patterns of African diaspora communities.

  • Marginal Revolution reports on the fact that some Greek islands are now up for sale to landowners, to help cover Greek debt.

  • At The Power and the Money, Noel Maurer argues contra Matt Yglesias that a North America self-sufficient in oil is possible and would change things.

  • Strange Maps reports on a Nicaraguan postage stamp that, on account of claims made on Honduran territory, nearly started a war.

  • The Volokh Conspiracy reports on the recent sharp rise in separatism in Catalonia. The distinction made between a nationalist movement and the American Confederacy is worth keeping.

rfmcdonald: (Default)
Czech journalist Martin Ehl, writing for Transitions Online, writes about how Hungarian Turanism--briefly, an incorrect nationalist theory that links Hungary not only with the Finnic peoples of northern Europe but with Turkic groups and various central Asians--is being used by Hungary's ruling Fidesz party to provide ideological justification for its rule. See here for an example of this theory as presented with a light nationalist spin.

It's worth noting, in the context of the extradition of Armenian-killing Azerbaijani military officer Ramil Safarov back to his homeland, that Azerbaijan as a Turkic nation-state is seen by Turanists as a kindred nation of Hungary. Perhaps there was a secondary motivation to the extradition behind the promise of bond purchases?

By giving its blessing to an obscure festival that propagates the ties between the Hungarian nation and the tribes of Central Asia through a theory with historical and living links to the Hungarian extreme right, Orban’s Fidesz party has tossed another explosive device into relations between Budapest and the rest of Europe.

Up to a quarter of a million visitors descended on the plain near the small town of Bugac in central Hungary this past weekend for the fourth annual Kurultaj, a gathering of tribal chiefs and national folklore groups that pay lip service to the tradition of Turanism.

The Turanians, so the theory runs, were a tribe of Iranian origin led by the mighty Tur. They were later identified with the Turks and later still embraced as forebears by several Central Asian nations in search of their ultimate origins. Most modern scholars regard this as an ungrounded theory, a modern legend.

In Hungary, the belief in the Magyars’ Turanian origins took hold in right-wing circles between the wars, a time when a part of the Hungarian elite sought cures for the trauma of the Trianon Treaty and the loss of two-thirds of the Hungarian empire’s territory and a third of its population. Far more dangerous than the Turan I – Hungary’s only domestic tank during World War II, built on license from Czechoslovakia’s Skoda works – Turanism became part of the ideological arsenal of the Hungarian Arrow Cross fascists.

The Arrow Cross line leads directly to the members and fellow travelers of today’s extreme-right Jobbik party, marked among other things by its undisguised anti-Semitism. With cynical irony you could remark that Jobbik’s public support for the anti-Israel statements of Iranian leaders stems not just from ideology but also from the belief in a shared ancestry.

For the first time this year, the Kurultaj festival became a semi-official event, although until now it’s been associated mainly with Jobbik. Marton Gyongyosi, the deputy chairman of Jobbik and of parliament’s foreign affairs committee, spoke last weekend of the need to seek the roots of the Hungarian nation in the east, the MTI news agency reported. He talked of the fictional Finno-Ugric theory “by which the Hungarians’ enemies try to undermine them,” and praised the official governmental “opening to the East” policy – which is nothing more than Budapest’s attempt to extricate itself from diplomatic isolation in Europe by looking for friends in Asia.

The musty theory of Turanism serves this purpose excellently. Tribal leaders were welcomed in parliament by deputy speaker and Fidesz member Sandor Leszak, and the government donated $310,000 to the Kurultaj organization. This weekend parliament saw not just oldsters in exotic folk costumes on its Secession-style benches, but also displays of battle scenes and falconry, among other things.

[. . .]

The Hungarian government’s cozying up to a mythology exploited by fascists is taking place against a backdrop of the “rehabilitation” of the interwar dictator Miklos Horthy – he’s had streets renamed after him and a statue of him erected – and international criticism of rising anti-Semitism in Hungary. It could be grounds to surmise that Orban and his party are nearer to the extremists of Jobbik than Europeans had previously thought.
rfmcdonald: (Default)
Patrick Markey's Reuters article analyzing the tensions between autonomous Kurdistan and the Iraqi central government over their respective approaches to the Syrian civil war--Iraqi Kurdistan is closely allying itself with the anti-central Syrian Kurds, at least, while the Iraqi central government dominated by Shi'ites doesn't want the current Iranian-allied government to be dislodged--makes for cheery reading. Oil makes things wonderfully complicated, too.

Might we yet have another Kurdish war in Iraq, or maybe even a broader conflict?

Over a few days last week, Baghdad and Kurdish officials separately rushed troops to the Syrian frontier, ostensibly to secure it against unrest in the neighboring country; but the mobilization brought Iraqi Arab and Kurdish soldiers face to face along their own disputed internal border.

Washington intervened and a potential clash was avoided. But the standoff opened a new front in Baghdad's already dangerously fragile relations with the Kurds in their push for more autonomy from central government.

"We don't want to fight, we are both Iraqis, but if war comes, we won't run," said Peshmerga Ismael Murad Khady, sitting under a straw awning to ward off the sun, the battered stock of a BKC machine gun pointing not towards some foreign border but at fellow countrymen manning the Iraqi army post.

Just visible are Iraqi army trenches and tents beyond the empty stretch of road that is now a de facto no-man's land in this small frontline. Nearby, local cars kick up dust as they take sidetracks to skirt the two posts.

Behind the Peshmerga, a title that means literally 'those who lay down their lives', a battery of Kurdish 122-mm howitzers directs its barrels towards the Iraqi line. They are part of the heavier armour reinforcements Kurdistan and Iraq drafted into the disputed area just a kilometre from the Syrian border.

Always a potential flashpoint, tensions between Baghdad and Kurdistan escalated after U.S. troops left in December, removing a buffer between the Iraqi Arab dominated central government and ethnic Kurds who have run their own autonomous area since 1991.

Iraq's national army units and Peshmerga have faced off before, only to pull back before clashes as both regions tested each other's nerves, lacking however any interest in confrontation.

Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki, a Shi'ite muslim, and Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani have sparred more aggressively since America's withdrawal, as Kurdistan chaffs against central government control.

At the heart of their dispute are contested territories claimed by Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and crude reserves now attracting majors like Exxon and Chevron to Kurdistan, upsetting Baghdad, which says it controls rights to develop oil.

Though autonomous, Kurdistan still relies on Baghdad for its share of the national oil revenues.

Kurdistan is growing increasingly closer to neighbour Turkey as it talks about ways to export its own oil and not rely on Baghdad. Maliki's government accuses Kurdistan of violating the law by signing deals with oil majors.
rfmcdonald: (Default)
Writing in MacLean's, Paul Wells highlights what might be the new normal in the official France-Canada relations, French non-support for Québec separatism. Almost since separatism took off as a political force in the 1960s, the idea that France would recognize an independent Québec was a linchpin of separatist strategies and French policy--at first officially, under De Gaulle, then more quietly under his successors.

[B]eginning with his 2007 election, Sarkozy began to change that. Sarkozy’s economic policies and his stance on major foreign-relations issues might change from day to day, but on Quebec he was consistent—and more hostile toward separatists than any of his predecessors.

Sarkozy’s best Canadian friend is the steadfastly federalist Power Corporation CEO Paul Desmarais. On a 2008 visit to Quebec City, Sarkozy became the first modern French president to come down openly against separatism. “I don’t see how proof of fraternal, familial love for Quebec has to feed proof of defiance toward Canada,” he said. “Frankly, if there’s someone who would tell me that the world today needs another division, then we don’t have the same view of the world.”

Enter the new guy. Hollande is a socialist and Harper really isn’t, and Conservatives in Ottawa worried that Hollande would differentiate himself from Sarkozy by retreating from his predecessor’s pro-federalist stance. But to their surprise, senior French and Canadian sources say the two leaders have managed to get off to a good start together.

Even on Quebec. On that election-night phone call, Hollande referred to “une amitié et un cousinage” with Canada and Quebec, which could translate as a reference to France’s Canadian friends and its cousins in Quebec. Note-takers and public-service parsers on the Canadian side noted the resemblance to Sarkozy’s preferred language: “amitié et fraternité,” friends and brothers.

Two weeks later they were at Barack Obama’s Camp David retreat in Maryland for a G8 summit. In their first face-to-face meeting, Hollande said two things about Quebec to Harper. First, that France sees its relations with Quebec and its relations with all of Canada to be parallel, harmonious and essentially synonymous. Second, that Hollande has no intention of disrupting that state of affairs.

Both French and Canadian sources interpret those comments as a continuation of Sarkozy’s line on the whole business, which was in turn viewed as an unusually pro-federalist departure from past practice. So Sarkozy left his Quebec brothers, or at least the Péquistes among them, out in the cold—and Hollande seems content to prolong that diplomatic isolation.


It goes without saying that French disinterest in Québec separatism will have a significant impact on the strategies of separatists. If, after a "Oui" majority in a hypothetical future referendum, separatists could no longer count on France automatically recognizing an independent Québec, their margins for international maneuver--hence domestic maneuver--will be hemmed accordingly.

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