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rfmcdonaldSeveral years ago, I'd written about how modern Slovenia was very substantially a product of Yugslavia after the Second World War, which created its modern borders and its state institutions while allowing Slovenia to evolve into a freer society than anywhere else in Communist Europe. Much more recently, I've written about Slovenia's Ten-Day War which saw a vastly outgunned Slovenia handily defeat the Yugoslav People's Army and win its independence, as accurately described at this Slovenian government website.
This leads to a natural question: How did Slovenia manage to develop a military while it was still part of Yugoslavia? Blame the Territorial Defense Forces. After the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Tito's Yugoslavia adopted the policy of creating a second military force in addition to the standing army, a collection of militias each run by a different Yugoslavian federal unit. Based on the model of the Partisans of the Second World War, the Territorial Defense Forces would mobilize the populations of each federal unit to fight in a wide-spread partisan war that, hopefully, would help see Yugoslavia liberated from its foreign invaders. Tensions between the TDF and the Yugoslav People's Army saw the former placed under the much closer supervision of the YPA, even though the federal units were charged with paying the costs of the TDFs.
Starting at the end of the 1980s, this changed when the Slovenian government passed legislation in August 1990 placing the TDF under republican control after creating secret parallel command structure within the TDF . Girded by high morale, by June 1991 Slovenia was prepared on multiple fronts.
The highly successful guerrilla attacks mounted against Yugoslav military targets in the full view of international media (of the dozen foreign citizens killed, something like four were journalists) . The incompetence of the Yugoslav military--sending in tanks without providing infantry support, going in without any very clear goals, above all not believing that the Slovenians had the will to fight--ensured a pretty thorough defeat.
As I've said before, what particularly interests me about the Ten Day War is its sheer post-modern nature, with an underarmed political unit using asymmetric warfare (military forces and media publicity) quite successfully against a much larger conventional force and achieving its goal of separation. The mass secessions in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union didn't trigger a wave of mass secessions elsewhere: Catalonia remains Spanish, Québec is Canadian, Kashmir is Indian despite everything and Kabyles remain Algerian, Puerto Rico is heading towards statehood, and by all accounts the Western Australians and Ryukyuans are happy enough in their own states.
I do wonder if Slovenia's military example has inspired other secessionist movements interested in imitating Slovenia's very highly contingent success and believing that it can be transplanted to their situations despite everything. (The Tamil Tigers, maybe?)
Thoughts?
According to rough estimates, the YPA had 44 casualties and 146 wounded, and the Slovenian side 19 casualties and 182 wounded. 12 foreign citizens were killed. There is no data available as to the number of Slovenian soldiers killed while attempting to escape from the YPA. 4693 YPA servicemembers and 252 federal police officers were captured. There were 72 minor and major armed conflicts during the war. 31 YPA tanks, 22 personnel carriers and 6 helicopters were destroyed, damaged or confiscated, along with 6,787 infantry, 87 artillery and 124 air defence weapons according to YPA inspections.
This leads to a natural question: How did Slovenia manage to develop a military while it was still part of Yugoslavia? Blame the Territorial Defense Forces. After the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Tito's Yugoslavia adopted the policy of creating a second military force in addition to the standing army, a collection of militias each run by a different Yugoslavian federal unit. Based on the model of the Partisans of the Second World War, the Territorial Defense Forces would mobilize the populations of each federal unit to fight in a wide-spread partisan war that, hopefully, would help see Yugoslavia liberated from its foreign invaders. Tensions between the TDF and the Yugoslav People's Army saw the former placed under the much closer supervision of the YPA, even though the federal units were charged with paying the costs of the TDFs.
Starting at the end of the 1980s, this changed when the Slovenian government passed legislation in August 1990 placing the TDF under republican control after creating secret parallel command structure within the TDF . Girded by high morale, by June 1991 Slovenia was prepared on multiple fronts.
Slovenia [. . . ] benefitted from excellent intelligence on the JNA's military strategy. Slovenes who served in the JNA gave sensitive information to senior Slovene military and political leaders. The information allowed the Territorial Defense forces to wage surprise guerrilla attacks against the JNA. Slovenia also demonstrated excellent coordination between its military and political-media staff. It successfully portrayed itself as the victim of a massive attack by the XNA. The Territorial Defense forces purposely attacked helicopters and tanks in an effort to show the JNA as thrusting its superior weaponry against the under-armed Slovenes. These attacks galvanized the world media and centered attention on Slovenia's resistance. At the same time, Slovenian political leaders cultivated diplomatic ties with key European allies, notably Germany and Austria, who spoke out against the JNA's moves. Overall, the short war illustrated a well-planned military operation by the Territorial Defense forces, coupled with a highly effective political and diplomatic strategy.
The highly successful guerrilla attacks mounted against Yugoslav military targets in the full view of international media (of the dozen foreign citizens killed, something like four were journalists) . The incompetence of the Yugoslav military--sending in tanks without providing infantry support, going in without any very clear goals, above all not believing that the Slovenians had the will to fight--ensured a pretty thorough defeat.
By all accounts, Yugoslav Army units are surrounded by Slovenian territorial defense forces behind barricades throughout the breakaway republic and are often without regular supplies of food and water, and oftencut off from their headquarters and from access to medical assistance.
"We are practically surrounded by the territorial defense," Col. Jovan Miskov, second in command of Yugoslavia's main Ljubljana barracks, said at a news conference on Sunday.
As I've said before, what particularly interests me about the Ten Day War is its sheer post-modern nature, with an underarmed political unit using asymmetric warfare (military forces and media publicity) quite successfully against a much larger conventional force and achieving its goal of separation. The mass secessions in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union didn't trigger a wave of mass secessions elsewhere: Catalonia remains Spanish, Québec is Canadian, Kashmir is Indian despite everything and Kabyles remain Algerian, Puerto Rico is heading towards statehood, and by all accounts the Western Australians and Ryukyuans are happy enough in their own states.
I do wonder if Slovenia's military example has inspired other secessionist movements interested in imitating Slovenia's very highly contingent success and believing that it can be transplanted to their situations despite everything. (The Tamil Tigers, maybe?)
Thoughts?
