[LINK] "South Korea’s Jeju, a peripheral success"

[rfmcdonald]

Andray Abrahamian's Asia Times article examines Jeju-do, an island located roughly equidistant between Korea and Japan in the Korea Strait with a unique history marked by a strong local identity and difficult relations with mainland Korea.

Jeju, culturally different from the rest of Korea, has long been on the fringe of central society. The island was an independent kingdom until the 5th century AD, after which it was a tributary state to Korea's Baekjae and Shilla dynasties. It briefly regained its independence in the 10th century and had varying levels of local administration until the newly formed Joseon Dynasty brought it firmly under central control in 1404. Though it was at this point finally integrated into Korean-Confucian modes of social organization, Jeju natives found social mobility and political or scholarly advancement severely constrained. Jeju also became a place for the central government to send exiles.

With a different founding myth, language and social traditions, Jeju natives continued to be on the outside of society and were treated as such. At various points in history, the islanders were too barbarian, too Mongolian or too Shamanist to be accepted by the central culture. This was at times expressed through unfair taxation regimes or corruption by officials dispatched to the island. At times of internal dynastic instability or foreign encroachment, their outsider status was reinforced through violence, often in excess of what one might call necessary normal physical enforcement of social stability. This meant that the islanders' localized identity was reinforced: a subaltern, outsider's identity, which was defined by suspicion and resistance to central control. Violent uprisings were frequent under Shilla, Baekjae and Goryo.

As Joseon's power waned, Jeju's long history of rebellion was brought into the modern era. In 1862, the Gang Jae Gom uprising was a reaction to the corruption of late Joseon officials. After Korea's ports were forcibly opened to trade and the Japanese in particular began affecting local economic patterns, uprisings broke out in 1890, 1891, 1896, 1898 and, perhaps most famously, in the 1901 Lee Jae Su uprising. This first uprising of the 20th century was a violent opposition to the increasing levels of conversion and influence wielded by French Roman Catholics. All of these rebellions were from the perceived mistreatment or victimization at the hands of outside forces. The 1948 struggle of communism against capitalism was merely the latest guise under which the conflict of outsider against local expressed itself.

What followed the 4.3 Incident was a 40-year period of repression, during which local versions of language and history where subjugated to national narratives. Jeju natives were Koreanized, as media, education and military service were standardized with the rest of the Republic of Korea. This was, of course, awfully repressive, but the demands of the homogenous, territorially bounded nation-state are very different from the flowing, tributary-alliance way Confucian societies organized center and periphery relationships.

The 4.3 incident, incidentally, saw between 25 and 30 thousand people killed out of a total island population of three hundred thousand. The development of a modern, wealthy, and democratic Korean nation-state--one that didn't practice the subordination of the periphery to the centre, but rather included everyone in a single body--was key in this.

First, Jeju's economy experienced huge investment and development with tangible, local results in the period of repression. As of 2008, Jeju's per capita gross regional domestic product was US$15,000. This is 78% of the national average, and higher than cities such as Daegu and Busan, in the wealthy southeast of the peninsula. Not only has income dramatically risen along with the rest of the country, but also Jeju now boasts the highest rates of longevity in the country.

South Korea's rapid development did not fail to include Jeju. Furthermore, as 70% of Jeju's new economy is based on tourism, for the last half-century mainlanders have visited the island with increasing frequency: there are currently around 150 commercial flights a day (and good luck trying to get a weekend flight from spring to autumn). The idea that Jeju is "exotic, but Korean nonetheless" is now a common one - the concept of Jeju as extrinsic and alien has disappeared.

Second, Jeju's autonomy is genuine in several key areas. While foreign and military affairs are still Seoul's purview, most major points of governance are in local hands. Key psychological indices include education and police. It is perhaps hard to overstate the value of this for a populace whose traditions and narratives were long subjugated alongside physical oppression at the hands of the authorities. The local government also controls its economic relations with the outside world, having total control over financial and visa regulations.

Furthermore, the foundation laid by prior economic development has freed up local authorities to pursue a variety of plans, including becoming a hub for regional cruise ships or for international secondary schools. Tax regimes have been set up to attract foreign investment and while the timing of the international financial crisis delayed many of the Jeju governments plans, South Korea's currency devaluation actually helped the local economy escape the worst of the credit crunch. Jeju had a record year in 2009 as Koreans accustomed to holidaying abroad compensated for the crash of the Won by going to Jeju instead, while Japanese tourists were attracted by the buying power the Yen suddenly had.

I can't help but wonder if Cheju's precedent will be at all applicable to North Korea, once--or if--it begins a rapprochement leading towards reunification with the south.