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rfmcdonaldOf late I've begun visiting the Guardian's Comment is free section. British historian Lynda Colley's article "Europe, not empire: Britain's foreign policy challenge" caught my attention, not least with the editorial summary "Scandinavia is the model for a UK that can no longer rely on its imperial history, but must seek alliances in Europe". With Britain falling outside an increasingly integrated European federation, regional powers rising to diminish British heft and its attractiveness to the United States as a favoured partner, and the Commonwealth heritage at risk not only to republicanism in Australasia but via Scottish independence, Colley argues that Britain--united or otherwise--should look to Scandinavia. (I'd blogged earlier about British claims to a Scandinavian identity.)
Colley gained fame with her 1993 Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. Her thesis was that the identity of the United Kingdom created by the 1707 unification of Scotland with England was fourfold, grounded on an identity as a Protestant community in a largely Catholic Europe, as a military power specializing in navies not armies, as an imperial power, and as a rival of France. These four distinctive qualities greatly diminished after the end of the Empire and Britain's integration into a European community, Colley argued, the traditional nations of England and Scotland and Wales would go their separate ways. Her recommendation that the United Kingdom look to Scandinavia, traditionally Protestant, its core states still constitutional monarchies, and on the critical fringes of the European project, does make sense. There's problems, though.
1. It's worth noting that Scandinavia, or Norden, isn't very much on the fringe--only Norway and Iceland are outside of the European Union altogether, the entire region (unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland) adheres to Schengen, Finland has adopted the Euro while the Danish krona is tied to that currency. How close is the United Kingdom (or the United Kingdom and Scotland) supposed to not get? Using Scandinavia as a model suggests that there should be greater integration.
2. Colley's right to point tout that Canada and India and Singapore and South Africa and Malaysia don't particularly need the United Kingdom as a metropole, no more than Mexico and Venezuela and Argentina need Spain to speak on their behalf, certainly no more than Brazil needs Portugal. The countries of the Commonwealth that are identified as the thriving potential markets replacing Europe's, whether the old settler colonies like Canada and Australia or the rising powers like India, Malaysia and Pakistan, have the institutional capacity needed to conduct foreign affairs without the guidance of the erstwhile metropole, thanks. We've got our own priorities, too, and have developed our own connections with European and non-European countries alike. The time of the unified Commonwealth is over, and critics of the European Union in Britain who think those ties could be strengthened are ridiculous ...
... but those ties do persist. Could the Commonwealth ever plausibly displace the European Union? No. It does provide Britain with connections that other European countries don't have, at least not to the same degree, at least for the time being.
3. There's the matter of size. For an independent Scotland, say, the idea of emulating the Scandinavian policy of broadly greater but critical engagement with Europe, and a retreat from an imperial presence generally, may be quite plausible. But what of the rump United Kingdom? (Neither Wales nor Northern Ireland are nearly as likely as Scotland to accede to independence.) If England still had a small population relative to continental Europe as it did well into the 19th century, in the range of a few millions, rather than a population now only somewhat smaller than France and plausibly larger than Germany's in a generation's time, then it might make sense to talk about Sweden as a model. But it doesn't: England, unlike Scotland or Sweden, is not a small nation. Declining it might be, England still has options that Scandinavia does not.
Of course the UK, and its component parts, should seek out as many connections with as many parts of the world as is profitable and feasible. But to play any kind of global role effectively, the UK is likely always to require allies within its own continent, and far more enterprise needs devoting to this.
Consider the Scandinavian countries. Like the UK, these have been predominantly Protestant states; they are monarchies; possess strong maritime and imperial traditions; and are geographically on the circumference of Europe. Their social and educational policies are admirable, as is their meritocracy. They should be obvious allies and points of reference not just for Edinburgh, but also for politicians in London.
Responding to Britain's future challenges will require unceasing agility in seeking out new alliances and refurbishing old ones inside Europe, not just outside it. But crucially it will involve something more. It has become fashionable to argue that it is England, not the UK as a whole, that faces particular difficulties in adapting to a changing world. This is not entirely correct. There is a degree, for instance, that some Scottish nationalism falls prey to the same fallacies to which little Englandism is subject. In both cases there can be an excessive, even narcissistic, faith in the beauties and possibilities of small nationhood.
Yet, while the old empires have gone, this is still a world dominated by vast overland powers that retain some of the characteristics of empires, and that possess vast economic and military resources. In such a world, all small nations are potentially at risk and at a disadvantage. Facing up to the implications of this is hard. So is accepting the bitter truth that, in strategic terms, countries in relative decline (which includes all Europe) must choose between a limited set of options, none of which is likely to be are wholly attractive. Yet coming to terms with these harsh realities is essential. The best way of dealing with a potential perfect storm is to adjust and prepare our minds.
Colley gained fame with her 1993 Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. Her thesis was that the identity of the United Kingdom created by the 1707 unification of Scotland with England was fourfold, grounded on an identity as a Protestant community in a largely Catholic Europe, as a military power specializing in navies not armies, as an imperial power, and as a rival of France. These four distinctive qualities greatly diminished after the end of the Empire and Britain's integration into a European community, Colley argued, the traditional nations of England and Scotland and Wales would go their separate ways. Her recommendation that the United Kingdom look to Scandinavia, traditionally Protestant, its core states still constitutional monarchies, and on the critical fringes of the European project, does make sense. There's problems, though.
1. It's worth noting that Scandinavia, or Norden, isn't very much on the fringe--only Norway and Iceland are outside of the European Union altogether, the entire region (unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland) adheres to Schengen, Finland has adopted the Euro while the Danish krona is tied to that currency. How close is the United Kingdom (or the United Kingdom and Scotland) supposed to not get? Using Scandinavia as a model suggests that there should be greater integration.
2. Colley's right to point tout that Canada and India and Singapore and South Africa and Malaysia don't particularly need the United Kingdom as a metropole, no more than Mexico and Venezuela and Argentina need Spain to speak on their behalf, certainly no more than Brazil needs Portugal. The countries of the Commonwealth that are identified as the thriving potential markets replacing Europe's, whether the old settler colonies like Canada and Australia or the rising powers like India, Malaysia and Pakistan, have the institutional capacity needed to conduct foreign affairs without the guidance of the erstwhile metropole, thanks. We've got our own priorities, too, and have developed our own connections with European and non-European countries alike. The time of the unified Commonwealth is over, and critics of the European Union in Britain who think those ties could be strengthened are ridiculous ...
... but those ties do persist. Could the Commonwealth ever plausibly displace the European Union? No. It does provide Britain with connections that other European countries don't have, at least not to the same degree, at least for the time being.
3. There's the matter of size. For an independent Scotland, say, the idea of emulating the Scandinavian policy of broadly greater but critical engagement with Europe, and a retreat from an imperial presence generally, may be quite plausible. But what of the rump United Kingdom? (Neither Wales nor Northern Ireland are nearly as likely as Scotland to accede to independence.) If England still had a small population relative to continental Europe as it did well into the 19th century, in the range of a few millions, rather than a population now only somewhat smaller than France and plausibly larger than Germany's in a generation's time, then it might make sense to talk about Sweden as a model. But it doesn't: England, unlike Scotland or Sweden, is not a small nation. Declining it might be, England still has options that Scandinavia does not.
