[LINK] "Deadlock for Catalonia and Spain"

[rfmcdonald]

Fernando Vallespín's Open Democracy essay covers territory I'm familiar with from discussions of Québec's status in Canada: most Catalans identify themselves as both Catalans and Spanish, and so are naturally not inclined towards separatism, but if they feel forced to choose between the two identity's they'd opt for the identity they experience most regularly over the one they don't, i.e. for independence.

I've been following Catalonian separatism's revival for some time, back in September 2010 with a post when the crisis began and then last month as support for separatism reached majority levels. The prospects for a united Spain in 2012 is at least as worrisome as the prospects for a united Canada in 1994, before the second referendum, all the more so since there at least seem to be strong economic arguments in favour of Catalonia's independence from Spain./

[W]hy independence, and not a qualitative change within Spain’s territorial arrangement, a new federal pact, a middle ground between real independence and the present situation? This would be consistent with the fact that two thirds of Catalans still consider themselves according to the polls as both Catalan and Spanish in one measure or another. And, in any case, it will certainly lead to greater consensus in Spain and Europe. It would also insure us against the risks of uncertainty that we always face when confronted with emotionally loaded conflicts, as is always the case with the clash of national sentiments. Or, at least, weaken their impact. In general, we know how these conflicts start, but not how they are definitively put to rest.

On the other hand – and on this Pere Vilanova’s article was quite enlightening- the burdensome conditions for changing the European treatises in order to make room for another European state resulting from the secession of a member state makes the result of this process quite unpredictable. It would never succeed with a Spanish veto, and hardly anyone in Catalonia would be willing to exchange Europe for total sovereignty. Without full Spanish compliance, both internally and on the European front, it could end in mayhem. The answer, independence, is thus turned into a question: why independence and not something else?

The Catalan answer would though be, and I would agree with them on this, that they have already tried it out, but were never really heard. A majority of Spaniards would never accept what needs to be done in order to implement a smooth accommodation of Catalan’s self-understanding within the Spanish state. As is well-known, part of Catalonia’s present frustration is due to the rejection of a small but significant portion of its new Statute of Autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court. This statute had already been severely expurgated of its most salient self-governing features by the Spanish parliament. After that, the sentiment among a large part of the Catalan population was something like the title of that song by The Who: we won’t be fooled again!

In any case, there is one thing that cannot be denied. The levels of self-government already being implemented in Catalonia throughout the last decades were effectively directed towards the creation of a nation-building process. The use of the Catalan language in both the public sphere and ordinary life became dominant, and a new generation has been slowly socialized within national sentiments that to a certain extent ignore its link to overall Spain. The ‘uncoupling’ of the country that I referred to before was already almost a social fact, although without its constitutional equivalent. It could be said, that ‘sociological Catalonia’ no longer corresponds with ‘official Catalonia’.

It has been a matter of time until that underlying contradiction was made explicit. And the catalyst for it was, of course, the economic crisis. The sense of grievance regarding the investment policies in infrastructures of the central state, Madrid, plus the burden of Catalonia’s contribution to the rest of Spain in the midst of savage austerity measures did the job. This was also fuelled by the deployment of an effective rhetoric of Spanish ‘plundering’ of Catalonia’s resources, and, contrary to what is happening in the rest of Spain, where these somber times are felt as the shattering of all illusions, independence gives its people a hope, a collective project, a light beyond the tunnel, both to their unrealized national aspirations and to the regaining of prosperity. Fortuna, the crisis, gave Artur Mas, Catalonia’s Premier, the Machiavellian occasione for a jump forward towards full (?) national sovereignty.

[. . .]

Nevertheless, it takes two for a divorce, and there are no velvet secessions. Spain is not the Sweden of 1905 that let Norway go, nor a semi-artificial nation such as post-soviet Czechoslovakia. Just as Catalonia is neither Norway nor the two other states that split. And no matter how the conflict is resolved, it might affect other European countries as well. There is, though, one thing for sure; it will take time and a lot of political subtlety and leadership on all parts if it is to end well. And besides, it comes at the worst time possible, within a critical moment in European integration and under the worst economic, social and institutional crisis that Spain has experienced since its transition to democracy. As so often happens in history, what to some Catalans seems to be a chance - occasione - is a nightmare to Spain and, I should think, to Europe as well. At least at this specific juncture.