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  • blogTO notes that TTC tunnels will get WiFi in 2018.

  • Border Thinking's Laura Augustín shares some of Edvard Munch's brothel paintings.

  • Centauri Dreams looks at the latest science on fast radio bursts.

  • Dangerous Minds shares some of the sexy covers of Yugoslavian computer magazine Računari.

  • Dead Things looks at the latest research into dinosaur eggs.

  • The Dragon's Gaze links to a paper suggesting that a high surface magnetic field in a red giant star indicates a recent swallowing of a planet.

  • Language Log shares an ad for a portable smog mask from China.

  • Lawyers, Guns and Money takes issue with the idea of NAFTA being of general benefit to Mexico.

  • Torontoist looks at the history of Toronto General Hospital.

  • Window on Eurasia is skeptical about an American proposal for Ukraine, and suggests Ossetian reunification within Russia is the next annexation likely to be made by Russia.

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  • The Dragon's Gaze reports on speculation that the Fermi paradox can be answered by assuming extraterrestrial civilizations have died already.

  • The Dragon's Tales looks at the climate of early Mars.

  • Far Outliers takes a look at ethnic divisions among Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia.

  • Joe. My. God. reposts his essay on gay pride parades, in all of their diverse and showy glory.

  • Marginal Revolution notes a study suggesting that, in Sweden, lottery winners do not experience improvements in their health.

  • Window on Eurasia looks at the dynamics behind Putin's neo-Soviet nostalgia, and looks at a sketchy prison in North Ossetia.

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  • The Boston Globe's Big Picture reports on the scene from Palmyra after the expulsion of ISIS.

  • James Bow links to a documentary on the search for Planet Nine.

  • The Dragon's Tales speculates that the ability to enter torpor might have saved mammals from the en of the Cretaceous extinction.

  • Honourary Canadian Philip Turner discovers the Chiac dialect of the Acadians of the Maritimes.

  • Joe. My. God. notes that Afrika Bambaataa has been accused of molesting young boys.

  • Language Hat reports on the renaming of the Czech Republic "Czechia."

  • Marginal Revolution notes Singapore has a graciousness index.

  • Personal Reflections' Jim Belshaw reflects on Australia's upcoming elections.

  • pollotenchegg maps the 2012 elections in Ukraine.

  • The Power and the Money's Noel Maurer explains how American investment in the Philippines was made impossible, so as to avoid welding that country to the US.

  • The Russian Demographics Blog links to a paper examining contraception and abortion among the Czechs and Slovaks in recent decades.

  • Towleroad notes Ted Cruz' disinterest in protecting gay people.

  • Window on Eurasia notes the scale of Russia's demographic problems, report the debate on whether Russia will or will not annex South Ossetia, and suggest Russia is losing influence in Central Asia.

  • The Financial Times' The World predicts the end for Dilma Rousseff.

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Open Democracy's Stephen Jones takes a look at South Ossetia. Nominally independent since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war like Abkhazia, South Ossetians seem inclined to favour unification with their co-ethnics in North Ossetia, in the Russian Federation. There's little prospect of that, though.

‘[I]ndependence’ will bring little to most South Ossetians – they will be condemned to isolation, marginality, and dependence. The prospects for cooperation with Georgia, its natural economic partner, and contacts with the rest of the South Caucasus through traditional seasonal work and cross border trade, are closed. In the 2012 South Ossetian presidential elections, all four candidates declared they would not engage with the Georgian government. Local migration to North Ossetia and Russia has accelerated, particularly among youth, adding to the SOAO’s demographic decline (villages are disproportionately made up of older women).

the 2012 elections, Alla Dzhioyeva, an anti-corruption crusader against Eduard Kokoity, the outgoing president (unrecognised by Georgia and the rest of the international community), had victory snatched from her by the South Ossetian Supreme Court. Dzhioyeva’s challenge had been unexpected, and she was not Russia’s preferred candidate. Although Dzhioyeva was later given a cabinet post, it illustrated the region’s limited political autonomy, underlined by the intimidating and unchallengeable presence of the Russian military. That court decision supported the Georgian contention that South Ossetia is a not a real state, but a Russian vassal, subject to Russia’s strategic goals. South Ossetia’s borders remain under Russian control, and South Ossetian foreign policy simply does not exist.

South Ossetia does not have the autonomous functions of a state able to provide for its citizens, 80% of whom hold Russian passports. There is constant talk (which goes back to irredentist demands made in the early 1990s) by Putin and local South Ossetian parties for a simple solution – union with North Ossetia. This means annexation by Russia because North Ossetia is part of the Russian Federation. United Ossetia, one of the nine parties running in the June 2014 South Ossetian parliamentary elections, has made union with North Ossetia central to its platform. It would be a popular decision. In a rare independent survey of South Ossetians in 2010 by Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, over 80% expressed the desire for union with the Russian Federation, and 82% wanted Russian troops to remain in South Ossetia permanently. Unlike Abkhazia, there is, paradoxically, little support for independence.

[. . .]

There are, in addition, potential repercussions in the North Caucasus if annexation takes place. The North Caucasus, which consists of six non-Russian autonomous republics (which contain significant ethnic Russian populations) and over 40 national groups, is crisscrossed with conflict between clans, regions, religions and republics; there are multiple border disputes – between Ingushetia and Chechnya, North Ossetia and Ingushetia, between Kabardins and Balkars, and between Kumyks and Chechens in Daghestan, to mention just a few. Changing borders in the Caucasus is rarely accomplished peacefully, and right now Russia does not want to endanger its precarious control over the North Caucasian Federal District.
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  • blogTO notes the construction of another tall condo on Wellesley between Yonge and Church.

  • The Dragon's Gaze links to a paper observing that the Titius-Bode law apparently doesn't work for exoplanets.

  • The Dragon's Tales observes that Western sanctions against the Russian space industry could harm its long-term prospects vis-a-vis China and the United States.

  • Eastern Approaches covers Ukrainian industrialist Rinat Akhmetov's turn towards supporting a united Ukraine.

  • The Financial Times' The World blog notes that Russia is pivoting towards Asia, especially China, to compensate for its broken Western ties.

  • Lawyers, Guns and Money tries to explain the concept of privilege.

  • Marginal Revolution quotes Neal Stephenson's argument that dystopian science fiction is popular because it's cheaper to film.

  • Torontoist examines ongoing efforts to revitalize the downtown neighbourhood of Alexandra Park.

  • Towleroad reports on the jailing of six men in Morocco for their homosexuality.

  • The Volokh Conspiracy examines ethical issues with being a corporation in the United States.

  • Window on Eurasia notes that a prominent North Ossetian has called for the annexation of ex-Georgian South Ossetia into the Russian republic.

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  • Eastern Approaches follows the story of Crimean Tatars who are now refugees in western Ukraine.

  • At the Financial Times' The World blog, John Reed examines the unlikely media star who is Crimean attorney-general Natalia Poklonskaya.

  • A Fistful of Euros' David Weman notes the United Nations vote against the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

  • Geocurrents has a series of posts on Ukraine and its area: one on the Moldovan region of Transnistria, a possible western anchor for Russia; one on Transcarpathia, a Ruthene-populated enclave in western Ukraine not quite Ukrainian; one on Ukraine's energy reserves.

  • At Lawyers, Guns and Money, Robert Farley notes the Russian takeover of the Ukrainian Black Sea fleet ships based in Crimea.

  • The Volokh Conspiracy's Eugene Volokh points out the many, many ways in which Kosovo does not compare to Crimea.

  • Window on Eurasia has a veritable brace of posts. Crimeans aren't taking up Russian passports with much enthusiasm, it seems, while the financial costs of annexation will be significant indeed. A Russian war in southeastern Ukraine would be a difficult war to fight, while post-Soviet space has already been destabilized (1, 2). Will South Ossetia be next to be annexed? (Northern California is not so likely.) Meanwhile, Turkish support for Turkic peoples can be destabilizing.

  • Understanding Society's Daniel Little takes a social science approach to the Russian annexation. What does it mean for the international system's future? Will there be more annexations?

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Writing for Open Democracy, Vakhtang Komakhidze writes at length about how the official policies of the Georgian government towards secessionist South Ossetia--basically, doing the best to cut off all contact with South Ossetia in the hopes that the South Ossetians will give in and unify with Georgia on Georgian turns--is counterproductive.

Over the 20 years of political and military confrontation between Georgia and its two separatist regions, it is South Ossetia that has had relatively better chance for settling its problems. The most difficult time has undoubtedly been the last few years since the 2008 war. Relations are virtually frozen: on the one hand, the Georgian government is refusing to accept recommendations which could have allowed greater cooperation; on the other hand, it offers no alternative to the EU’s recommendations and says nothing about any prospects for settling the Georgian-Ossetian question.

The shadow of the August war still looms large in Georgian-Ossetian relations and the bombing of Tskhinvali, the region’s capital, by Georgian artillery in August 2008 dominates the Ossetian media to this day. Unofficially, however, the Ossetian side has already expressed a hope that economic relations will be restored, most particularly in the Georgian-Ossetian border zone, where they were cut off unilaterally by the Georgians before the war.

The Ergneti open-air market extends over several hectares right on the administrative border. It came into being spontaneously in the second half of the 1990s, thanks to improved relations between the then presidents, Eduard Shevardnadze and Lyudvig Chibirov. The Ergneti market was an unofficial free trade zone of sorts and the business operations that took place there led to a rapid improvement in Georgian-Ossetian relations. Georgian currency began to circulate in the South Ossetian financial sector and people were able to move around on both sides of the conflict zone almost without restriction. The level of trust in trade relations improved to such a degree that trading partners on both sides distributed goods without prepayment. Georgian and Ossetian NGOs ran joint projects; the subject of the 1991 war almost disappeared from the media on both sides.

By 2003 Georgia and Ossetia were ready to start negotiating a political settlement, but relations began to deteriorate with the arrival in power of President Mikheil Saakashvili. His most important pre-election pledge had been the restoration of the country's territorial integrity, but he tried to force events: under the banner of fighting corruption and improving the economy, the Georgian government closed down the Ergneti market, which accounted for a substantial part of South Ossetian revenue. The South Ossetian administration took this as a manifestation of political pressure. Georgian and Ossetian experts believed that economic regulation of the Ergneti market would have been possible, and its arbitrary closure led to a cooling in relations between the two sides and the eventual evaporation of any hope of a political settlement. The Georgian government responded with greater political pressure and militant rhetoric, which, in the end, escalated into the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008.


Is it cynical to suggest that Saakashvili doesn't want to settle the South Ossetian conflict, since keeping the conflict going suits his interests and those of his government? Actually, if the treatment of refugees is indicative, it's only honest to say that.

The town of Akhalgori remained under Georgian jurisdiction after 1992, but was occupied by South Ossetia in 2008. During the August war, refugees from this town and from other parts of the conflict zone headed for the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. The Georgian government quickly created camps, with basic housing painted in bright colours, to accommodate many of the displaced. These camps are however located away from population centres, and the refugees have little hope of finding work. They live in extreme poverty and their brightly-painted houses are a constant reminder of the war.

After the end of the hostilities, the South Ossetian administration offered the Akhalgori refugees a chance of returning to their homes. A crossing was set up on the administrative border, enabling people to move in either direction. Given the difficult social conditions in the refugee camps, many refugees decided to return to the occupied territory.

The Georgian government made unofficial attempts to stop refugees from Akhalgori District returning to their homes, and when a significant number of them did decide to head back, the government cut off the supply of natural gas to the district.
The Georgian government, however, made unofficial attempts to stop refugees from Akhalgori District returning to their homes. When a significant number of them did decide to head back, the government cut off the supply of natural gas to the district. In the winter, the lack of heating led many of the refugees to go back to the refugee camps and even those who had wanted to go home chose to stay in the camps.


Russian policies aren't helping, clearly, but Georgia's not exactly helpful, either.

Go, read.
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The Ossetians are going to be reunified within Russia, or at least their leaders expect such to come about as reported by the Associated Press.

The breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia has predicted it would become part of Russia.

Three days after Moscow recognised it as independent, parliamentary speaker Znaur Gassiyev, said Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the region's leader, Eduard Kokoity, discussed the idea earlier this week.

They agreed Russia would absorb South Ossetia "in several years" or earlier, he said.

Meanwhile, Georgia announced it would recall all diplomatic staff from its embassy in Moscow in protest at the presence of Russian troops on its territory.

Georgia's parliament had urged the government to sever diplomatic ties, calling Russia an "aggressor country" and a Georgian MP said his country will eventually regain control of South Ossetia and another rebel region, Abkhazia.

"The separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Russian authorities are cut off from reality," Gigi Tsereteli said. "The world has already become different and Russia will not long be able to occupy sovereign Georgian territory."

The crisis has prompted an emergency EU summit on Monday with some countries pressing for sanctions against Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia and South Ossetia plan to sign an agreement on the placement of Russian military bases in South Ossetia.

The province's deputy parliamentary speaker Tarzan Kokoiti said South Ossetians have the right to reunite with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia.

"Soon there will be no North or South Ossetia -- there will be a united Alania as part of Russia," he said, using another name for Ossetia. We will live in one united Russian state."
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From the Financial Times comes Jan Cienski's article "Saakashvili lays blame for crisis firmly on Russia".

[O]n the night of August 7, when Georgian forces began their rocket and artillery barrage of Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, the chief of Georgian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, went on Georgian television to say Georgia's "power-wielding bodies" had "decided to restore constitutional order" in the breakaway region.

Mr Saakashvili denies ever using those words. He said his forces moved to slow a Russian advance into Georgia in order to "confront them for three days and to wake up the world".

General Kurashvili also did not mention Russian armour.

The dispute is about more than words. Many leaders, including those who strongly back Georgia in its fight with Russia, accuse Mr Saakashvili of having responded to the shelling of Georgian villages by South Ossetian separatists by undertaking a risky attempt to seize control of the region. That led to Russia's well-planned counter-attack and the invasion of Georgia.

In Mr Saakashvili's version, he is blameless for the resulting crisis that has destroyed much of the Georgian military, seen the Russians damage bridges, roads and other infrastructure inside Georgia proper, shaken investor confidence, and left Russia in even firmer control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia's other separatist enclave.

"We didn't expect this kind of escalation and invasion," said Mr Saakashvili, who has taken to going to sleep at 6am as he deals with the crisis.


From Reuters comes Dmitry Solovyov's piece "Envoy sees bitter legacy of war in Ossetian village".

Georgian troops arrived Khetagurovo on Aug. 8 in a storm of steel and bullets, killing eight people and badly damaging the village of ethnic South Ossetians.

When they left two days later, harried by the Russian forces that crushed Tbilisi's bid to restore control over its breakaway region, locals say their took four prisoners with them and forfeited any chance of reconciliation.

Passions were still running high when Thomas Hammarberg, a European human rights official, arrived in the village on Sunday to witness the release of two Georgian tank crew as a goodwill gesture by the Ossetian authorities.

"Why are you releasing these bloody Georgians if they don't release my husband who is held hostage there?," village book keeper Rita Bestayeva shouted at Hammarberg, the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commissioner.

Russian soldiers held angry villagers at bay as the two Georgian servicemen -- captured when Russian troops retook the village -- were whisked away in a car in the direction of Georgia, a gesture Hammarberg said he would use his influence to push Tbilisi to reciprocate.

"I know that it is very difficult for people in this village to accept that those two prisoners have been released," he told reporters during a break in the visit, which was closely chaperoned by the Russian military.

"I respect their reactions but I am convinced that this is a way to secure that those people missing from this village come back as soon as possible," he said.

What remains of Khetagurovo, set in the hills of South Ossetia amid orchards and vineyards, bears the marks of war and the buildings still standing are pockmarked with shrapnel and bullets.

The conflict has left a lasting legacy in the minds of those like pensioner Yuza Khasiyeva, who saw one neighbour lying in his courtyard killed by a shrapnel headwound and another elderly resident lying dead.

The village is surrounded by a ring of ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia, but asked if the two communities could live together after the latest conflict, she snorted:

"Are you mad? It's better to die than live with them."

"My grandparents told me that in the 1920s they were already killing us, so what we see now is already a third wave of their terror against the Ossetians."


Way to go on veracity. Way to go on the reconciliation front, too.
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