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One thing I've observed here for the past few years, as far back as 2003, is the accelerating (and non-exclusive) integration of the different Lusophone countries of the world--Brazil, Portugal, Angola and Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and Sao Tomé e Principe, East Timor in the Pacific--in any number of domains. After a sufficient amount of time following the end wars of independence in Portuguese Africa and the successful transitions to democracy in Portugal itself and Brazil, the bonds of language and history could return, ultimately under the benign hegemony of a Brazil that has emerged as a great power. This has manifested in any number of ways, from coordinated language reforms to surveillance of and support for troubled democracies to East Timorese purchase of Portuguese government debt.

One new way in which this is being manifested is in the intensification of migratory flows. After a time in the 1990s when Portugal became a country of net immigration, economic malaise in Portugal has definitely accelerated flight of Portuguese around the world, to points in western Europe and the rest of the Lusophone world in substantial numbers as far away as Angola. A new flow may yet form, of Brazilian farmers migrating to Mozambique.

Mozambique invites Brazilian soy, corn and cotton growers to plant on its savanna and introduce their farming know-how to sub-Saharan Africa, the head of Mato Grosso state’s cotton producers association Ampa said on Monday.

Brazil has been successfully growing crops on its centre-west plains since a breakthrough in tropical soybeans in the 1980s unlocked the productive potential of the expansive region by breeding soy to grow closer to equatorial regions.

While Mozambique possesses similar climatic and soil characteristics, Amapa president Carlos Ernesto Augustin told Reuters that some areas in the country on the southeast coast of Africa even had more fertile soils than Brazil.

“The price of the land there is too good to ignore,” said Mr. Augustin, who added that the risks inherent in buying Brazilian land as a producer were enormous because of high costs and stiff environmental regulations.

Producers who are granted concessions to plant would be required only to pay a tax of 21 reais per hectare ($5.30/acre U.S.), and would receive an exemption from import tariffs on farm equipment.

Prime productive land in Brazil’s developed south can run to 35,000 reais a hectare, compared with 5,000 reais in the extreme frontier regions of the centre-west and northeast savannas, where infrastructure is poor. Brazil’s import tariffs on farm equipment can also be steep.

[. . .]

“Mozambique is probably going to look a lot like Mato Grosso [Brazil’s leading soy state] 40 years ago,” Mr. Augustin said. “We are well-acquainted with the challenges of this type of frontier farming. Transport will be a concern.”


An offer is one thing, and it is true that there is interest on both sides in substantially strengthening ties between rising Brazil and terribly poor Mozambique. Will the offer be taken up by any significant number of Brazilian farmers and agricultural businesses? Will the interest be sustained? Watch this space for more.
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I've a post up at Demography Matters commenting on predictions that southern Europe will become impoverished and transformed into a Eurabian annex. No, this isn't true.
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I've a post up at Demography Matters taking a look at the dire situation in southern Europe, especially Portugal, where a stagnant economy and youth underemployment are fueling mass emigration on a worrisome scale. It's even inspired a pop hit, in Deolinda's "Parva que Sou".



Go, read and listen.
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  • Acts of Minor Treason and Steve Munro are both very unhappy with the tendency to automatically equate streetcars with light rails. This is just not so.

  • Derek Flack's photoessay, hosted at blogTO, showing the CPR tracks behind Dupont Street--i.e. my street of residence--was nice to see indeed. The photos provide nice, unexpected angles on the neighbourhoods I spend my time in.

  • The Burgh Diaspora notes that a major problem for troubled American cities lies in the inability of many of their residents, tied down by real estate, to move to more promising environs. Some kind of process that could encourage people who left to return with their skills (and perhaps investments) might work.

  • Eastern Approaches comments on the apparent end, but continuing tensions, in the name-spelling row between Poland and Lithuania.

  • Far Outliers records a Japanese-trained Dutch bankers impressions of 1960s America as a place marked by open hospitality and a troubling guilelessness.

  • Alex Harrowell, at A Fistful of Euros, thinks that the European Union has proven its worth by keeping Berlusconi from running Italy completely into the ground.

  • The Global Sociology Blog traces the global migration of soccer players, finding that while their movements trace historic pathways and reflect established connections, their movement is actually the product of at least five sorts of micromovements.

  • Passing Strangeness' [livejournal.com profile] pauldyre shows how the accidental release of mustard gas off the southern Italian coast in the Second World War, causing hundreds of dead, actually helped save millions of live through cancer treatments.

  • The Power and the Money's Noel Maurer argues that things look fairly bright for Portugal, with plausible projections suggesting renewed growth and the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and impressive and potentially quite productive investments in infrastructure and new technologies, too.

  • The Search's Douglas Todd writes about self-righteous greens. Ethics aside, that's just bad politics.

  • Slap Upside the Head suggests that, with a resolution of the Québec segment of the New Democratic Party, Canadians are well on their way towards stripping organizations offering cures for homosexuality of charitable status, on the New Zealand model.

  • Spacing Toronto applauds the well-designed, multi-use parking lots of Portland OR.

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Over at the Power and the Money, Noel Maurer convinces me that the East Timorese purchase of Portuguese debt actually makes sense from a business perspective.

Portuguese bonds are a pretty good investment. The 10-year bond is yielding 6.7% — that’s 2.7 times the yield on German bonds. Unless Portugal repudiates past-due interest payments (and in postwar debt restructurings, only Argentina has done that) bondholders would come out ahead as long as the haircut on debt principal is less than 25%. (To be fair, the math is a bit more complicated, because it depends on when Portugal defaults, but that serves to make the bonds more attractive.) In other words, the East Timorese deal is far from charity.

[. . . The purchase has the obvious additional benefit of buying some Portuguese goodwill, which ain’t nothing, considering that Portuguese aid averaged €42.6 million per year between 1999 and 2009. Moreover, Portugal has been cutting foreign aid significantly, so buying goodwill could have a big return. Considering that East Timor will earn €34.4 million per year on its investment, that is a pretty cheap way to buy goodwill.

From Portugal’s point-of-view, however, there is no charity. First, the loan is a drop in the bucket compared to the country’s total debt of €145 billion. Second, the loan is being made at commercial rates, and will involve buying existing sovereign debt, not the provision of new money. Third, it might not all involve Portuguese sovereign debt: the Timorese authorities have added the following weasel words: “Investments could be made in highly successful public or quasi-governmental enterprises that guarantee high returns.” Considering that $700 million is a legal maximum for East Timor, which has to invest 90% of its assets in U.S. Treasury bonds, the implication is that the Portuguese government will get less than that.

In other words, Portugal will get a small amount of help from a source with every incentive to lend it money regardless of political connections.


At least noteworthy is the fact that East Timor has the money to invest, having put its oil revenues in a well-managed investment fund. If I read Noel correctly, moderate optimism about the long-term future of this fund--and, one may infer, East Timor--is justified.
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Huh. Inter Press Service's Mario do Queiroz came up with another interesting story.

With the announcement that his country is ready to buy Portuguese debt, the president of East Timor, José Ramos-Horta, set a precedent in international economic relations that was universally praised in political and financial circles in this southern European country.

The president of one of the poorest countries on the planet, whose per capita income of 600 dollars ranks it 130th in the world, offered a hand to its former colonial power to help it weather the financial crisis.

"I don't see difficulties for East Timor, in terms of buying Portuguese debt," Ramos-Horta said Sunday on a visit to the former Portuguese enclave of Macao in China, where he announced that the government of Prime Minister José Alexandre Xanana Gusmão had decided to diversify investments by East Timor's petroleum fund.

The oil fund was established by the government in 2005 to receive and distribute billions of dollars in tax revenue from emerging oil and gas projects in the Timor Sea, with the aim of ensuring the proper distribution of the earnings.

The president added that other investments could be made in highly successful public or quasi-governmental enterprises that guarantee high returns, such as companies in telecoms or renewable energy, an area in which Portugal is a world leader.

On Monday, State Budget Secretary Emanuel dos Santos described Ramos-Horta's announcement as "a gesture of friendship."

According to initial projections, East Timor's investment in Portugal, slated for next year, could total one billion dollars.

However, the Diario Económico newspaper of Lisbon put the amount at 700 million dollars, because the East Timor oil fund is worth around seven billion dollars and by law, 90 percent of the assets must be invested in U.S. Treasury bonds.


The article goes on to describe new Brazilian and Angolan investment projects in Portugal, a phenomenon also described in an earlier IPS article.

The idea that Portugal may receive substantial amounts of aid-cum-investment from its colonies--all of which have GDP per capitas well below the Portuguese average, recent growth notwithstanding, only one of which has a GDP larger than Portugal's (although admittedly Brazil's a huge exception to this)--is an interesting inversion of the standard postcolonial paradigm. It says much about the current weakness of Portugal, and at least as much about the strength of Portugal's more fortunate ex-colonies. It also suggests that, in one critical way, Portugal's integration with the European Union and the Eurozone isn't going to be as complete as (say) that of Greece or many other peripheral Eurozone countries, simply because Portugal is a periphery of the Lusophone world in addition to the Eurozone. Competition's never a bad thing, at least.
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While discussion about the reasons for Canada's failed bid for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council is ongoing, emphasizing Canadian foreign policy, [livejournal.com profile] absinthe_ca pointed me to some surprisingly intelligent analyses of the situation from David Frum. Canadian foreign policy may have contributed, but broader international politics played a critical role. Canada belongs to a voting bloc that includes western European countries, like (say) winners Germany and Portugal; this has complications.

The Western European and others group nominated not the requisite two candidates, but instead three: Germany and Portugal, as well as Canada. By nominating three, the Western European and Others bloc forfeited its right of decision. That looks like an unwise act. Why did it happen?

The answer has nothing to do with Kyoto or Israel, and everything to do with the internal politics of the European Union. It’s the European Union countries that dominate the Western bloc. Increasingly, the EU countries have been negotiating these UN nominations among themselves first. They decide that they want Germany and Portugal — and then they muscle their way through the rest of the bloc onto the UN floor.

[. . .]

European Union bloc voting gives the EU unintended clout within the Security Council. Remember, Eastern Europe is also a bloc, and it gets one seat on the Security Council, currently held by Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not yet a EU member, but it would dearly like to be, and so would other members of the Eastern European group. The EU can pressure EU applicants into complying with EU wishes, even against a supposed EU ally like Canada.


Meanwhile, Brazil's geopolitical heft may have led to the United States' not choosing between Canada and its Lusophone European ally.

Of the five seats that open in January 2011, one belongs to the Latin American bloc.

This seat will go to Colombia. The seating of Colombia is a deserved accolade for a democracy that has successfully battled terrorism and drug gangs. Colombia’s seating also represents a diplomatic victory for the United States: Colombia is a close U.S. ally and a target of subversion from Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

How did the United States score this victory? Answer: with a lot of help from rising regional heavyweight, Brazil. (Brazil also helped the United States stop a Venezuelan bid for the Security Council back in 2006. The seat went instead to Guatemala.)

But when a country like Brazil offers help, it usually expects some kind of payback. Portuguese-speaking Brazil feels a special relationship with its former metropole, Portugal. And we know that Brazil campaigned hard for Portugal in the General Assembly vote.

[. . .]

In the early 2000s, Germany had launched a quixotic bid for a permanent Security Council seat. That bid went nowhere. But as a consolation prize the other European countries agreed to give Germany another early turn in a temporary seat — even though Germany had had a turn very recently, in 2003-2004.

Accelerating Germany’s next turn in this way threatened to displace small country Portugal, which had not had a turn since the 1990s. Portugal declined to stand down.

The United States might have tried to pressure Portugal — but didn’t, because it needed Brazil’s help with the Colombian nomination. Thus, two Western European candidacies went forward at the same time as Canada’s.

Although the United States preferred Canada’s nomination over Portugal’s, the deal with Brazil required the United States to stay neutral between Portugal and Canada both in Brussels and then at the General Assembly.
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I, for one, welcome my Brazilian overlords? AFP's Thomas Cabral has more on how the linguistic hegemonism of Brazil is upsetting many Portuguese.

ortugal is finally applying a long-delayed accord to standardise spelling in Portuguese-speaking countries, but in random fashion that has left most residents baffled about how to use their alphabet.

Ironically, Portugal's press has taken the lead in using the new spelling while the government -- via the schools -- continues its hesitation waltz over a reform approved by parliament in 2008 after a 20-year debate.

"It is absurd," said Nuno Pacheco, co-director of one daily, the Publico, which has so far refused to enact "a reform full of contradictions".

"Our children read newspapers that do not use the same spelling they are taught at school," he said.

The confusion has revived an old sore point over what some saw as a David vs. Goliath battle -- only this time David lost: under the 1990 accord, spelling in the world's eight Portuguese-speaking countries moves to the more phonetic form employed by Brazil.

As opponents point out, the English and Americans co-exist as neighbours ... or neighbors, so why can't Portuguese-speaking countries do likewise.

"It is a bad spelling reform and a political instrument for the expansion of Brazil," said linguist Antonio Emiliano.

He and other critics see the reform, already in place in Brazil, as tantamount to Portugal's "cultural abdication" to the commercial power of its vast former colony -- which claims 190 million of the world's 230 million Portuguese speakers.

[. . .]

The uniform spelling is aimed at making Internet searches easier, legal documents more standard and promote a bigger market for film and book productions in the Lusophone countries -- a world from the ancient Roman province of Lusitania, today's Portugal.

Outside Portugal and Brazil, these include Angola, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea Buissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. Portuguese is also spoken in some Asian pockets, including the special Chinese administrative region of Macau and India's Goa state.

Under the reform, the consonants P and C -- which can sound very different in Rio, Lisbon or Maputo -- are removed where they are silent, as in Brazilian Portuguese. Words like "optimo" (great) or "direccao" (direction), as they have been spelled in Portugal, will become "otimo" and "direcao".

The reform also expands the Portuguese alphabet to 26 letters by adding K, W and Y, and includes some new rules for accents.
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I've got a post up at Demography Matters that provides a potted history of Portuguese emigration and links to Noel Maurer's ost on the surprising new destination for Portuguese emigrants. Go, read both of these posts.
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AFP examines the dwindling community of Eurasians, descendants of centuries-old Portuguese settlements, concentrated in the Malaysian port city of Malacca and a community threatened by assimilation..

George Paul Overee, a sprightly 78-year-old museum guide, greets newcomers with a cheerful "Bom dia" and listens to Portuguese folk music as he sits in his village square.

But like most of the Malaysian Portuguese community in the port city of Malacca, a living legacy of long-gone colonial days, he has never set foot in the country from whence his forefathers journeyed some 500 years ago.

As one of the oldest members of the community, he is intent on preserving this fascinating enclave, with its unique language and traditions, against the pressures of modernisation.

"My children have long left this place. I see my grandchildren every once in a while," Overee said as he guided a group of Chinese tourists through the tiny museum at Malacca's Portuguese settlement.

"But I will never accept that the people in this village will ever forget their culture. It should begin in the family, start speaking the language at home to the young and cultivate the culture," he said.

The Portuguese village, a strip of coastal land overlooking the Malacca Strait, is a hive of activity as community members mingle in the central square, and entertain scores of tourists during the holiday season.

"Tourists are curious about us and there are also many Portuguese who come by to visit and keep in touch with us," Overee said proudly as he played folk music from a CD sent by a tourist from Lisbon.

[. . .]

"Only the very old and the very young remain here and the working people are mostly away seeking better paid jobs in big cities like Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and even in Australia," said the village headman Peter Gomez.

"We make it a point to keep the festivals every year so that they have an opportunity to get recharged with their culture and the language," he said.

"We are afraid that the culture and the heritage may disappear altogether."
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The Inter Press Service has recently posted three articles that struck me as particularly interesting.


  • First came Marcela Valente's "Blogs – a Shortcut to Fame?", an article examining how some Argentine writers have been gaining national and international fame thanks to their blogging, winning awards and spinoffs and the like. The writers interviewed don't expect blogs to displace more conventional forms of literature, but rather to supplement and enrichen the media universe.
  • Servaas van den Bosch's "China in Africa – South-South Exploitation?" wonders, after observing the situation in Namibia, whether the ongoing influx of Chinese investment in Africa is actually helping the continent as a whole, with the frequent use of imported Chinese workers, the very low wages paid to African workers, and the undermining of local industry with cheap Chinese imports, additionally gaining a back door into European markets through the various Europe-ACP trade agreements.

  • Finally, Mario de Queiroz interviews East Timorese president José Ramos-Horta on the subject of East Timor. Ramos-Horta hopes that oil exploitation and good agriculture will help East Timor grow out of its structural poverty, the products of more than four centuries of Portuguese colonialism on top of the devastating Indonesian occupation and continuing political instability.

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This afternoon I'll be flying out to my native Prince Edward Island, a province on the Atlantic coast of Canada, for my first visit in nearly three and a half years. I'm looking forward to seeing friends and family again, but I'm more wary about the changes that have surely visited the province. I'm not convinced that many of these have been for the better, between the loss of the 2013 Island Games, the lifting of the ban on beer and soda cans, what looks like the imminent closure of Woodleigh Replicas & Gardens so soon after Fairy Land and Rainbow Valley (Rainbow Valley!), the export of our blue whale skeleton, and the ludicrous-sounding optimism of operators that this summer will be a good tourist season despite rising fuel costs and the strong Canadian dollar. Still, we'll see.

On a completely unrelated note, people still interested may be interested to know that The Globe and Mail's Rhéal Séguin suggests that Ms. Couillard may have been an informant for the Sûrete du Québec, the Québec provincial police.

While I'm gone, here are some interesting links for you to peruse.


  • Over at Alpha Sources, Claus Vistesen argues that Brazil may be coming into its own as a global economic power.

  • Amused Cynicism's Phil Hunt tells us that British terrorists, like their Canadian counterparts, can be almost laughably stupid.

  • [livejournal.com profile] angel80 points out that the recently discovered uncontacted tribe in the Brazilian Amazon may be doomed given the rate of deforestation.

  • 'Aqoul's The Lounsbury links to Gideon Rachmann's Financial Times column "On Israel and the campaign bus", which points out that the Untied States has played an increasingly unproductive and self-destructive role in the Middle East thanks in part to the unconditional support lent by evangelical Christians to hard-right Israelis.

  • blogTO covers the recent cyclists' protest on the Gardiner Expressway that managed to shut down much of that west-east coastal traffic artery for hours, as does Torontoist.

  • Edward Hugh argues that much of the recent surge in Vietnamese inflation can be traced to impending labour shortages caused by the country's rapid demographic transition.

  • Crooked Timber's John Quiggin started a very interesting discussion on the United States' historical memory, or lack thereof, of the First World War. Many of the commenters suggest that ethnic divisions at home may have made the conflict too painful to remember for most.

  • Daniel Drezner tackles the Sharon Stone issue with decidedly good (or at least snarky) humour.

  • In another excerpt from Michael Burleigh's Sacred Causes, Far Outliers explores the anticlericalism of the Second Spanish Republic and the surprisingly sharp decline in religious observance that had been ongoing since at least the late 19th century.

  • Otto Spejkers at The Invisible College provides coverage of the Mothers of Srebrenica's lawsuit against the United Nations, demanding reparations for the United Nations' unwillingness to stop the genocide there.

  • Language Hat features coverage of the reaction to the decision to standardize the Portuguese language according to Brazilian norms, regardless of Portuguese protests.

  • Spacing Toronto coverage of the recent proposal to tear down a good chunk of the Gardiner Expressway, opening up direct line-of-sight connections between Toronto and Lake Ontario for the first time in decades.

  • Strange Maps features a map of Europe's goblin distribution.


Finally, everybody welcome Noel Maurer's new blog, Of Arawaks, Archives, and a Good Cigar! It's now on the sidebar.
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Although the recent coup attempt in East Timor, the East Timorese government was not decapitated and Ramos-Horta survived his shooting, the whole episode underlines the fragility of the East Timorese state. Some of the press coverage has explored how East Timor is caught between Indonesia and Australia, as the two countries' security, economic, and political concerns in East Timor lead to their deeper engagement with the island state. This makes it all the most interesting how energetically the East Timorese government has been promoting Portuguese as the national language, not the Bahasa Indonesia or English of these neighbours.

Portuguese is a major world language and the Lusophone world comprises more than two hundred million people, two trillion dollars worth of GDP and just under ten millions of square kilometers of land area, but the language and the world are both overwhelmingly concentrated in the Atlantic world, in Portugal, in Brazil, in an increasingly Lusophone Angola, and in the island groups (Sao Tome e Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde) dispersed in the Atlantic Ocean between these three countries, with Mozambique being the major outlier. East of Mozambique, in the Indian Ocean basin that Portugal once dominated in the 16th century, the Portuguese language has signally failed to entrench itself as a language of wider communication, and the Portuguese communities on the Indian Ocean have dwindled. Even in the Indian state of Goa, Portuguese until 1961, the language and heritage of Portugal seem to be mainly of folkloric and touristic importance. The Bahasa Indonesia of East Timor's most recent colonizer and the English of East Timor's patron are much more important in East Timor's neighbourhood.

Despite all this, East Timor still became the eighth member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the Lusophone equivalent of the Organisation de la Francophonie, and has since worked energetically to promote knowledge of Portuguese among the younger generations of East Timorese, who had been kept by the Indonesian occupation from picking the language up from their elders. (This 2002 Associated Press article describes how the East Timorese government recruited Portuguese teachers intensive education program in the Portuguese language.) Why? Geoffrey Hull in a 2000 piece for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation ("Portuguese in East Timor", argued that Portuguese was a natural choice because it was deeply implanted in East Timorese culture by more than three centuries of Portuguese presence. This line is backed up by Andrea K. Molnar, who argues that Portuguese gives East Timor a special place in a wider universe of Lusophone countries, decisively separating East Timor from a formerly hegemonic Indonesia. All this is true, but as The New York Times observed in 2007, the selection of Portuguese has imposed significant costs on East Timor.

The rumble of a generator and the whir of ceiling fans muffled the quiet words of a judge as he questioned a witness in a murder trial here one recent hot, still afternoon.

But even if they could have heard him, most of the people sprinkled through the little courtroom, including the defendant and the witnesses, could not have understood what he was saying.

The judge was speaking in Portuguese, the newly designated language of the courts, the schools and the government--a language that most people in East Timor cannot speak.

The most widely spoken languages in this former Portuguese colony are Tetum, the dominant local language, and Indonesian, the language of East Timor’s giant neighbor.

For a quarter of a century, Portuguese had been a dying tongue, spoken only by an older generation. It was banned after Indonesia annexed the territory in 1975 and imposed its own language.

In a disorienting reverse, a new Constitution re-imposed Portuguese after East Timor became independent in 2002. The marginalized became mainstream again, and the mainstream was marginalized.

Linguistic convenience was sacrificed to politics and sentiment. In a nation that had never governed itself and had few cultural symbols to unite it, this language of resistance to the Indonesian occupiers was an emblem--particularly to the older generation--of freedom and national identity.


Despite intensive efforts, it doesn't seem as if enough East Timorese are fluent in Portuguese to avoid serious problems at every levels of society, from the government bureaucracies which work (supposedly) in Portuguese people to the villagers whose education is hindered by the requirement that they learn a language they have no familiarity with and no access to on a day-to-day basis. East Timor may yet become as Lusophone as the other seven members of the CPLP, but there are going to be plenty of speedbumps on the way.
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When I disembarked from the TTC bus at the corner of Dufferin and Dupont, I was interested to see that the Dupont Avenue street sign was labelled, in smaller type, "Rua do Alentejo." Taken from the south-central Portuguese province of the same name, like Dundas Street's label "Rua Açores" near my old neighbourhood, this street sign is ample testimony to the prominence of Portuguese Canadians in west-central Toronto.

This community is a young one, celebrating its 50th anniversary in 2003, after the arrival of the first significant group of Portuguese immigrants in Canada. Post-war Canada's need for labour and Portugal's political and economic backwardness prompted a massive population shift to Canada, in particular Toronto. Carlos Teixeira's extensive essay at Multicultural Canada provides an excellent overview.

Four decades after their first arrival in Canada, the Portuguese have communities from coast to coast. In 1991 most lived in Ontario (202,395), Quebec (42,975), British Columbia (23,380), Alberta (9,755), and Manitoba (9,530). Though many came to work on farms or railways, most settled in cities. In 1991 Toronto had 124,325 residents of Portuguese origin; Montreal, 32,330; Kitchener, Ontario, 13,755; Hamilton, 9,625; Vancouver, 9,255; Winnipeg, 7,970; Ottawa-Hull, 6,580; London, 6,330; and Edmonton, 4,685.

The pioneers lived in deteriorated, low-income, working-class neighbourhoods in the heart of the cities, on the margins of emerging central business districts, near jobs and transportation. The majority were single individuals who resided in low-rental flats, tenements, and rooming-houses – often with relatives or friends from the same village/region of Portugal – in order to save to buy a house and to bring over relatives from Portugal.

Portuguese colonies began taking shape in the 1960s. The steady increase in immigration and the constant arrival of entire families, through chain sponsorship, consolidated immigrant neighbourhoods. Often two or three families shared the same house or apartment/flat. The majority of these immigrants came from rural areas of Portugal, particularly in the Azores, and lacked knowledge of English or French, skills, and money. These districts functioned as reception areas, offering information and security, but also tended to isolate Portuguese from the host society.

Portuguese communities in Canada tend to be self-contained and self-sufficient. Their remarkable level of institutional completeness is demonstrated by the number of social and cultural institutions (198, including 111 in Ontario), religious institutions (thirty-eight churches), and ethnic businesses (over forty-six hundred, with some thirty-five hundred in Ontario), most located within the core of the communities. In 1981 Portuguese Canadians were among the most segregated groups in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.


The Portuguese Canadian community remains a tight one to this very day, though sometimes with negative consequences as recently reported ("Charting a new course") by the Toronto Star's education reporter Louise Brown.

“As a community, we’re proud of our ability to preserve our culture — but this is Canada! We have to nail down English! We have to create an environment that expects children to succeed at school,” said [Melissa] Arruda, 22, the youngest member of the new Portuguese-Canadian Education Network.

“Only four out of my 40 Portuguese classmates from grade school went on to university. Not that everyone has to go, but more of us should feel we at least have that choice.”

This is the new face of Portuguese Canada; seeking to rewrite the future by understanding how its children fell behind, and focusing on parents and schools to close the gap.

Fifty years after the first major wave of Portuguese immigrants landed in Canada — from one of the few countries where attending high school had not been mandatory for most of the 20th century — they remain to this day the least likely new Canadians to go to college or university. About 12 per cent of Toronto’s Portuguese community now earn a university degree — a far cry from only 1 per cent in 1971, but about one-third as many as in the population at large, according to a study this year by York University professor Michael Ornstein.

Some Portuguese community leaders admit that a culture with deep roots in skilled labour, which often has prized home ownership above higher education, may make it too easy for weak students — especially boys — to quit school for the heady $25 to $30 an hour to be made in construction.

But with more than 70 per cent of new jobs in Canada predicted to need some post-secondary training, many Portuguese-Canadians want to break that blue-collar cycle.

“We helped build this city. We help clean this city. Now we’d like to help run this city,” said lawyer Cidalia Faria, an assistant Crown attorney, at a recent standing-room-only conference for Portuguese parents run by the education network.

“Don’t think we’re asleep at the wheel — the Portuguese community has got its eyes wide open,” said Marcie Ponte, executive director of the Working Women’s Community Centre, which runs a free tutoring program called On Your Mark. But why do Portuguese Canadians still drop out in such numbers? It doesn’t help that some teachers and principals seem to have given up on the community, said high school English teacher Ana Fernandes, chair of the Portuguese Canadian Education Network.

“I hear that a lot: `Oh, he’s a Portuguese student; what can you expect?’ or `He’s Portuguese? Better give him just five pages to read instead of 10,’.” said Fernandes, who is working on her PhD in literature. Fernandes said Portuguese students need more role models.

Others say schools could do more to reach out to Portuguese parents and include material of interest to Portuguese Canadians in the curriculum.

“We’re still a massively working class community and a lot of parents don’t know where to go for help for their children, between the education barrier and the language barrier and shift work,” said professor Fernando Nunes, vice-president of the Portuguese-Canadian National Congress.

He added the curriculum makes very little mention of the Portuguese community’s contributions to Canada.

Some admit its tight-knit nature — in which it is possible to live and shop in Portuguese neighbourhoods and work on predominantly Portuguese job sites without ever needing to speak much English — plays a role in keeping children in the same footsteps as their parents.

At St. Helen Catholic School in Little Portugal, for example, 89 per cent of students were born in Canada, yet for 61 per cent, the first language they learned at home was not English.
rfmcdonald: (Default)
Portuguese rule in Angola ended very badly. Portugal is to Angola what France is to Algeria, or Britain to Ireland, that is to say, the colonizer left to deal with the colonized. The main difference is that Portugal-Angola have shared a rather more traumatic mutual history. Imagine, for comparison's sake, that the French war in Algeria was waged not by the reasonably democratic Fourth Republic but rather by a repressive right-wing fascist dictatorship that had mishandled things to the point that a goodly chunk of the French population had emigrated, and that the insane unwinnable war only ended with a successful left-wing coup by elements of the military that promptly segued into a minor years-long revolution. Portuguese disengagement, as chronicled by Ryszard Kapuscinski in his Another Day of Life, remains a case study of how not to decolonize.

At least Portugal's disengagement from Angola was mercifully quick for the Portuguese. Angola, in the meantime, was left with a three-way civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of people, sowed so many landmines as to make great swathes of the country uninhabitable, and made the country the poorest in the world. The dead remain dead and the landmines remain as devillishly impossible to extract as ever. The economy is booming, though, oil exports propelling an economy projected to grow by 27.9% in 2006. If Angola's oil reserves prove as plentiful as some people hope, Angola's growing population of 11 million people might manage to make it to a better future, assuming as always that the rampant corruption and theft of the country doesn't dissipate everything.

Now, thirty-one years after it left, Portugal is returning to its former colony. Humanitarian issues aren't motivating this reengagement, though Portugal is sending school teachers to bolster a fragile Angolan educational system. Cultural issues play a role, thanks to the two countries' membership in the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and the continuing growth of Angolan Portuguese but not much of a role. The attractive economics of Angolan oil and Portugal's flagging economy, rather, justified the recent visit of Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates to Angola, leading a team of businessmen ready to sign contracts on the model of Jean Chrétien's Team Canada government-backed trade missions. If Angola is booming, then Portugal is stagnating, a multi-year recession leaving Portuguese companies that had prospered in the growth years of the 1990s stranded. Brazil has its own domestic champions; Angola, now, not nearly so much.

The result is an increasing Portuguese entanglement in the affairs of its largest former African colony. Now, almost half of the turnover of Portuguese construction company Soares da Costa comes from Angola, while Portuguese banks are making a nice profit thanks to their entrenchment on the ground in a country that really didn't have a modern banking system. There is even talk of a new talk of a Portuguese-Angolan strategic partnership. In the Lusophone world, Portugal is always necessarily going to remain in second place behind the subcontinental giant of Brazil, with its trillion-dollar economy and large Angolan-origin population and overwhelming cultural influence. There's still some niches for Portugal, though, and quickly modernizing and Lusophonizing Angola isn't likely to object. Why bother when there's so much cash floating around?
rfmcdonald: (Default)
If you go to Wikpedia's page on the demographics of Portugal, you'll see this image prominently featured. For those of you uninterested in going to Wikipedia, that image is a graphical representation of the evolution of the Portuguese population since 1960s. The numbers of dips and valleys is remarkable: Portugal's population reached nine million in 1964, dipped sharply to a nadir of less than 8.7 million in 1970, shot up to ten million by 1984 before shrinking by another one hundred thousand people by 1991, finally resuming a slow growth path that has taken the Portuguese population almost to 10.1 million.

Why? Mass death wasn't the cause of these occasional shrinkages, while Portugal's fertility rate--though below replacement levels,--has never been that low. Emigration, rather, si the result. leaving the country has long been a profitably strategy for Portuguese hoping to improve their standard of living and future prospects, as Portugal's Library of Congress study notes.

Emigration on a massive scale began in the second half of the nineteenth century and continued into the 1980s. Between 1886 and 1966, Portugal lost an estimated 2.6 million people to emigration, more than any West European country except Ireland. Emigration remained high until 1973 and the first oil shock that slowed the economies of West European nations and reduced employment opportunities for Portuguese workers. Since then, emigration has been moderate, ranging between 12,000 and 17,000 a year in the 1980s, a fraction of the emigration that occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The main motive for emigration, at least in modern times, was economic. Portugal was long among the poorest countries in Europe. With the countryside able to support only a portion of farmers' offspring and few opportunities in the manufacturing sector, many Portuguese had to go abroad to find work. In northern Portugal, for example, many young men emigrated because the land was divided into "handkerchief-sized" plots. In some periods, Portuguese emigrated to avoid military service. Thus, emigration increased during World War I and during the 1960s and early 1970s, when Portugal waged a series of wars in an attempt to retain its African colonies.


As Mario da Queiroz wrote back in July, this poverty--along with the repessive Salazar regime and the pointless colonial wars in Africa, ended up producing a population of five million Portuguese living in other countries around the world. This tradition of emigration has slowed down, but it's interesting to note that starting just before Portugal joined the then-European Community in 1986 and cotninuing until the early 1990s a second wave of Portuguese emigration, amounting perhaps to several percent of the Portuguese population, took off. Another wave of emigration may yet be beginning, since (as da Queiroz observes) Portugal's relatively low levels of productivity relative to the new central European states, China, and India leaves its economy quite vulnerable. Portugal has experienced a relative decline of late, its GDP per capita having been recently surpassed by the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Unlike those two countries, which have become more lands of immigration than emigration, Portugal is still early. There's no reason why Portugal can't be a land of multiple immigrations and emigrations, with new workers coming from eastern Europe and Latin America to replace native-born Portuguese who've left for points elsewhere in Europe. Compare this trend to the strategy, of Poles, Lithuanians and Latvians, of emigrating to the United Kingdom and Ireland.

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